Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade by Galvin, Harriett R.




Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal
Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade
Harriett R. Galvin
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Galvin, Harriett R., "Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade" (1986). Minnesota
Law Review. 1433.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1433
Shielding Rape Victims in the State and




Introduction and Statutory Survey ......................... 764
I. The Backdrop to Reform: Evidentiary
Considerations ........................................ 777
A. The General Rule ................................ 778
B. Exceptions to the General Rule .................. 781
C. A "Nonexception": Evidence of Other Crimes,
Wrongs, or Acts .................................. 788
II. The Rape-Law Reform Movement ................... 791
A. The Origins of Rape-Law Reform ............... 791
B. Constitutional Problems with Rape-Shield
Legislation ........................................ 802
III. An Alternative Legislative Solution .................. 808
IV. Analysis and Critique of Existing Rape-Shield
Legislation ............................................ 812
A. The Michigan Approach ......................... 812
1. Bases of Admissibility of Sexual Conduct
Evidence Under the Michigan Approach:
The Statutory Exceptions ..................... 815
a. Evidence of sexual conduct between the
complainant and the accused .............. 815
b. Evidence of specific instances of sexual
conduct to prove an alternative source of
the physical consequences of the alleged
rape ........................................ 818
c. Evidence of sexual conduct tending to
* Assistant Professor, Ohio State University College of Law. I am very
grateful to Francis X. Beytagh and James E. Meeks, present and former Ohio
State Law Deans, for their generous support for this Article; Professors Vivian
Berger, Daniel C.K. Chow, Lawrence Herman, and Nancy H. Rogers, who read
and commented on an earlier draft; Jeffrey C. Moore and Thomas M. Wood,
who assisted with research; and Debra S. Hylton, who processed these words.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
prove the complainant's bias or motive to
fabricate the charge ....................... 825
d. Evidence of a pattern of sexual conduct
similar to the charged sexual conduct
offered to prove consent .................. 830
e. Evidence of sexual conduct offered to
prove a mistaken belief in consent ........ 848
f. Evidence of sexual conduct offered to
rebut the state's proof ..................... 854
g. Evidence of the complainant's prior false
allegations of rape ......................... 858
h. Relevant sexual conduct evidence for
which no exception exists in any of the
Michigan-style statutes .................... 863
2. Summary of the Michigan Approach ......... 871
B. The Texas Approach ............................. 876
C. The Federal Approach ........................... 883
D. The California Approach ......................... 894
Conclusion .................................................. 903
A ppendix ................................................... 906
Table 1 ...................................................... 906
Table 2 ...................................................... 908
Table 3 ...................................................... 912
Table 4 ...................................................... 914
Table 5 ...................................................... 916
INTRODUCTION AND STATUTORY SURVEY
Speaking in support of the Privacy Protection for Rape
Victims Act of 1978,' then-Representative Elizabeth Holtzman
made the following statement on the floor of the House of
Representatives:
Too often in this country victims of rape are humiliated and harrassed
[sic] when they report and prosecute the rape. Bullied and cross-ex-
amined about their prior sexual experiences, many find the trial al-
most as degrading as the rape itself. Since rape trials become
inquisitions into the victim's morality, not trials of the defendant's in-
nocence or guilt, it is not surprising that it is the least reported crime.
It is estimated that as few as one in ten rapes is ever reported.2
1. Pub. L. No. 95-540, 92 Stat. 2046. This Act resulted in FED. R. EvD.
412, the federal rape-shield law, which became effective in trials commencing
after November 28, 1978. This was the first addition to the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which went into effect on July 1, 1975, see Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub.
L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
2. 124 CONG. REC. 34,913 (1978) (statement of Rep. Holtzman). Holtz-
man, the bill's principal sponsor, and other proponents urged Congress to
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These remarks succinctly capture the impetus behind the
nationwide reform of evidentiary law applicable to rape prose-
cutions that swept through state legislatures and Congress in
the Inid-1970's.3 Rape-shield laws, as they are popularly known,
reversed the long-standing common-law doctrine that permit-
ted a defendant accused of rape to inquire into the complain-
ant's4 "character for unchastity," that is, her 5 propensity to
adopt the bill on the further ground that it would provide a model for state
reform. See id.; 124 CONG. REc. 36,256 (1978) (statement of Sen. Bayh); Pro-
tection for the Privacy of Rape Victims, 14 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 1902
(Oct. 30, 1978) (statement of President Carter on signing the bill). Over half of
the states, however, had already adopted rape-shield laws at the time Congress
acted. 124 CONG. REc. 34,913 (1978) (statement of Rep. Holtzman). The states'
leadership regarding rape-shield legislation was in contrast to Congress's lead-
ership role in the realm of evidentiary reform generally, see 1 J. WEINSTEIN &
M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE T-1 (Supp. 1985) (twenty-nine states have
adopted various forms of the Federal Rules of Evidence). This contrast is un-
derstandable considering that so few rape cases are tried in the federal courts.
See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
3. For a list of state and federal statutes restricting the admissibility of
sexual conduct evidence in rape trials, see infra app. (Table 1). The first such
statute was passed in Michigan in 1974. See Act of Aug. 12, 1974, 1974 Mich.
Pub. Acts 1025, 1028-29 (codified as amended at MCH. Comp. LAws ANN.
§ 750.520j (West Supp. 1985)). By 1976, over half of the states had enacted
rape-shield statutes in some form. See Berger, Man's Tria Women's Tribula-
tion" Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 32 (1977). At pres-
ent, forty-eight states, the federal government, and the military have such
provisions. The admissibility of sexual conduct evidence in Arizona is re-
stricted by judicial decision. See State ex. rel Pope v. Superior Court, 113 Ariz.
22, 29, 545 P.2d 946, 953 (1976) (subject to certain enumerated exceptions, evi-
dence of a rape complainant's prior sexual conduct is inadmissible). Utah has
no rape-shield statute. See State v. Howard, 544 P.2d 466, 470 (Utah 1975) (evi-
dence of complainant's unchaste character is admissible "where there is thus a
genuine and critical issue as to consent").
There is extensive commentary on rape-shield laws. See infra notes 14,
28, 31, 33. The following sources are particularly valuable: 23 C. WRIGHT & K.
GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 5381-5393 (1980); Berger,
supra; Letwin, "Unchaste Character," Ideology, and the California Rape Evi-
dence Laws, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 35 (1980); Ordover, Admissibility of Patterns of
Similar Sexual Conduct" The Unlamented Death of Character for Chastity, 63
CORNELL L. REv. 90 (1977); Tanford & Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws
and the Sixth Amendmen4 128 U. PA. L. REV. 544 (1980).
4. In this Article, the term "complainant" will be used to describe the
person making the accusation. "Victim" will be used when discussing cases
that resulted in a rape conviction. The designation "prosecutrix" is fast be-
coming obsolete because of feminist assertions that it evokes an image of a vin-
dictive woman whose testimony is suspect. See S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST
OUR WILL 386 (1975); 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 3, § 5382, at 510,
§ 5384, at 538.
5. Throughout this Article the male gender is used to refer to a perpetra-
tor and the female gender is used to refer to a victim of rape and related of-
fenses. Although many sexual assault statutes are presently cast in gender-
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engage in consensual sexual relations outside of marriage.6 Ev-
idence of previous sexual conduct was deemed relevant at com-
mon law7 on the issue of whether the rape complainant had
consented to sexual relations on the occasion in question 8 -a
complete defense, if established, to a charge of forcible rape.
Some courts further permitted such evidence of unchastity to
be used to impeach a complainant's credibility on the theory
that "promiscuity imports dishonesty."9
neutral terms, see infra note 18, the vast majority of victims are female. See
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULL. 1, THE CRIME OF
RAPE (Mar. 1985) (reports National Crime Survey estimate of 123,000 male
rape victims compared to 1,511,000 female victims between 1973-82) [hereinaf-
ter cited as STATISTICS].
6. "Chastity" denotes abstention from premarital or extramarital sexual
intercourse. See State v. Bird, 302 So. 2d 589, 592 (La. 1974).
7. Indeed, such evidence was admissible even in modern codifications
before the states enacted rape-shield laws. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2) ad-
visory committee note ("[A]n accused may introduce pertinent evidence of the
character of the victim, as in support of a claim of... consent in a case of rape
.... "); CAL. EvID. CODE § 1103 law revision commission note (West 1966) ("[I]t
is well settled that in a rape case the defendant may show the unchaste char-
acter of the prosecutrix by evidence of prior voluntary intercourse in order to
indicate the unlikelihood of resistance on the occasion in question."). The
rapid turnabout in legislative attitudes toward unchaste character evidence is
demonstrated by the fact that Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2) was enacted
in 1975, only three years before Congress passed the federal rape-shield stat-
ute. See sup'a note 1. Indeed, Congress apparently gave no serious considera-
tion to restricting the use of unchaste character evidence during hearings on
the rules of evidence. See Proposed Rules of Evidence, 1973: Hearings Before
the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
In the event of a conflict between Rule 412 and Rule 404(a)(2), Rule 412
controls because it applies "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law."
FED. R. EvID. 412(a), (b).
8. See infra notes 94-109 and accompanying text. Although statutory
definitions vary, the gravamen of the crime of rape is nonconsensual sexual
intercourse. R. PERKINs & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAw 197-200 (3d ed. 1982).
For a discussion of the consent standard, see generally Note, Towards a Con-
sent Standard in the Law of Rape, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 613 (1976). "Forcible
rape," which involves the use of force or the threat to use force, is different
from "statutory rape," which involves nonforcible sexual intercourse with mi-
nors who are deemed incapable of giving consent. See R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE,
supra, at 198. Finally, there are the rare cases of nonforcible sexual inter-
course that are presumed to be nonconsensual due to the victim's mental inca-
pacity or unconsciousness, or the perpetrator's fraudulent conduct. See
generally Puttkammer, Consent in Rape, 19 Nw. U.L. REv. 410, 416 (1925)
("No doubt seems to be felt anywhere that a woman so imbecile as not to
know what is occurring about her is not capable of consenting to the sexual
act."). In this Article, unless otherwise indicated, "rape" refers to forcible
rape.




Pressure for evidentiary reform came from an unusual and
uneasy alliance of feminist organizations and law enforcement
agencies. 10 These groups persuaded legislators that in-court dis-
closure of the most intimate details of the rape complainant's
personal life acted as a significant deterrent to the reporting
and, hence, the prosecution of rape.1 ' They further maintained
that such "character assassination" in open court, a common de-
fense strategy in forcible rape prosecutions, 2 accounted for the
high rate of acquittal in those cases that proceeded to trial.1 3
Most important, a growing body of feminist literature ques-
tioned the traditional rationale that a woman's unchastity has
probative value on the question of whether or not she was
raped.14
Indeed, the burgeoning Women's Movement' 5 did not seize
simply on one outmoded evidentiary concept as a target of re-
10. See infra notes 130-131, 159-162 and accompanying text. For a thor-
ough discussion of the "politics" of rape-shield legislation, see 23 C. WRIGHT &
K. GRAHAM, supra note 3, § 5382; NATIONAL INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT &
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FORCIBLE RAPE, AN ANALYSIS OF
LEGAL ISSUES 46-47 (1978) [hereinafter cited as FORCIBLE RAPE]; Berger, supra
note 3, at 3-7; Letwin, supra note 3, at 4041; Loh, The Impact of Common Law
and Reform Rape Statutes on Prosecution: An Empirical Study, 55 WASH. L.
REV. 543, 556-76 (1980).
11. See People v. McKenna, 196 Colo. 367, 372, 585 P.2d 275, 278 (1978); 23
C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 3, § 5382, at 493-505; Berger, supra note
3, at 4-6; infra note 151 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 144-148 and accompanying text; 23 C. WRIGHT & K.
GRAHAM, supra note 3, § 5382, at 506; Berger, supra note 3, at 12-15.
13. See infra note 159; People v. McKenna, 196 Colo. 367, 372, 585 P.2d
275, 278 (1978); H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 249-55 (1966);
Berger, supra note 3, at 6, 29-30.
14. See, e.g., B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. Ross, SEx DIS-
CRIMINATION AND THE LAw 83943 (1975) [hereinafter cited as BABCOCK]; S.
BROWNMILLER, supra note 4, at 386; Berger, supra note 3, at 55-57; Ordover,
supra note 3, at 97-102; Washburn, Rape Law: The Need for Reform, 5 N.M.L.
REV. 279, 292-301 (1975); Note, The Victim in a Forcible Rape Case: A Femi-
nist View, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 335, 34345 (1973); Note, If She Consented
Once, She Consented Again-A Legal Fallacy in Forcible Rape Cases, 10 VAL.
U.L. REV. 127, 13749 (1976); Comment, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Soci-
ety and Law, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 919, 939 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
Sexism in Society]; Comment, The Rape Victim: A Victim of Society and the
Law, 11 WILLAmr L.J. 36, 49-54 (1974).
15. For a description of the resurgence of the Women's Movement in the
1960's, see generally J. FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION 44-70
(1975); J. HOLE & E. LEVINE, REBIRTH OF FEMNISM 15-167 (1971). The Na-
tional Organization for Women, which coordinated much of the rape-law re-
form lobbying effort, was formed in 1966. Its leadership was drawn from
women who had participated in the President's Conference on the Status of
Women and the Civil Rights Movement of the early 1960's. See Geis, Forcible
Rape: An Introduction, in FORCIBLE RAPE: THE CRIME, THE VICTIM, AND THE
1986]
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form. Rather, the Movement attacked the entire jurisprudence
of rape as an embodiment of stereotypes and attitudes highly
contemptuous of women.16 Police and prosecutors, seeking to
remove obstacles to the apprehension and conviction of offend-
ers, joined forces with women's groups; together they pushed
reform measures through legislatures with remarkable rapidity
and political acumen.17
On the substantive law front, a majority of states compre-
hensively revised their rape statutes. The new statutes cover a
wide variety of gender-neutral sexual assaults, displacing the
single offense of "carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and
against her will."1 8 Accompanying this change is a more flexi-
OFFENDER 4 (D. Chappel, R. Geis & G. Geis eds. 1977) [hereinafter cited as
Geis, An Introduction].
16. For a discussion of the feminist critique of rape law, see infra notes
130-179 and accompanying text. Earlier efforts by women's groups to target
prostitution for reform failed to attract wide support and produced ideological
divisions. Geis, An Introduction, supra note 15, at 4-5. Feminists found that
rape reform was an issue of widespread appeal that cut across class and race
lines. 1d. at 5; Loh, supra note 10, at 569; see also FORCIBLE RAPE, supra note
10, at 46 (Feminist attack on rape laws "was symbolic for these laws have re-
flected some of the most blatantly sexist attitudes of society."); 23 C. WRIGHT
& K. GRAHAM, supra note 3, § 5382, at 516-20 (As a political cause, the crime of
rape was "a powerful metaphor for the sort of oppression that many women
found in the traditional roles assigned to them in society.").
17. See FORCIBLE RAPE, supra note 10, at 2-4; Loh, supra note 10, at 567.
For an overview of specific legislative reforms, see generally H. FIELD & L.
BIENEN, JURORS AND RAPE 207-458 (1980) (state-by-state analysis of rape laws);
FORCIBLE RAPE, supra note 10, at 51-71 (state-by-state summary of rape legis-
lation as of Nov. 1976); Bienen, Rape 111-National Developments in Rape Re-
form Legislation, 6 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 170 (1980) (analysis of legislative
changes in the area of rape reform since 1976); Ireland, Rape Reform Legisla-
tion: A New Standard of Sexual Responsibility, 49 U. CoLO. L. REV. 185 (1978)
(discussion of various reforms of rape law).
By 1980, almost every state had passed some form of rape-reform legisla-
tion. The overall purpose of reform legislation was to remove sexist biases
from existing rape law and "treat rape more like other offenses." Berger,
supra note 3, at 12.
18. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 8, at 199. In addition to the Wo-
men's Movement and the "war on crime," a third force behind rape-law re-
form was the more general trend of codification of state criminal law. By the
late 1960's, over thirty jurisdictions had started or completed revisions based
upon the Model Penal Code of 1962. Loh, supra note 10, at 567-69; see also
FORCIBLE RAPE, supra note 10, at 46-47 (rape law changes in several states
have generally reflected the Model Penal Code revisions). A key feature of
the Code was to grade offenses by degree according to the level of the perpe-
trator's culpability.
With regard to rape law, recognition solely of the offense of nonconsen-
sual sexual intercourse with females was designed to protect female chastity,
which was essential to marriage and family life, rather than to protect the bod-
ily security and sexual freedom of all persons, chaste or unchaste. See infra
[Vol. 70:763
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ble penalty structure, predicated on the degree of the offense,
enacted in response to reformers' claims that the severe, "often
draconian" penalties for rape discouraged jurors from convict-
ing.1 9 Further, almost all states eliminated the requirement
that the complainant resist her assailant to the utmost of her
physical ability as an objective manifestation of her nonconsent;
several states eliminated the resistance standard entirely.20
In terms of evidentiary law, reformers not only passed
rape-shield laws, but also dispensed with the requirement that
text accompanying notes 131-135; Loh, supra note 10, at 562-63. Redefining
rape in gender-neutral terms, such as "sexual assault," protects victims of ho-
mosexual assaults while also "freeing this branch of the law from outmoded
notions harmful to women." Berger, supra note 3, at 12. Moreover, the grad-
ing of assault based on the degree of force serves to focus the inquiry on the
offender's conduct rather than on the complainant's moral worth. Such grad-
ing also allows for a more equitable penalty structure. See infra note 19 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the gradation of forcible rape into de-
grees, see FORCIBLE RAPE, supra note 10, at 14-19, 71-72; Bienen, supra note 17,
at 178; Ireland, supra note 17, at 185 n.3; Note, Recent Statutory Developments
in the Definition of Forcible Rape, 61 VA. L. REV. 1500, 1517-29 (1975).
19. See FORCIBLE RAPE, supra note 10, at 18-19; Berger, supra note 3, at 8-
9, 12; Bienen, supra note 17, at 172-74, 179; Note, supra note 18, at 1517. Imme-
diately prior to the Supreme Court's invalidation of arbitrary death penalty
provisions, see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), sixteen states and the
federal government authorized capital punishment in forcible rape cases. H.
KAY, SEx-BASED DISCRIMINATION 906 (2d ed. 1981). Other states had very se-
vere prison terms. See Note, supra note 18, at 1517. Understandably, in the
absence of powerful evidence, juries were reluctant to convict.
20. See FORCIBLE RAPE, supra note 10, at 5; Berger, supra note 3, at 8, 11;
Bienen, supra note 17, at 180-84; Ireland, supra note 17, at 188-89 n.15. On the
resistance standard generally, see Note, The Resistance Standard in Rape Leg-
islation, 18 STAN. L. REV. 680 (1966); Note, supra note 18, at 1503-16.
Distrust of rape complainants, the severity of possible penalties upon con-
viction, and the importance of chastity as a value to be protected by rape law
all contributed to this unique requirement of resistance, unknown in prosecu-
tions for other forcible, nonconsensual conduct such as robbery or assault. See
Note, supra note 18, at 1503-04, 1509; Comment, Sexism in Society, supra note
14, at 931-32, 934-38. The resistance requirement is misguided in that it focuses
on the victim's conduct rather than on the force used by the offender. More-
over, it demands conduct that is highly dangerous. Recent studies indicate
that persons who resist their assailants risk greater injury than those who do
not resist. See Schwartz, An Argument For the Elimination of the Resistance
Requirement From the Definition of Forcible Rape, 16 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 567,
578-80 (1983). A National Crime Survey of 1,043,000 rape victims who were
physically attacked during the rape, as opposed to verbally threatened, be-
tween 1973 and 1982 showed that where the victim used some form of resist-
ance, injury was more likely (57%) than in cases where she did not resist
(43%). See STATISTICs, supra note 5, BULL. 4. A final problem with a stringent
resistance requirement is that, absent obvious evidence of physical abuse,
resistance is almost impossible to prove at trial without corroborating wit-
nesses. See Note, supra note 18, at 1506-08.
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the complainant's testimony be corroborated and with the
mandatory jury instructions that her testimony be scrutinized
with caution.21 Innovations outside the courtroom included
rape-crisis counseling centers,22 mandatory emergency treat-
ment in a hospital for post-rape victims,23 reimbursement
schemes for victims' medical expenses, 24 and programs to raise
the consciousness of police and prosecutors in their treatment
of rape victims.2
5
Of all the reforms directed toward restoring the integrity
and dignity of the rape victim,26 however, rape-shield laws
21. See FORCmLE RAPE, supra note 10, at 27-33, 71; Berger, supra note 3,
at 10-11; Ireland, supra note 17, at 197-98; Note, supra note 18, at 1529-33. Both
of these features were similarly based on deep distrust of the rape complain-
ant's credibility. See People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 873-76, 538 P.2d
247, 254-56, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119, 126-28 (1975); BABCOCK, supra note 14, at 843-62;
Berger, supra note 3, at 9-10; see also Note, The Rape Corroboration Require-
ment- Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE L.J. 1365, 1373-78 (1972) (elaborating on
reasons for historical distrust of rape complainants).
An additional safeguard against false charges by rape complainants is the
admissibility, in most jurisdictions, of evidence that the complainant promptly
reported the attack. See C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 297, at
859 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984). This doctrine represents an exception to the rule
that prohibits evidence of prior consistent statements of testifying witnesses.
See Graham, The Cry of Rape: The Prompt Complaint and the Federal Rules
of Evidence, 19 WILLAMETTE L.J. 489, 492-94 (1983); Note, The Admissibiity of
Extrajudicial Rape Complaints, 64 B.U.L. REV. 199, 204-11 (1984). Under some
statutory schemes, the requirement that a rape complaint must be timely filed
operates, in effect, as a statute of limitations. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 632-A:7 (Supp. 1983) (six months, if complainant is over eighteen); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 213.6(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (three months).
22. See In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 494 Pa. 15, 20, 428 A.2d 126,
128 (1981); Hardgrove, An Interagency Service Network to Meet Needs of Rape
Victims, 57 Soc. CASEWORK 245, 250-53 (1976).
23. For examples of state statutes requiring hospitals to provide emer-
gency services for alleged rape victims, see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111-1/2, §§ 87-
2, -5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.29 (Page 1982).
24. For examples of state statutes providing that local governments bear
the cost of evidence-gathering medical examinations, see CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 13968.1 (West Supp. 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.28 (Page 1982); see
also MINN. STAT. § 611A.21(3)(b) (1984) (allowing development of program
providing for sexual assault victims' medical expenses).
25. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 41, § 97B (Law. Co-op. 1983) (requiring
police units with training as rape counselors); NATIONAL INST. OF LAW EN-
FORCEMENT & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FORCIBLE RAPE, A
NATIONAL SURVEY OF THE RESPONSE BY PROSECUTORS 28-31 (1978).
26. An additional rape-law reform is the trend toward abolition or modifi-
cation of the traditional spousal exception to rape. See Bienen, supra note 17,
at 184-09; Schwartz, The Spousal Exemption for Criminal Rape Prosecution, 7
VT. L. REV. 33, 38-42 (1982). Until recently, a man could not "rape" his wife by
forcing her to submit to sexual intercourse, see R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra
note 8, at 202-04, because the prevailing view was that marriage implies contin-
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clearly engendered the most controversy. Civil libertarians27
and scholars28 expressed concern that foreclosing inquiry into
the prior sexual history of the complainant to protect her pri-
vacy might impinge on the accused's sixth amendment right to
present relevant evidence in his defense.2 9 Although literature
questioning the constitutionality of rape-shield statutes
abounds,30 much of the debate understandably has been con-
ducted on an abstract level, given the dearth of case law under
the statutes. Now that most of these statutes have been in
existence for ten years, it is appropriate to examine their opera-
tion in trial courts and interpretation of them by appellate
courts to determine where the balance has been struck between
the protection of the victim's privacy and the accused's sixth
amendment right to present relevant defense evidence. Such
an examination is the focus of this Article.
Scholarly comment on rape-shield laws "in action" has cen-
uing consent to sexual relations, see Comment, Sexism in Society, supra note
14, at 926 n.34. Total abolition of the spousal exemption has not been achieved,
but the standard compromise has been to abolish the exemption where the
spouses are living apart. FORCIBLE RAPE, supra note 10, at 14.
27. See Privacy of Rape Victims: Hearings on H.R. 14666 and Other Bills
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1976) (statement of Dovey Roundtree on behalf of
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)) [hereinafter cited as House Hear-
ings]; Herman, What's Wrong With the Rape Reform Laws?, 3 Civ. Lm. REV.,
Dec. 1976-Jan. 1977, at 60, 66-73. Indeed, within the ACLU, there was contro-
versy concerning the proper scope of rape-shield legislation-a not surprising
fact considering the ACLU's strong commitment both to women's rights and
to the rights of criminal defendants. See id. at 63-66 (the ACLU Women's
Rights Project proposal was rejected by the ACLU Board of Directors in favor
of Policy 229, a more "defendant-oriented" proposal, adopted in February,
1976).
28. See, e.g., 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 3, § 5387, at 566-90;
Berger, supra note 3, at 52-72; Burnim, Massachusetts Rape-Shield Law-An
Over-step in the Right Direction, 64 MASs. L. REv. 61, 65-72 (1979); Rudstein,
Rape Shield Laws: Some Constitutional Problems, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1,
14-46 (1976); Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 3, at 544-90; Westen, Compulsory
Process II, 74 MICH. L. REV. 191, 208-213 (1975); Note, Limitations on the Right
to Introduce Evidence Pertaining to the Prior Sexual History of the Com-
plaining Witness in Cases of Forcible Rape: Reflection of Reality or Denial of
Due Process?, 3 HoFsTRA L. REv. 403, 419-425 (1975); Note, Indiana's Rape
Shield Law: Conflict with the Confrontation Clause?, 9 IND. L. REV. 418, 418-
40 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note, Indiana's Rape Shield Law]; Note, Louisi-
ana's Protection for Rape Victims: Too Much of a Good Thing?, 40 LA. L. REV.
268, 273-82 (1979); Comment, Ohio's New Rape Law: Does it Protect Complain-
ants at the Expense of the Rights of the Accused?, 9 AKRON L. REv. 337, 337-59
(1975); Comment, The Kentucky Rape Shield Law: One Step Too Far, 66 Ky.
L.J. 426, 442-44 (1977).
29. See infra notes 181-214 and accompanying text.
30. See supra notes 27-28.
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tered either on the federal statute,31 which is implicated in only
a minute proportion of the nation's rape cases, 32 or on individ-
ual state statutes.3 3 No systematic look at nationwide trends in
application has been attempted. The commentators usually
note two points in passing, however. First, the United States
Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the constitutionality of any
rape-shield provision.34 Second, those state supreme courts that
have considered the constitutional issue have almost univer-
sally upheld the statutes. 35 Although accurate, these state-
31. See, e.g., Spector & Foster, Rule 412 and the Doe Case: The Fourth
Circuit Turns Back the Clock, 35 OKLA. L. REv. 87, 90-94, 101-15 (1982); Com-
ment, Federal Rule of Evidence 412: Was the Change An Improvement?, 49 U.
CIN. L. REV. 244, 253-57 (1980).
32. Comment, supra note 31, at 245. The federal courts have jurisdiction
only where the alleged rape occurred within the areas of special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the United States, see 18 U.S.C. § 2031 (1982), or on
an Indian reservation, see 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1982). Federal rape prosecutions
between 1974 and 1976 involved a total of 42 defendants. House Hearings,
supra note 27, at 3 (statement of Roger Pauley on behalf of the Dep't of
Justice).
33. See, e.g., supra note 28; Caulfield, The New Oregon Sexual Offenses Ev-
idence Law: An Evaluation, 55 OR. L. REv. 493 (1976); Ghent, Victim Testi-
mony in Sex Crime Prosecutions: An Analysis of the Rape Shield Provision
and the Use of Deposition Testimony Under the Criminal Sexual Conduct
Statute, 34 S.C.L. REV. 583 (1982); Kneedler, Sexual Assault Law Reform in
Virginia-A Legislative History, 68 VA. L. REV. 459 (1982); Letwin, supra note
3; Weddington, Rape Law in Texas: H.B. 284 and the Road to Reform, 4 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 1 (1975-1976); Note, Act 197 of 1977: Arkansas' Rape-Shield Statute,
32 ARK. L. REV. 806 (1979); Note, California Rape Evidence Reform: An Anal-
ysis of Senate Bill 1678, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1551 (1975); Note, The Admissibility
of a Rape-Complainant's Previous Sexual Conduct The Need for Legislative
Reform. 11 NEw ENG. L. REV. 497 (1976); Note, Rape and Other Sexual Offense
Law Reform in Maryland, 7 U. BALT. L. REV. 151 (1977); Note, Florida's Sex-
ual Battery Statute: Significant Reform but Bias Against the Victim Still
Prevails, 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 419 (1978); Note, The Illinois Rape-Shield Statute:
Will It Withstand Constitutional Attack?, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 211; Note, Evi-
dence-Admissibility of the Victim's Past Sexual Behavior Under Washing-
ton's Rape Evidence Law--Wash. Rev. Code § 9.79.150 (1976), 52 WASH. L. REV.
1011 (1977); Comment, Idaho Code § 18-6105: A Limitation on the Use of Evi-
dence Relating to Prior Sexual Conduct of the Prosecutrix in Idaho Rape Tri-
als, 15 IDAHO L. REV. 323 (1979); Comment, Sexual Assault Victim's Prior
Sexual Conduct Admissible if Three Conditions Met State v. Gavigan, 67
MARQ. L. REV. 396 (1984); Comment, Can Georgia's Rape-Shield Statute With-
stand A Constitutional Challenge?, 36 MERCER L. REV. 991 (1985); Comment,
Rape Evidence Reform in Missouri" A Remedy for the Adverse Impact of Evi-
dentiary Rules on Rape Victims, 22 ST. LouIs U.L.J. 367 (1978); Comment,
Rape Reform Legislation and Evidentiary Concerns: The Law in Penn-
sylvania, 44 U. PIT. L. REV. 955 (1983).
34. See, e.g., Kneeder, supra note 33, at 498; Comment, supra note 31, at
249-50.
35. See, e.g., Spector & Foster, supra note 31, at 105; Comment, supra note
31, at 249; Annot., 1 A.L.R. 4th 283, 287 (1980).
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ments ignore significant aspects of rape-shield jurisprudence
that come to light upon an examination of all fifty statutes and
the several hundred cases 36 that have been decided under them.
Existing rape-shield statutes vary widely in scope and in
procedural detail.37 Their single common feature is a rejection
of the previous automatic admissibility of proof of unchastity.
Beyond that notable change, however, the statutes vary signifi-
cantly in the degree to which they restrict the admissibility of
evidence of the rape complainant's prior sexual conduct. Put-
ting aside for the moment differences between specific statutes,
this Article will show that there are four distinct conceptual
approaches to rape-shield legislation. I shall refer to these ap-
proaches as the Michigan, Texas, federal, and California
approaches.
At the restrictive end of the statutory spectrum are one-
half of the nation's rape-shield laws-twenty-five in number-
that are modeled on the Michigan statute.38 These statutes pro-
hibit the introduction of sexual conduct evidence subject to cer-
tain enumerated exceptions. The statutory exceptions are
highly specific, reflecting legislative efforts to anticipate pre-
cisely those circumstances in which sexual conduct evidence
will be critical to the presentation of a defense. In effect, these
statutes have stripped courts of their discretion to determine
the relevancy of sexual conduct evidence on a case-by-case ba-
sis. Although these statutes are highly protective of the inter-
ests of the complainant and the state, they do not accommodate
sufficiently the needs of the accused to present relevant evi-
dence in his behalf.
Indeed, a pattern of judicial response to restrictive Michi-
gan-type statutes has developed.3 9 In a significant number of
cases, appellate courts have strained to uphold the validity of
these statutes while at the same time ordering the introduction
of relevant sexual conduct evidence. This result has been
achieved by circumventing the explicit statutory prohibitions
and by relying instead on legislative history and underlying pol-
icy considerations. In a smaller number of cases, courts have
held the Michigan-style statutes unconstitutional as applied in
particular factual settings. Some of the statutes have been
36. This author looked at approximately 370 cases.
37. See infra app. (Tables 2-5).
38. See MIcH. CoMP. LAWs ANN. § 750.520j (West Supp. 1985). For a list of
statutes following the Michigan approach, see infra app. (Table 1).
39. For a discussion of judicial application of Michigan-type statutes, see
infra notes 250-537 and accompanying text.
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amended in response to cases that demonstrated the need for
additional exceptions.40 Even though amendments can cure
specific constitutional defects, the underlying flaw inherent in
Michigan-type statutes remains: it is almost impossible to antic-
ipate the myriad factual contexts in which sexual conduct evi-
dence may be highly relevant to a legitimate defense theory.
A smaller number of rape-shield laws suffer from the op-
posite defect. In the eleven states adopting the Texas ap-
proach,4' trial courts have nearly unfettered discretion to admit
sexual conduct evidence merely upon a showing of relevancy
under traditional standards, that is, when probative value out-
weighs prejudicial effect. These statutes seek to accommodate
the interests of the complainant and the state through a single
procedural device, a judicial determination of relevancy at an in
camera hearing before introduction of the sexual conduct evi-
dence.42 This procedure is designed to encourage careful judi-
cial consideration of the probative worth of such evidence. If
the court determines that the evidence is inadmissible, the com-
plainant is thus spared public disclosure of her sex life and the
jury is not prejudiced by objectionable questions. Because the
statutes lack any substantive restrictions on the admissibility of
sexual conduct evidence, however, judges are as free to permit
its introduction as they were prior to the enactment of the
legislation.43
A third group of statutes, modeled on the federal rape-
40. See Act of June 24, 1983, ch. 83-258, § 1, 1983 Fla. Laws 1315, 1315
(amending Act of June 6, 1977, ch. 77-104, § 237, 1977 Fla. Laws 245, 329) (codi-
fied as amended at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2) (West. Supp. 1985)); Act of
Mar. 28, 1983, Pub. L. No. 322, § 1, 1983 Ind. Acts 1966, 1966 (amending Act of
May 5, 1981, Pub. L. No. 298, § 6, 1981 Ind. Acts 2314, 2389-90) (codified as
amended at IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-4(b)(3) (Burns 1985)); Act of July 27, ch.
822, § 1(5)(a), 1977 Or. Laws 863, 864 (amending Act of May 20, 1975, Ch. 176,
§ 2(4), 1975 Or. Laws 219, 219) (codified as amended at OR. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 40.210 (1984)).
41. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.065 (Vernon Supp. 1986). For a list of
statutes following the Texas approach, see infra app. (Table 1).
42. Most of the Michigan-type statutes also mandate an in camera pro-
ceeding. The court's function at the hearing required by these statutes, how-
ever, is simply to determine either that the sexual conduct evidence falls
within a statutory exception or that the evidence should be excluded, notwith-
standing that it falls within an exception, because probative value is out-
weighed by prejuducial effect in any particular case. Courts have no discretion
under any of the Michigan-type statutes to admit evidence that does not fall
within an exception. See infra note 242 and accompanying text.
43. For a discussion of judicial application of Texas-type statutes, see in-
fra text accompanying notes 538-575.
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shield provision," combines features of both the restrictive and
the discretionary approaches to avoid the underinclusiveness
and overinclusiveness of each. In the seven statutes adopting
the federal approach, sexual conduct evidence is generally pro-
hibited, subject to certain enumerated exceptions. The key fea-
ture of this scheme, however, is a "catch-basin" provision that
allows introduction of unexcepted sexual conduct evidence if
the evidence is, for example, "constitutionally required to be
admitted"4 5 or "relevant and admissible in the interests of jus-
tice. '46 The obvious problem with such legislation is that it of-
fers the defendant no guidance on how to meet the criteria.
Regarding the constitutional standard, recent Supreme Court
forays into the area have produced no clear test for determin-
ing when the state's interest in excluding evidence must give
way to the accused's right to present a defense.47 Without a
clearer pronouncement, the catch-basin provision is of little
utility and presents dangers of abuse to either of the counter-
vailing interests involved.48 Similar risks are presented by the
vague "interests of justice" standard.
Finally, under the California approach,4 9 sexual conduct
evidence is separated into two broad categories depending on
the purpose for which it is offered. Evidence is categorized as
either substantive evidence, which is offered to prove consent
by the complainant, or credibility evidence, offered to attack
her credibility. Inexplicably, some of the seven statutes follow-
ing the California approach generally prohibit the first category
of evidence, subject to a few exceptions, while others prohibit
the second category, subject to some exceptions. The primary
flaw in this legislation is that sexual conduct evidence does not
neatly break down into "consent" or "credibility" uses. In most
cases, the testimony of the complainant establishes the crucial
element of nonconsent; the two terms thus are functional
equivalents. Evidence that establishes consent by the complain-
ant will simultaneously impeach her credibility, and evidence
that impeaches her credibility will raise the likelihood of con-
44. FED. R. EviD. 412. For a list of statutes following the federal ap-
proach, see infra app. (Table 1).
45. FED. R. EviD. 412(b)(1).
46. N.Y. CRaM. PRoc. LAW § 60.42(5) (McKinney 1981).
47. See infra notes 183-207 and accompanying text.
48. For a discussion of judicial application of the federal approach, see in-
fra notes 576-614 and accompanying text.
49. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 782, 1103(b) (West Supp. 1986). For a list of
statutes following the California approach, see infra app. (Table 1).
1986]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
sent. Thus, the statutory prohibition of either consent or credi-
bility evidence often can be circumvented depending upon the
circumstances of the case. Cases decided under these statutes
demonstrate the difficulties of pigeonholing sexual conduct evi-
dence into either of these highly ambiguous categories.50
In the remainder of this Article, the problems inherent in
each of these statutory schemes will be critically analyzed in
light of the case law applying and interpreting the various stat-
utes. Under pressure from powerful interest groups to proceed
with haste and to embrace a symbol of sexual autonomy and
equality with one quick stroke of the legislative pen, drafters of
rape-shield legislation failed to approach the task of evidentiary
reform functionally. Although each approach suffers from a
distinct flaw-the Michigan approach is underinclusive; the
Texas approach is overinclusive; the federal approach offers no
guidance to the trial judge; and the California approach is am-
biguous-each of these flaws in turn stems from the drafters'
basic misperception of the precise wrong to be redressed by re-
form legislation. To explain how the reform legislation has
failed to reconcile sufficiently the conflicting interests involved,
Part I of this Article examines the evidentiary constraints upon
which pre-reform doctrine was grounded.51 Part II discusses
the movement to reform rape law in general and the specific
goals and policies underlying rape-shield legislation.52
Throughout this discussion, constitutional constraints on ex-
cluding sexual conduct evidence will provide a backdrop to the
legislative solutions ultimately reached.53 Building upon these
evidentiary, policy, and constitutional considerations, Part III
proposes an alternative legislative solution,- a solution that not
only furthers the policies underlying rape-shield laws, but also
protects rape defendants' due process and confrontation rights.
Part IV then critically examines the four current types of rape-
shield legislation and notes how the shortcomings inherent in
each scheme would be obviated under the proposed solution.55
The Article concludes by arguing that both the reformers' goal
of abolishing the outmoded and sexist-based uses of sexual con-
50. For a discussion of judicial application of the California approach, see
infra notes 615-661 and accompanying text.
51. See infra text accompanying notes 56-129.
52. See infra text accompanying notes 130-179.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 180-214.
54. See infra text accompanying notes 215-239. The proposed statutes are
set forth in full in the Conclusion.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 240-661.
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duct evidence and the goal of protecting the constitutional
rights of defendants would be better served by the proposed
scheme than by existing law.
I. THE BACKDROP TO REFORM: EVIDENTIARY
CONSIDERATIONS
To understand current rape-shield legislation, one must
first examine the various purposes for which sexual conduct ev-
idence was traditionally offered in a prosecution for rape.
Traditional notions about women and sexuality in combination
with the rules pertaining to character evidence constituted the
rationales for admitting such evidence. 56
Proof of sexual conduct was treated as a species of "charac-
ter" evidence,57 a form of circumstantial evidence offered at
trial in order to prove that a person possessing a particular
character trait acted in conformity with that trait on the occa-
sion in question.58 If, for example, defendant Smith were ac-
cused of assault, the prosecutor undoubtedly would like to
show that Smith was generally a violent person to raise the in-
ference that Smith committed the assault in question. This in-
ferential use of character, sometimes referred to as "character
to prove conduct,"59 is sharply circumscribed by a set of rules
and exceptions once described as a "grotesque structure" which
is "archaic, paradoxical and full of compromises and compensa-
tions."60 This evidentiary puzzle must therefore be pieced to-
gether to appreciate fully the precise purpose for which sexual
conduct or "character for chastity" evidence was offered in rape
prosecutions prior to passage of the shield laws.
56. Letwin, supra note 3, at 43-44.
57. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 21, § 186, at 549-55.
58. See, eg., FED. R. Evm. 404; see C. McCoRMICK, supra note 21, § 193, at
571-74.
59. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 3, § 5232, at 342.
60. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948). See 1A J. WI-
MORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 54.1, at 1150 (P. Tillers rev. ed. 1983). The cir-
cumstantial use of character evidence is to be distinguished from the rare
situation in which a person's character is, under the applicable substantive
law, itself an ultimate issue in the case. For example, in a suit for defamation
in which the defense of truth is raised, if plaintiff Smith alleges that Jones
called Smith a violent person, the question whether the plaintiff is or is not a
violent person is an ultimate issue that directly determines the outcome of the
case. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 21, § 187, at 551-52. The use of character
evidence in any form is freely allowed in these "character in issue" cases. See
FED. R. EvID. 405(b); C. McCORMIcK, supra note 21, § 187, at 551-53.
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A. THE GENERAL RULE
The general rule is that character evidence, offered to
prove that a person acted in conformity with a character trait
on a particular occasion, is inadmissible in both civil and crimi-
nal cases.6 1 The reason for the prohibition against character, or
"propensity," evidence, as it is sometimes called, is not that
such evidence is irrelevant.6 2 Rather, the basis for exclusion is
that the low probative value of character evidence is out-
weighed by an array of countervailing considerations.63
A threshold problem in determining probative value is that
of definition. The rules nowhere define the term "character"
and everyday usage is vague and elusive. Dean Wigmore called
character "the actual moral or psychical disposition or sum of
traits."64 Professor McCormick defined "character" solely to
distinguish it from "habit" evidence, the latter being highly
probative and therefore universally admissible without
restriction:
Character is a generalized description of a person's disposition, or of
the disposition in respect to a general trait, such as honesty, temper-
ance or peacefulness. Habit, in the present context, is more specific.
It denotes one's regular response to a repeated situation.... Thus, a
person may be in the habit of bounding down a certain stairway two
or three steps at a time, of patronizing a particular pub after each
day's work, or of driving his automobile without using a seatbelt.
6 5
Although frequently thought of in moral terms,66 "charac-
61. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 404(a); see C. MCCORMICK, supra note 21, § 188,
at 553.
62. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 21, § 188, at 554 ("[E]vidence that an indi-
vidual is the kind of person who tends to behave in certain ways almost always
has some value as circumstantial evidence as to how he acted (and perhaps
with what state of mind) in the matter in question."). Dean Wigmore also be-
lieved that character evidence was generally probative of conduct, but argued
that it should be excluded for policy reasons. See 1 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE § 55, at 449-50, § 57, at 454 (3d ed. 1940). But see infra note 67.
63. See 1A J. WIGMORE, supra note 60, § 54.1, at 1150-51.
64. Id. § 52, at 1148.
65. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 21, § 195, at 574-75 (footnotes omitted). See
also FED. R. EVID. 406 (evidence of habit is relevant).
66. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 211 (5th ed. 1979) (describing character
as "[tihe aggregate of the moral qualities which belong to and distinguish an
individual person"). McCormick's examples of character-honesty, temper-
ance, and peacefulness--also convey such moral overtones. See supra text ac-
companying note 65. Wigmore also viewed character in moral terms. This is
demonstrated by his argument for excluding character evidence in civil cases:
A party's character is usually of no probative value. Where the
issue is whether a contract was made or broken, whether money was
paid or property improved by mistake, whether goods were illegally
converted or a libel published, there [is] no moral quality in the act
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ter" has no concrete or generally accepted legal definition. Psy-
chological evidence suggests that a person's character traits are
dynamic, rather than static.67 Further, a person's character
may be different in different situations.68 Smith may be calm
and placid around home and family but aggressive and belliger-
ent in social situations or with strangers. In short, character is
too slippery a concept upon which to base an inference of
conduct.69
The speculative probative value of character evidence com-
bines with the "dangerous baggage" of countervailing policy
considerations to create the general exclusionary rule.70 The
counterweights to admissibility arise from the fact that charac-
ter traits "are normally not neutral facts-they often give rise
to and support severe moral judgments. '71 Thus, the most sig-
nificant danger in admitting character evidence is the potential
for jury misuse: it may divert the jurors' attention from the is-
sue at hand and induce them to punish or reward a party solely
for having an attractive or unpleasant character.72 Jurors may
further penalize or bestow undue benefits on a party for calling
witnesses with bad or good character traits.73
alleged... and moral character can therefore throw no light on the
probability of doing or not doing.
1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 62, § 64, at 474. See also Ordover, supra note 3, at
98-99 (concept of character is morally biased); cf. United States v. West, 670
F.2d 675, 682 (7th Cir.) (intelligence not a character trait), cert denied, King v.
United States, 457 U.S. 1124 and Jeffers v. United States, 457 U.S. 1139 (1982).
Professor Richard Kuhns argues that the differing treatment accorded habit
and character proof by the rules of evidence-the former is freely allowed
whereas the latter is beset with restrictions-supports the view that character
connotes a moral quality. Although habit is a more routine, regularized re-
sponse to a particular situation and is therefore more probative, it is also mor-
ally neutral and therefore nonprejudicial. Kuhns, The Propensity to Mis-
understand the Character of Specifw Acts Evidence, 66 IOWA L. REV. 777, 779
& n.7 (1984).
67. See, e.g., R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH To EVI-
DENCE 237 (2d ed. 1982). Indeed, recent psychological studies suggest that
character evidence has little or no probative value. See Mendez, California's
New Law on Character Evidence: Evidence Code Section 352 and the Impact of
Recent Psychological Studies, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1003, 1050-59 (1984).
68. See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 67, at 237.
69. On the elusive nature of character evidence, see 22 C. WRIGHT & K.
GRAHAM, supra note 3, § 5233, at 349-57.
70. C. McCoRMICK, supra note 21, § 188, at 554; 1A J. WIGMORE, supra
note 60, § 57, at 1180-81.
71. Letwin, supra note 3, at 48.
72. 1A J. WIGMORE, supra note 60, § 54.1, at 1150-51; FED. R. EVID. 404(a)
advisory committee note.
73. For psychological studies that demonstrate the prejudicial impact of
character evidence, see Mendez, supra note 67, at 1044-50. Particularly in
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Hence we find the general ban on character evidence. Em-
phasis is placed on "general" because, through a myriad of ex-
ceptions, "character to prove conduct" manages to creep back
into the courtroom. History rather than logic accounts for the
exceptions, although arguably the countervailing considerations
are reduced in these exceptional situations.74 Even so, the law
of evidence expresses its "unfriendly" attitude toward the cir-
cumstantial use of character evidence 75 by carefully regulating
the permissible mode of proof in those situations where the
prohibition is inapplicable.
Three possible types of proof of character are recognized:76
the aggregate community view of Smith's character, commonly
referred to as reputation evidence; a witness's personal opinion
of Smith's character; and specific instances of Smith's conduct
that demonstrate the existence of a particular character trait.
At common law, the relatively "neutral and unexciting" reputa-
tion evidence was the preferred mode of introducing character
evidence.7 7 Under most modern codes, opinion evidence is also
permitted.78 Specific instances of conduct, however, surely the
criminal cases, introducing evidence of the accused's bad character creates the
risk that the jury will either feel minimal regret at convicting an innocent de-
fendant on the ground that he or she is generally a bad person and deserving
of punishment regardless of guilt or innocence, or ignore more relevant evi-
dence in the case and find the defendant guilty because of his or her bad char-
acter. See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 67, at 218-19. Additional
concerns, applicable in all cases, are that the trial will simply become bogged
down in disputes over the collateral issue of character; that admitting the evi-
dence, as well as contradictory proof, will consume an undue amount of time;
and that a party may be surprised by, and unable to refute, character evidence
without a continuance. See id. at 219; C. MCCoRMICK, supra note 21, § 188, at
554.
74. See FED. R. EvID. 404(a) advisory committee note; Michelson v. United
States, 335 U.S. 469, 487 (1948).
75. Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic and
Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 851 (1982).
76. See FED. R. EVID 405; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 21, § 186, at 550.
77. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 21, § 186, at 550. Due to the anonymity
of modern urban life, courts have narrowed the notion of a community reputa-
tion to permit evidence of one's reputation in the workplace or in other places
where one has spent substantial amounts of time. R. LEMPERT & S.
SALTZBURG, supra note 67, at 239.
78. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 405(a). This marks a return to earlier orthodox
practice, as pointed out by Wigmore, who was a strong proponent of this mode
of proof. See 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 62, § 1983, at 151-52, § 1986, at 165-67.
Wigmore argued that opinion evidence, based on personal knowledge, was far
more illuminating than "the secondhand, irresponsible product of multiplied
guesses and gossip which we term 'reputation.'" Id. § 1986, at 167 (footnote
omitted). Moreover, there is general agreement that reputation evidence is
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most "decisive revelation[s] of character,"79 are strictly prohib-
ited. 0 The persuasiveness of "specific act" evidence gives rise
to the dangers of unfair prejudice and undue consumption of
time in proving a sufficient number of instances.81
B. EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE
The first exception to the prohibition on character evi-
dence benefits the accused in a criminal case. Although the
prosecution is forbidden to prove that defendant Smith,
charged with assault, is a violent individual, Smith himself may
prove, through reputation or opinion evidence, that he is a
peaceable member of the community.8 2 The policy underlying
this exception is that the greatest danger created by admitting
character evidence, prejudice to the accused, is obviously not
present. In addition, the danger that the jury will be prejudiced
in the defendant's favor is not a sufficient basis for exclusion; 3
it is felt that the accused should have every opportunity to
present evidence that might raise a reasonable doubt about his
guilt.84
The second exception, of particular relevance to this Arti-
cle, is based upon similar reasoning. The criminal defendant
may prove a pertinent trait of his victim's bad character as evi-
dence that the victim acted in conformity with that character
little more than opinion in disguise. See FED. R. EVID. 405(a) advisory commit-
tee note.
79. C. MCCORMICK, MCCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 187, at 443 (2d ed. 1972).
80. See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 405(a). An exception to this prohibition is
made, however, when character itself is in issue. Id advisory committee note.
81. C. McCoRMICK, supra note 21, § 186, at 550. Character witnesses may
be cross-examined, however, about specific acts of the witness whose character
is in question. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 405(a). The sole purpose for such cross-
examination is to test the witness's qualifications to state an opinion or knowl-
edge of reputation. See FED. R. EVID. 405 advisory committee note. Thus, the
reputation witness and the opinion witness may be asked, respectively, "Have
you heard" or "Do you know" of specific instances of Smith's conduct.
82. See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 404(a)(1); C. McCoRMICK, supra note 21, § 191,
at 566. The accused is limited to offering evidence of "pertinent" character
traits, that is, those that are inconsistent with the conduct charged. See, e.g.,
FED. R. EvID. 404(a)(1).
83. C. McCoRMICK, supra note 21, § 191, at 566.
84. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948). The accused
takes certain risks by calling character witnesses, however. Having opened the
door by introducing evidence of good character, the accused invites rebuttal by
the prosecution in the form of evidence of bad character. See, e.g., FED. R.
EVm. 404(a)(1). Additionally, the defendant's character witnesses may be
cross-examined about defendant's specific bad acts. See supra note 81.
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trait.8 5 This exception is justified by the additional means it af-
fords the defendant in exculpating himself and by the lack of
any prejudice to his cause.86
At common law, evidence of the victim's character was ad-
mitted in two types of cases. First, a defendant accused of
homicide who claimed that he had acted in self-defense was
permitted to prove that the deceased had a reputation for being
a violent individual, thus enhancing the possibility that the de-
ceased had been the aggressor in the affray.8 7 The danger of
misuse in this instance was that the jury might be tempted to
acquit the defendant on the ground that the victim "got what
he deserved," irrespective of any provocation.88 There was also
a fear of fabricated testimony by the defendant and defense
witnesses concerning the deceased's propensity for violence.8 9
Therefore, many common-law courts were cautious when con-
fronted with such evidence, limiting its admissibility solely to
homicide cases, perhaps because of the special need for the evi-
dence in such cases.90 Many courts also required that there be
some evidence that the victim had been the aggressor before
the victim's character could be attacked.9 ' Today, most courts
85. See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 404(a)(2); C. McCoRMICK, supra note 21, § 193,
at 571-73.
86. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 21, § 193, at 572.
87. Id. at 571-72; 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 62, § 63, at 467. This eviden-
tiary theory was frequently confused with that which permits evidence of the
victim's violent character to establish the defendant's apprehension of danger
and the reasonableness of the defendant's defensive actions. See id. at 470.
Evidence offered under the latter theory is not being used to prove the de-
ceased's conduct and therefore it does not constitute an exception to the prohi-
bition on character evidence; to use this theory, however, the defendant must
have known of the deceased's aggressive tendencies. Id.
88. C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 21, § 193, at 572.
89. 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 62, § 63, at 469-70, § 111, at 551-52.
90. This is pure speculation, for there appears to be no explanation for the
earlier limitation to cases of homicide, nor for the expansion to cases of
assault.
91. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 3, § 5237, at 399; 1 J. WIG-
MORE, supra note 62, § 111, at 552. Dean Wigmore stated the rationale for cau-
tion as follows:
There ought, of course, to be some other appreciable evidence of
the deceased's aggression, for the character-evidence can hardly be of
value unless there is otherwise a fair possibility of doubt on the point;
moreover, otherwise the deceased's bad character is likely to be put
forward to serve improperly as a mere excuse for the killing, under
the pretext of evidencing his aggression, and it is often feasible to ob-
tain untrustworthy character-testimony for that purpose.
Id. Indeed, for these reasons, the drafters of the Maine Rules of Evidence re-
cently excluded altogether the exception for victim character proof. See 2 J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, 404[21], at 404-181 to -182.
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admit evidence of the victim's character in assault cases as well
as in homicide cases,92 but the requirement of independent evi-
dence of aggression largely remains.9 3
Rape-shield statutes were primarily directed against the
second common-law usage of victim character evidence. That
usage was based on the notion that women who had engaged in
sexual intercourse outside of marriage had violated societal
norms and therefore possessed the character flaw of unchastity,
that is, a propensity to engage in nomnarital sexual activity.94
Accordingly, a defendant accused of forcible rape who pro-
fessed innocence on the ground that the complainant consented
to the sexual act in question was permitted to prove the com-
plainant's "unchaste character."95 From that proof, the jury
was permitted to infer that such an unchaste woman was more
likely to have consented to sexual intercourse on the occasion
in question. 96 Thus, a permissible rhetorical inquiry to the fact
92. 1A J. WIGMORE, supra note 60, § 63, at 1350-66. Furthermore, FED. R.
EVD. 404(a)(2) and many state adaptations thereof do not limit victim charac-
ter proof to the trait of violence. As one commentator has noted:
Thus (theoretically at least) a defendant accused of bribing a public
official might show that the official in question had exhibited the trait
of greed or abuse of power in order to advance a defense of extortion.
Perhaps a person accused of "joyriding" might be able to prove the
owner's characteristic trait of generosity to support his claim that he
was operating the car with the permission of the owner.
Uviller, supra note 75, at 856 (footnote omitted).
93. Although many states enforce such a requirement, most codifications
do not expressly require such independent evidence. 1A J. WIGMOHE, supra
note 60, § 63, at 1367 n.4.
The prosecution may rebut victim character proof by introducing, for ex-
ample, evidence of the victim's peaceable character. In some jurisdictions, the
prosecution in homicide cases need not await the introduction of victim char-
acter proof before proving the deceased's peaceable character. Any evidence
for the defense offered to show that the deceased was the first agressor will
trigger the prosecution's right to offer evidence of the deceased's peaceable-
ness. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 404(a)(2); 1A J. WIGMORE, supra note 60, § 63, at
1373 n.6.
94. See 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 62, § 62, at 464-66; Ordover, supra note
3, at 96-99.
95. See, e.g., FED. R. EViD. 404(a)(2) and advisory committee note; I J.
WIGMORE, supra note 62, § 62, at 464.
96. 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 62, § 62, at 464. "Unchaste character" in-
structions specifically conveyed this notion to the jury. For instance, the for-
mer California jury instruction on this issue read:
Evidence was received for the purpose of showing that the female
person named in the information was a woman of unchaste character.
A woman of unchaste character can be the victim of a forcible
rape but it may be inferred that a woman who has previously con-
sented to sexual intercourse would be more likely to consent again.
Such evidence may be considered by you only for such bearing as
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finder in such cases was: "And will you not more readily infer
assent in the practiced Messalina, in loose attire, than in the re-
served and virtuous Lucretia?" 97 This evidentiary theory is a
straightforward application of the exception to the general rule
prohibiting character evidence-it permits evidence of the vic-
tim's character to prove conduct, namely consent.98
The common-law doctrine admitting evidence of the rape
complainant's unchaste character was universally applied and
unquestioned99 although, notably, without the caution and ac-
companying limitations applicable to victim character proof in
the homicide context. Independent evidence of consent was not
a condition precedent to the admission of unchaste character
evidence;100 indeed, in some cases courts admitted such evi-
dence even when the uncontradicted proof showed a violent
sexual assault on the complainant.10 1 In still other cases, courts
admitted evidence of unchastity even when defenses other than
consent were raised, such as mistaken identity or denial of sex-
ual intercourse. 10 2
it may have on the question of whether or not she gave her consent to
the alleged sexual act and in judging her credibility.
CALJIC No. 10.06 (3d rev. ed 1970), quoted in Letwin, supra note 3, at 39.
These instructions were not prohibited in California until 1974, see Act of
Sept. 23, 1974, ch. 1093, 1974 Cal. Stat. 2320 (codified as amended at CAL. PE-
NAL CODE § 1127d(a) (West 1985)), when two new provisions, §§ 782 and 1103,
were added to the Evidence Code, see Robbins Rape Evidence Law, ch. 569,
1974 Cal. Stat. 1388-89 (codified as amended at CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 782, n03(b)
(West Supp. 1986)).
97. People v. Abbot, 19 Wend. 192, 195 (N.Y. 1838).
98. As a result of the general prohibition, the prosecution would, of
course, be forbidden from eliciting evidence of the rape defendant's sexual his-
tory to prove his propensity to rape. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying
text.
99. See cases cited in 1A J. WIGMORE, supra note 60, § 62, at 1261 n.4; 22 C.
WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 3, § 5238, at 415.
100. 1A J. WIGMORE, supra note 60, § 62, at 1264 & n.10. But see, e.g., State
v. Warford, 293 Minn. 339, 341-42, 200 N.W.2d 301, 303 (1972), cert denied, 410
U.S. 935 (1973); Shapard v. State, 437 P.2d 565, 600 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert
denied, 393 U.S. 826 (1968).
101. See, e.g., Packineau v. United States, 202 F.2d 681, 685-86 (8th Cir.
1953) (exclusion of evidence of complainant's past sexual conduct with individ-
ual other than defendant held error despite proof of physical injury to com-
plainant), overruled, United States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268, 271-72 (8th Cir.
1978); cases cited in Ordover, supra note 3, at 114 n.136. But see Note, Indi-
ana's Rape Shield Law, supra note 28, at 432 & n.55.
102. See, e.g., People v. Degnen, 70 Cal. App. 567, 591, 234 P. 129, 138-39
(1925); Teague v. State, 208 Ga. 459, 466, 67 S.E.2d 467, 472 (1951) (dictum). But
see cases cited in Berger, supra note 3, at 57 n.338. Although the general rule
was that unchaste character evidence was irrelevant if consent were not an is-
sue, Professor Leon Letwin notes that this limitation could often be theoreti-
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The permissible mode of proof of unchastity in a minority
of jurisdictions was a further oddity. The majority of courts, in
line with the usual rules on character proof, permitted the de-
fense counsel to elicit evidence solely of the complainant's rep-
utation for chastity in the community. Evidence of specific acts
was forbidden.10 3 Nevertheless, an opposing view, espoused by
such scholars as Dean Wigmore1 04 and Justice Cardozo, 0 5 per-
suaded a minority of states to admit evidence of specific acts of
unchastity on the ground that reputation evidence simply is not
reliable in the absence of proof of its factual basis. L06 Moreover,
it was urged, the notion of a reputation is outmoded in modern
times, particularly in large urban areas.10 7 Although there is
much force to these arguments, significantly they took hold
solely in the context of rape cases; in other types of cases in
which character evidence was admissible, reputation evidence
remained the preferred mode of proof.
Finally, even in the "reputation only" jurisdictions, specific
acts of unchastity offered to prove consent were uniformly ad-
missible in one important instance: when the prior sexual acts
were with the defendant on trial108 Such acts, according to
cal because a defendant cannot be forced to elect between various defenses.
See Letwin, supra note 3, at 50.
103. See 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 62, § 200, at 684; Berger, supra note 3, at
16-17. Acts of prostitution, however, were viewed as akin to reputation evi-
dence. Id. at 17 n.109. See I J. WIGMORE, supra note 62, § 200, at 688. The rea-
son for the prohibition of specific acts in this particular context was
articulated long ago by the Supreme Court of Florida:
The fact that a woman may have been guilty of illicit intercourse
with one man is too slight and uncertain an indication to warrant the
conclusion that she would probably be guilty with any other man who
sought such favors of her. If she was a woman of general bad reputa-
tion for chastity.., the case would be different.
Rice v. State, 35 Fla. 236, 238, 17 So. 286, 287 (1895). Another reason for the
prohibition against specific acts evidence was that the complainant might be
surprised by and unprepared to defend against proof of such past acts. Berger,
supra note 3, at 18. Finally, there was a concern that the jury would become
distracted by the collateral question of whether the alleged victim "dated Jack
or slept with John or attended 'wild parties' with Jim." Id; see cases cited id,
n.114.
104. See 1A J. WIGMORE, supra note 60, § 62, at 1260 n.2.
105. See B. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 156-57 (1921);
22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 3, § 5238, at 413 n.13.
106. See, e.g., Packineau v. United States, 202 F.2d 681, 685-87 (8th Cir.
1953), overruled, United States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268, 271-72 (8th Cir. 1978);
People v. Walker, 150 Cal. App. 2d 594, 601-02, 310 P.2d 110, 114-15 (1957);
State v. Wulff, 194 Minn. 271, 274, 260 N.W. 515, 516 (1935).
107. See B. CARDOZO, supra note 105, at 156-57. For additional arguments
supportive of admitting specific act evidence, see Berger, supra note 3, at 18-19.
108. See, e.g., Smiloff v. State, 439 P.2d 772, 777 (Alaska 1968); People v.
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Dean Wigmore, stood on a different footing than general un-
chaste character evidence because they did not evince a general
immoral character so much as "an emotion towards the particu-
lar defendant tending to allow him to repeat the liberty."'' 0 9
Common-law usage of the third and final exception to the
rule against character evidence was also targeted for reform by
rape-shield advocates. In contrast to the substantive use of
character evidence to illuminate an element of the case, proof
of character might also help the jury decide the secondary but
crucial issue of a witness's credibility, that is, whether witness
Smith is telling the truth in the case on trial. Accordingly, evi-
dence of Smith's bad character universally is admissible to
prove that Smith is unworthy of belief as a witness.110
Regarding the generally permissible modes of proof, two
are relevant in the present context. First, witness Jones may
testify that witness Smith has a bad reputation for truthfulness
in the community.:11 Second, in some jurisdictions, Smith him-
self may be cross-examined about specific acts of his conduct
evidencing his character for dishonesty. 1 2 Because, as previ-
ously noted, specific instances of misconduct create risks of un-
fair prejudice to parties, harassment of witnesses, and jury
distraction on collateral matters, such inquiry is limited. Thus,
the cross-examiner is "bound by" Smith's answer and may not
Mangum, 31 Cal. App. 2d 374, 381, 88 P.2d 207, 211 (1939); People v. Greeley, 14
Ill. 2d 428, 431-32, 152 N.E.2d 825, 827 (1958).
109. 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 62, § 200, at 688. See infra notes 250-264 and
accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., C. McCORMICK, supra note 21, § 41, at 89; cf. FED. R. EVID.
608 (evidence is limited to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness).
111. See C. McCoRMICK, supra note 21, at § 44, at 100-01. The current
trend is in favor of permitting such proof by opinion as well as reputation tes-
timony. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 608(a); C. McCoRMICK, supra note 21, § 44, at
101 n.4. Evidence of good character for truthfulness, however, may only be in-
troduced if there has been an attack on the witness's character for truthful-
ness. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 608(a).
112. The majority of courts permit such inquiry subject to discretionary
control by the trial judge. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 608(b); C. McCoRMIcK, supra
note 21, § 42, at 91. A number of states, however, absolutely prohibit impeach-
ment by means of specific acts of misconduct. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 787
(West 1966); OR. R. EVID. 608(2); see C. McCoRMICK, supra note 21, § 42, at 90-
91 n.7. McCormick considered this view "the fairest and most expedient prac-
tice because of the dangers otherwise of prejudice (particularly if the witness
is a party), of distraction and confusion, of abuse by the asking of unfounded
questions, and of the difficulties... of ascertaining whether particular acts re-
late to character for truthfulness." Id, at 90-91.
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prove Smith's past deceptive conduct with extrinsic evidence.113
Moreover, only acts that bear on the character trait of veracity,
as opposed to bad character generally, are admissible. 114
Despite the general mandate that reputation and specific
acts must relate to truthfulness, a minority of courts took the
view that unchastity in women is relevant not only to the issue
of consent, but also to credibility; they believed "promiscuity
imports dishonesty."'" 5 Interestingly, the purported link be-
tween promiscuity and veracity was not made with regard to
male witnesses in those states,"L6 nor was it made with respect
to female witnesses in other than sexual offense prosecu-
tions.117 The foundation for this anomalous result may be
traced to the powerful influence of Dean Wigmore, who was ad-
amant in his view that an exception was warranted for female
complainants in sexual offense cases "because a certain type of
feminine character predisposes to imaginary or false charges of
this sort."' "' Accordingly, he urged that such a credibility at-
113. See, e.g., FED. R. EViD. 608(b); C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 21, § 42, at
92.
114. This is the majority approach. See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 608(b); C. Mc-
CORMcK, supra note 21, § 42, at 90.
A third mode of proof, permitted in almost all jurisdictions, is impeach-
ment by prior criminal conviction. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 609; C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 21, § 43, at 93-100. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 609, all offenses
involving "dishonesty or false statement" are admissible to impeach a witness's
credibility. See FED. R. EVID. 609. As to other crimes, only those "punishable
by death or imprisonment in excess of one year" may be inquired about, and
then only if the court determines that the probative value of the evidence out-
weighs prejudice to the defendant. I&L For a recent critique of this mode of
impeachment, "one of the major anomalies in the picture," see Uviller, supra
note 75, at 862-77.
115. Berger, supra note 3, at 16. See, e.g., Frady v. State, 212 Ga. 84, 85-86,
90 S.E.2d 664, 665-66 (1955); Frank v. State, 150 Neb. 745, 753, 35 N.W.2d 816,
822 (1949); State v. Coella, 3 Wash. 99, 106, 28 P. 28, 29 (1891) ("She could not
have ruthlessly destroyed that quality [chastity] upon which most other good
qualities are dependent, and for which, above all others, a woman is rever-
enced and respected, and yet retain her credit for truthfulness unsmirched
As to the permissible mode of proof, the majority of jurisdictions re-
stricted the evidence to the complainant's reputation. See, e.g., Common-
wealth v. McDonald, 110 Mass. 405, 406 (1872); McDermott v. State, 13 Ohio
St. 332, 333-35 (1862). A minority permitted impeachment both through repu-
tation evidence and specific instances of unchaste acts. See, e.g., Frank v.
State, 150 Neb. 745, 752-53, 35 N.W.2d 816, 822 (1949).
116. See, e.g., State v. Sibley, 131 Mo. 519, 531-32, 33 S.W. 167, 171 (1895)
("What destroys the standing of [females] in all the walks of life has no effect
whatever on the standing for truth of [males].").
117. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 106 Cal. 289, 293-94, 39 P. 622, 623 (1895).
118. 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 62, § 63, at 467.
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tack should be allowed even in sexual offense cases where non-
consent of the complainant is not an element, such as statutory
rape.119
C. A "NONEXCEPTION": EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES,
WRONGS, OR ACTS
This survey of evidence rules pertaining to character would
not be complete without mention of one final doctrine that is
often erroneously thought of as an exception to the ban on pro-
pensity evidence. In theory, however, the doctrine is actually a
logical extension and perhaps a clarification of the general ex-
clusionary rule. As discussed earlier,120 evidence of a person's
"crimes, wrongs, or acts," other than those at issue at trial, may
not be admitted for the sole purpose of proving that person's
character as a basis for inferring conduct in conformity there-
with.12 ' Utilizing the well-established evidentiary principle of
119. See id at 466-67. Indeed, Wigmore's deep-rooted fear of unfounded
charges instituted by women prone to rape fantasies led to his even more ex-
treme suggestion, nowhere adopted, that every sex offense complainant should
submit to a psychiatric examination as the ultimate safeguard against baseless
charges. See 3A J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 924a, at 737 (J.
Chadbourn rev. 1970). The following passage in Wigmore's treatise has been
cited time and again as authority for the proposition that a rape complainant's
accusation is inherently suspect:
Modern psychiatrists have amply studied the behavior of errant
young girls and women coming before the courts in all sorts of cases.
Their psychic complexes are multifarious, distorted partly by inherent
defects, partly by diseased derangements or abnormal instincts, partly
by bad social environment, partly by temporary physiological or emo-
tional conditions. One form taken by these complexes is that of con-
triving false charges of sexual offenses by men. The unchaste (let us
call it) mentality finds incidental but direct expression in the narra-
tion of imaginary sex incidents of which the narrator is the heroine or
the victim. On the surface the narration is straightforward and con-
vincing. The real victim, however, too often in such cases is the inno-
cent man; for the respect and sympathy naturally felt by any tribunal
for a wronged female helps to give easy credit to such a plausible tale.
Id at 736.
The psychological literature upon which the sweeping statements
in this text are based consists of five case studies from a 1915 text-
book, and of letters and monographs from four psychiatrists, all dated
before 1933 .... The authorities supporting this part of the text
have never been updated in revisions and supplements to Wigmore
BABCOCK, supra note 14, at 856 (footnote omitted). Yet, because of Wigmore's
prominence generally, his ideas had enormous impact in this area. See id. at
855-56; Berger, supra note 3, at 27; Ordover, supra note 3, at 120-22.
120. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(b); C. McCORMICK, supra note 21, § 190, at
557-58; Slough & Knightly, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41 IOwA L. REv. 325,
[Vol. 70:763
RAPE-SHIELD LAWS
multiple admissibility,122 however, a party may introduce evi-
dence of those other acts despite their tendency to prove char-
acter if another, noncharacter use can be made of the
evidence. 2 3
For example, a showing that Smith, on trial for the murder
of a law professor by means of a unique modus operandi, only
recently murdered three other law professors by means of the
same modus operandi, would serve to identify Smith as the
killer in this instance.24 This use of other acts is distinct from
showing that merely because Smith is a murderer, he probably
murdered the deceased.'25 Similarly, where there is evidence
that Jones had a "common plan or scheme" to steal a car, rob a
bank, and use the car as a getaway vehicle, the state would be
permitted to prove Jones's theft of the car at Jones's trial for
bank robbery. In this instance, proof of the uncharged car theft
325 (1956). The rule is also called the "propensity rule" to convey the forbid-
den inference. See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 67, at 215-16.
Although most frequently applied in criminal cases to prevent the prosecution
from introducing evidence of the accused's uncharged crimes, the rule is not so
limited in scope. It prohibits admission of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" of a
person in civil or criminal cases. Id. at 215 n.42.
122. For example, FED. R. EvID. 105 provides, in pertinent part, that
"[w]hen evidence which is admissible ... for one purpose but not admissible
... for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the
evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly." Id
123. See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 404(b). The rule lists examples of noncharacter
uses of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" evidence: "proof of motive, opportu-
nity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident." Id It states an "inclusionary," as opposed to an "exclusionary," ver-
sion of the principle, because permissible purposes include everything except
propensity. See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 67, at 216. For a
more elaborate listing of the permissible purposes of other acts evidence, see
C. McCoRMICK, supra note 21, § 190, at 558-64; R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG,
supra note 67, at 224-31.
124. Professors Kenneth Broun and Robert Meisenholder give the example
of a robber of a gas station wearing a medieval knight's helmet. See K. BROUN
& R. MEISENHOLDER, PROBLEMS IN EVIDENCE 11 (2d ed. 1981). Other colorful
examples of distinctive modus operandi evidence are gathered in E. IM-
WINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MIscoNDucT EVIDENCE § 3:13, at 31-32 (1984).
125. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 21, § 190, at 559. This basis for admit-
ting other crimes evidence requires "[m]uch more than the mere repeated
commission of crimes of the same class, such as repeated murders, robberies or
rapes. The pattern and characteristics of the crimes must be so unusual and
distinctive as to be like a signature." Id. at 559-60. Although courts occasion-
ally apply the label "common plan or scheme" to this theory of admissibility,
the more frequently used labels "distinctive modus operandi" and "identity"
are more apt. "Distinctive modus operandi" summarizes the rationale on
which the evidence is admitted, and "identity" points out the purpose for
which this kind of evidence is invariably used. R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG,
supra note 67, at 227.
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raises an inference of an overall plan on Jones's part; the exist-
ence of the plan makes it more probable that Jones is guilty of
the charged bank robbery.2
6
Despite limiting instructions that juries may not use such
"other act" evidence to infer bad character, the potential for
abuse of this rule is obvious and its actual abuses are well docu-
mented.127 Properly applied, however, the rule acknowledges
that a single item of evidence may have a noncharacter as well
as a character use. The mere fact that an item of evidence has
a tendency to prove character is not, in and of itself, a sufficient
basis for exclusion under the rule. The court must determine,
on a case-by-case basis, whether the probative value of the evi-
dence on the noncharacter theory is substantially outweighed
by the danger that the jury will use the evidence for the imper-
missible character purpose.128 Indeed, a serious shortcoming in
126. See E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 124, § 3:21, at 53. There is perhaps
no more "elastic and bewildering" exception to the propensity rule than the
"common plan or scheme" exception, variously labelled "plan," "scheme," "de-
sign," or "system." Id. § 3:20, at 50; R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note
67, at 227. Courts use the label in a variety of overlapping situations: "to
prove the existence of a definite project directed toward completion of the
crime in question," Slough, Relevancy Unraveled, 6 U. KAN. L. REv. 38, 49
(1957); "[t]o complete the story of the crime on trial by placing it in the con-
text of nearby and nearly contemporaneous happenings," C. McCoRMICK,
supra note 21, § 190, at 558; and to prove identity by means of a "unique modus
operandi," see supra note 125. Courts and litigants frequently use the labels
"plan," "scheme," and the like without clarifying which of these three sitau-
tions is applicable. Moreover, courts frequently admit other crimes evidence
under the "plan" rubric even when there is insufficient proof that the defend-
ant had a true plan. Such practice violates the propensity rule because the
only inference to be drawn is that the defendant has a bad character and prob-
ably committed the crime in question. The commentators refer to this im-
proper application of the plan exception as the "spurious plan" doctrine. See
E. ImwiNKELRIED, supra note 124, § 3:23, at 61-62; 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BER-
GEE, supra note 2, 404(16), at 404-124 to -127. For examples of some courts'
improper application of the doctrine in the context of rape cases, see cases
cited infra note 361.
127. See Weissenberger, Making Sense of Extrinsic Act Evidence: Federal
Rule of Evidence 404(b), 70 IOwA L. REv. 579, 579 (1985) ("[The frequency of
admission [of other crimes evidence] may belie the proposition that exclusion
is the general practice."); see also P. ROTHSTEIN, EVIDENCE IN A NUTSHELLu
STATE AND FEDERAL RULES 363 (2d ed. 1981) ("[lit is difficult to discern a the-
ory of admission under ... [Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)] that does not
implicitly rely on the argument that a propensity has manifest itself."); Slough
& Knightly, supra note 121, at 336 ("As matters now stand, the average prose-
cutor will find little difficulty in rooting out the proper precedent [for admit-
ting other crimes evidence] to fit the case in point.").
128. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee note ("No mechani-
cal solution is offered. The determination must be made whether the danger
of undue prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence in view of
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current rape-shield legislation is the failure to appreciate that
sexual conduct evidence may be used for a variety of purposes,
only one of which involves an inference regarding the victim's
character based upon outdated notions about women and sexu-
ality. Moreover, as will be discussed, 2 9 the probative value of
such evidence for its legitimate noncharacter use at times
clearly outweighs the dangers of impermissible character use.
The discussion above, although somewhat simplified, fairly
well describes the state of evidence law that existed prior to the
enactment of the rape-shield statutes. This preexisting struc-
ture should be kept in mind when examining the legislative re-
sponses, not only as a tool for comparison, but also to
understand why the existing rape-shield laws in many cases fail
to further the policies underlying evidence rules generally.
I. THE RAPE-LAW REFORM MOVEMENT
A. THE ORIGINS OF RAPE-LAw REFORM
As noted earlier, 30 feminist critics, supported by the law
enforcement establishment, persuaded legislators from coast to
coast to enact rape-shield laws significantly restricting the com-
mon-law evidence rules discussed above. Because the thesis of
this Article is that many of the reform statutes have gone be-
yond what was needed to effectuate their underlying purposes,
it is important to articulate those purposes and the context in
which they were formulated.
The impetus for rape-law reform in general may be traced
to the resurgence of the Women's Movement in the late 1960's
and its focus on rape and the administration of rape law as
powerful symbols of the oppression of women by men.'3 ' Femi-
nists maintained that the male-dominated legal system viewed
rape as "different"' 32 from other crimes because of a set of his-
torical attitudes about women and sexuality. 33 Some features
of the traditional ideology were a "double standard" for male
and female sexuality and a dichotomy between the "good" wo-
the availability of other means of proof and other factors appropriate for mak-
ing decisions of this kind under Rule 403.").
129. See infra notes 208-212 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
132. See Berger, supra note 3, at 7-10; see also 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM,
supra note 3, § 5382, at 508-31 (discussing the feminist critique of rape laws as
background to changes in the Federal Rules of Evidence).
133. See S. BROWNanLLER, supra note 4, at 16-30 (description of attitudes
toward women and rape through history).
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man and the "bad" woman. These dualities carried with them
notions that sex was normal for men but abnormal for women,
and that the chaste woman functioned as the exclusive posses-
sion of one man while the unchaste woman, "lacking status as a
sole possession, function[ed] as the outlet for 'normal' male pro-
miscuity.' 34 Feminists urged that, as a result of this tradi-
tional orientation, the crime of rape was designed not to protect
a woman's bodily integrity and freedom of sexual choice, but
rather to protect a man's right to the exclusive possession of a
chaste woman. 135
Traditional ideology also maintained that unchaste women
became either vindictive or susceptible to rape fantasies and in-
clined falsely to charge men with rape.136 This belief was based
on the notion that extramarital sexual activity was abnormal
for women.137 Judicial opinions frequently echoed the words of
Sir Matthew Hale, Lord Chief Justice of the King's Bench, that
rape "is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved,
and harder to be defended against by the party accused, tho
never so innocent.' 38 Distrust and contempt for the unchaste
female accuser was formalized into a set of legal rules unique
to rape cases. The most prominent rule allowed the use at trial
of evidence of the complainant's unchaste conduct. 139 These
134. Comment, Sexism in Society, supra note 14, at 938. See 23 C. WRIGHT
& K. GRAHAM, supra note 3, § 5382, at 512-14; Comment, Forcible and Statu-
tory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and Objectives of the Consent
Standard, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 72-74 (1952).
135. See S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 4, at 16-30; FORCIBLE RAPE, supra
note 10, at 2; 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAm, supra note 3, § 5382, at 513-15; Gold
& Wyatt, The Rape System. Old Roles and New Times, 27 CATH. U.L. REv. 695,
697-705 (1978); Ireland, supra note 17, at 187; Comment, Sexism in Society,
supra note 14, at 924-26; Comment, supra note 134, at 72-74. The exemption
for spousal rape is frequently cited as illustrative of the proposition that rape
laws were not designed to protect women from sexual assault. See FORCIBLE
RAPE, supra note 10, at 13-14; Comment, Sexism in Society, supra note 14, at
925-26.
136. See FORCIBLE RAPE, supra note 10, at 29; 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM,
supra note 3, § 5382, at 527-30; Note, supra note 21, at 1373-78; see also Berger,
supra note 3, at 21-22 ("From earliest times an overriding fear of false charges
has shaped the courts' responses to this crime."). For the influence of Wig-
more on this notion, see supra note 119.
137. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
138. 1 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 634 (1st Am.
ed. 1847). Hale was Lord Chief Justice of the King's Bench from 1671 to 1676
and author of THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN, published posthu-
mously in 1736. For a case prohibiting use of this cautionary jury warning, see
People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 873-74; 538 P.2d 247, 254, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 119, 126 (1975).
139. Other practices unique to rape cases and evincing suspicion and hostil-
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rules combined to shift the usual focus of a criminal trial from
an inquiry into the conduct of the offender to that of the moral
worth of the complainant.
Reformers also documented that suspicion and hostility to-
ward the rape complainant affected not only the legal rules ap-
plied to rape but also the discretionary, less visible aspects of
the criminal justice system. For example, police and examining
physicians-the complainant's first contacts with the system-
frequently expressed a lack of empathy with the complainant
along with judgmental attitudes toward her and even, at times,
a prurient interest in the sexual details of the incident.140 A
woman who did not fulfill the stereotype of a previously chaste
victim who had been attacked in a dark alley by a total stranger
and who had fought to the finish to preserve her chastity' 4 ' was
often viewed as having "precipitated" the attack or as having
given consent when none was given.142 Indeed, rape complain-
ity toward the complainant included the following- the requirement that the
testimony of the complainant be corroborated by other evidence, see supra
note 21 and accompanying text; special jury instructions voicing Sir Matthew
Hale's fears and mandating that "you examine the testimony of the [complain-
ant] with caution," Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d at 871, 538 P.2d at 252, 123 Cal.
Rptr. at 124; and a requirement unknown to prosecutions for other crimes in-
volving forcible or nonconsensual conduct-proof by the State that the com-
plainant had resisted the attack to the utmost of her physical ability as an
objective indication of her nonconsent, see supra note 20 and accompanying
text.
140. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 3, at 23-24; Gold & Wyatt, supra note 135,
at 705-12; Note, The Victim in a Forcible Rape Case: A Feminist View, 11 AM.
CRiM. L. REv. 335, 347-50 (1973).
141. See Berger, supra note 3, at 23-24 (quoting Comment, Rape in Illinois:
A Denial of Equal Protection, 8 J. MAR. J. PRAc. & PROC. 457, 469 (1975)).
Although, as Professor Vivian Berger observes, many people believe that rape
occurs only in this narrowly defined situation, she further notes that empirical
data disputes this belief. See Berger, supra note 3, at 24. A frequently cited
study by Menachim Amir, based on a sample of 646 rape victims and 1292 of-
fenders identified in police files of reported rapes in Philadelphia between
1958 and 1960, found that strangers comprised only 42.3% of forcible rapists.
M. AMIR, PATTERNs IN FORCIBLE RAPE 234 (1971). The breakdown in the re-
maining cases was as follows: stranger with general knowledge of the victim,
9.6%; acquaintance, 14.4%; close neighbor, 19.3%; close friend or boyfriend, 6%;
family friend, 5.3%; relative, 2.5%; no information, 0.6%. IdL A more recent
study of 1.5 million rapes and attempted rapes nationwide between 1973 and
1982, however, reports that two-thirds of rapes are committed by "strangers,"
as opposed to "non-strangers." See STATISTICS, supra note 4, BULL. 2-3. Be-
cause this survey does not define the terms "stranger" or "non-stranger," it is
not clear to what degree these findings vary from those of Amir.
142. See Note, supra note 140, at 339-40; Comment, Sexism in Society,
supra note 14, at 929-30. "Victim precipitation" is a label applied to cases
where the victim either puts herself in a vulnerable situation (hitchiking, go-
ing to a man's apartment) or retracts from an earlier agreement to have sex.
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ants as a whole stood a significantly higher chance than did vic-
tims of any other major felony of seeing their accusations
deemed "unfounded."'143
If the complainant's version nonetheless withstood official
scrutiny and the case proceeded to trial, the common-law rules
permitting proof of the complainant's sexual past resulted in
nothing less than character-assassination in open court. The
catch-phrase "victim on trial"144 captures the essence of this
criticism. This focus on the complainant's sex life led to insinu-
ations by defense attorneys that she "enjoyed' '145 the sexual act
in question and that she "asked for it" by her appearance or
conduct.146 Cross-examination often delved not only into the
complainant's chastity or lack thereof but also into matters
such as her use of contraceptives, attendance at nightspots,
adulterous relationships, illegitimate offspring, and so on.147
Amir, Victim Precipitated Forcible Rape, 58 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY & PO-
LICE SCI. 493, 493-97 (1967); see M. AMp,. supra note 141, at 264-66. It extends
notions of assumption of the risk and contributory fault to rape law. Berger,
supra note 3, at 26-27, 30; Ireland, supra note 17, at 189.
143. In 1974, for example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation reported
that 15% of rape complaints were determined by investigation to be un-
founded, that is, police determined that a rape did not occur. This figure com-
pared with a 4% "unfounded rate" for all other serious crimes. See FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES
10 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS]. Moreover, a
study of the Philadelphia Police Department during the last half of 1966 re-
vealed that approximately 20% of the rape complaints received were un-
founded. Comment, Police Discretion and the Judgment That a Crime Has
Been Committed-Rape in Philadelphia, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 277, 281 (1968).
The authors of the Philadelphia study believe that both the figures they ob-
tained as well as those reported by the FBI are misleadingly low because they
are based on the number of cases investigated as rapes, and not all rape com-
plaints are investigated as rape offenses. 1d. at 279 n.8. The authors concluded
that "probably at least 50%" of the actual rape complaints were unfounded.
1d. at 279 n.8. See also Berger, supra note 3, at 24 n.151 (citing sources on dif-
ferent estimates of police "unfounded" rates).
144. See Berger, supra note 3, at 12-13; see also Commonwealth v. Strube,
274 Pa. Super. 199, 207-08, 418 A.2d 365, 369 (1979) ("Indeed, in our present ad-
versarial system, the art of cross-examination is often employed not as a rapier
to reveal the nuances of a witness's testimony, but as a bludgeon to underscore
the complainant's possibly checkered past."), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 992 (1980).
For a graphic example of such inquiry, see BABCOCK, supra note 14, at 832-38.
145. Berger, supra note 3, at 13; Comment, Sexism in Society, supra note
14, at 932 n.71.
146. See supra note 142 and accompanying text; Note, supra note 8, at 624-
26.
147. See Berger, supra note 3, at 14 nn. 90 & 92. As Professor Vivian Ber-
ger notes, although objections to such questions were sometimes sustained,
"this type of questioning in open court wreaks almost as much psychological
havoc as would the necessity of responding." Id. at 15.
[Vol. 70:763
RAPE-SHIELD LAWS
The image of a typical rape trial put forth by reformers was
that of an inquisition into the moral worth of the complainant
to determine if she were deserving of the full protection of the
law. 148
The totality of these practices, feminists argued, deterred
victims from reporting rape to the authorities for fear of being
"twice traumatized"-first by the rape and then by the "sys-
tem."149 The claim was supported by statistical evidence indi-
cating that while the incidence of rape was steadily on the
rise,15 0 it was at the same time one of the most underreported
of serious crimes.151 Admittedly, numerous factors, such as the
148. See, e.g., Ireland, supra note 17, at 188; cf. 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRA-
HAM, supra note 3, § 5382, at 506 ("The standard defense strategy for punching
holes in a rape case was (and is) an attempt to destroy the credibility of the
complaining witness by smearing her as mentally unbalanced, or as sexually
frustrated, or as an over-sexed promiscuous whore.") (quoting S. Brownmiller,
Against Our Will, Paper, 262 (1976)).
Professors Charles Wright and Kenneth Graham observe that "good evi-
dence of the extent of abuse [by defense attorneys] is difficult to come by" and
therefore the evidence of such abuse is largely anecdotal. 23 C. WRIGHT & K.
GRAHAM, supra note 3, § 5382, at 496. This lack of authoritative documenta-
tion results from the fact that the prosecution cannot appeal a finding of not
guilty where a ruling in its favor would subject the accused to a second trial in
violation of the double jeopardy clause. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 420
U.S. 332, 339-53 (1975). Therefore, instances where such inquiry led to acquit-
tals do not appear in the appellate opinions. 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM,
supra note 3, at § 5382, at 496-97; cf Berger, supra note 3, at 14 n.91 (the prose-
cution's inability to appeal an acquittal sometimes leads judges to "overadmit"
defendants' evidence to avoid reversal).
149. See Bohmer & Blumberg, Twice Traumatized: The Rape Victim and
the Court; 58 JUDICATURE 391 (1975).
150. In 1974, the year in which rape-shield legislation was first enacted,
there were 55,210 forcible rapes and attempted rapes reported to police nation-
wide. See 1974 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 143, at 11. This figure
represents an increase of 49% since 1969-a slightly higher increase than for
any other violent crime. Id. at 22. Other violent crimes had increased as fol-
lows: murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, 40.3%; robbery, 48%; and aggra-
vated assault, 46.6%. Moreover, the rape "rate," defined as the number of
rapes per 100,000 inhabitants, had increased 41.8% since 1969 compared to a
40.3% increase in the violent crime rate and a 31.8% increase for all index
crimes. Id "Index Crimes" refers to seven offenses chosen by the FBI to
serve as an "index" for gauging fluctuations in the overall volume and rate of
crime. These offenses include: murder and nonnegligent manslaughter; forci-
ble rape; robbery; aggravated assault; burglary; larceny; auto theft; and arson
(added in 1979). See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME RE-
PORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 86 n.1 (1979).
151. A variety of estimates exists comparing the numbers of actual and re-
ported rapes. One frequently cited statistic estimated that forcible rape oc-
curred at three and one-half times the reported figure. See THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 21 (1968). This estimate was arrived
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fear of retaliation by the rapist, the desire to avoid publicity, or
the desire to protect close family members, may account for the
failure to report rape.1 52 Nonetheless, the legal system's hostil-
ity toward the rape victim has been widely perceived as the
prime deterrent to reporting.153
Empirical evidence demonstrated that jurors' attitudes re-
flected the prevailing cultural myths about women and rape.
In their classic study of jury behavior conducted between 1954
and 1958,154 Professors Harry Kalven, Jr. and Hans Zeisel re-
ported that in forty-two cases of rape in which the complainant
and assailant were not complete strangers, no extrinsic proof of
force existed, and there were not several assailants, 155 only
three convictions resulted, even though in those same cases,
presiding judges would have convicted seven times as often.1 56
Further, the authors produced substantial data that indicated
that jurors misused evidence of unchastity and improperly con-
sidered "victim-precipitating" conduct, such as going to a bar or
getting into a car with the defendant, to "penalize" those com-
plainants who did not fit the stereotype of the "good woman"
either by convicting the defendant of a lesser charge or by sim-
ply acquitting the defendant. 57 The study concluded that ju-
rors, in effect, "rewrite the law of rape" when the accuser is
deemed undeserving of its protection. 5 8
at by a survey of 10,000 households by the National Opinion Research Center
of the University of Chicago conducted in 1965 and 1966. That survey showed
a greater disparity between actual and reported rape than with regard to any
other violent crime. Id. Other estimates of the rape reporting rate run even
lower. See Note, supra note 21, at 1375 nn.68-69 (estimates of the percentage
of rapes actually reported run as low as five percent). In 1974, the FBI de-
dared that "of all the Crime Index offenses, law enforcement administrators
recognize that [forcible rape] is probably one of the most under-reported
crimes." 1974 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 143, at 22.
152. See Berger, supra note 3, at 24; Comment, Sexism in Society, supra
note 14, at 921-22.
153. See Berger, supra note 3, at 24; see also C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM,
supra note 3, § 5382, at 499-501 (rape-shield law most likely influences victim's
decision whether to testify or not; but degree of impact not proven). But see
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE
UNITED STATES 16 (1976) ("[under-reporting is] due primarily to the fear of
victims for their assailants and the sense of embarrassment over the
incident").
154. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 33 n.1 (1966).
155. Kalven and Zeisel define these types of rape as "simple" rapes. I&L at
252. If any one of these three factors is not present, then the rape is defined as
an "aggravated" rape. Id.
156. Id. at 252-54.
157. Id. at 249-51, 254.
158. Id. at 251. But see Rudstein, supra note 28, at 28; Tanford & Bocchino,
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These statistics on underreporting and jury behavior con-
vincingly refuted Sir Matthew Hale's thesis that complainants
possessed the advantage in rape cases and accordingly focused
public attention on the crime of rape as a major law enforce-
ment problem.15 9 The emergence of the feminist rape-reform
movement in the early 1970's coincided with our nation's preoc-
cupation with "law and order" and "crime in the streets," thus
creating a powerful coalition for change.160 Women's groups at
the grassroots level attracted crime-control advocates to their
cause by portraying the breakdown in the enforcement of rape
laws in apocalyptic terms.16 1 While not necessarily embracing
the feminist critique of rape law, police and prosecutors jumped
on the rape-reform bandwagon. Their rationale for change was
largely pragmatic: the legal system's treatment of rape victims
should be changed to encourage reporting of rape, which will
lead to the apprehension and conviction of rapists, which, in
turn, will deter future rapists. 62
The thrust of the reform movement was directed against
supra note 3, at 572-74. Professors David Rudstein, J. Alexander Tanford, and
Anthony Bocchino all argue that the study does not support the argument, fre-
quently made by reformers, that evidence of unchastity causes acquittals in
forcible rape cases, because it is not clear what percentage of the cases actually
involved unchastity evidence as opposed to "victim precipitation" evidence.
159. See Berger, supra note 3, at 29-31; Note, supra note 8, at 623-28. Re-
formers additionally pointed to low conviction rates in rape cases generally to
refute the notion that jurors tend to sympathize with rape complainants. In
1974, one year before the majority of rape-shield laws were passed, 35% of
adults prosecuted for forcible rape were convicted as charged (an additional
16% were convicted of a lesser crime), see 1974 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS,
supra note 143, at 24, while 61% of adults prosecuted for all crime index of-
fenses were found guilty as charged (an additional 9% were convicted of a
lesser crime), see id. at 46.
160. See supra notes 10, 17 and accompanying text; FORCIBLE RAPE, supra
note 10, at 46-47; Kneedler, supra note 33, at 461-63; Loh, supra note 10, at 571.
161. Illustrative is this call for action by the Michigan Women's Task Force
on Rape:
The problem of rape is rapidly approaching epidemic proportions.
Michigan legislators have a unique opportunity and a pressing respon-
sibility; immediate legal reform [is needed] to prevent the rape epi-
demic before it happens.... Without prompt action on this crisis,
hundreds of people will be assaulted while the assaulters continue to
go virtually free from any threat of conviction. This certainty far out-
weighs the uncertain benefits of more years of deliberation.
MICH. TASK FORCE ON RAPE, BACKGROUND MATERIAL FOR A PROPOSAL FOR
CRIMINAL CODE REFORM TO RESPOND TO MICHIGAN'S RAPE CRISIS 1 (1973),
quoted in FORCIBLE RAPE, supra note 10, at 1. See also Loh, supra note 10, at
571-72 (quoting a "legislative fact sheet" circulated by the women's lobby to
Washington legislators, sounding a similar alarm).
162. See 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 3, § 5382, at 495.
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the use at trial of the complainant's sexual history with persons
other than the accused. This practice was viewed as having the
greatest impact on the victims, 63 and thus on the under-
enforcement of rape laws. Specifically, reformers contended
that legislation restricting the common-law practice of delving
into the rape complainant's previous sexual activities would en-
courage victims to report rapes and cooperate in the prosecu-
tion of their assailants.16 In addition to shielding the
complainant from humiliating and harassing inquiry, restricting
the admissibility of evidence of unchastity would prevent juror
misuse of such evidence.1 65
More compelling than these instrumentalist arguments was
the claim by rape-shield proponents that the changing moral
climate in this country simply invalidated the underpinnings of
the common-law doctrine, rendering unchastity evidence irrele-
vant for its stated purposes.1 66 These advocates of reform legis-
lation pointed to contemporary research on sexual behavior
that demonstrated that the vast majority of young women in
our society-the primary targets of rapists-engage in consen-
sual sexual relations outside of marriage, and that a large ma-
jority of men surveyed considered this behavior normal and
acceptable.1 67 Because the decision to engage in consensual
163. See supra text accompanying note 2; supra note 152 and accompanying
text; 124 CONG. REC. 36,256 (1978) (statement of Sen. Bayh) ("The practice of
subjecting rape victims to such interrogation has been clearly shown to act as a
deterrent on effective law enforcement for the crime of rape."); Berger, supra
note 3, at 24, 31.
164. As one court has noted:
The basic purpose of [the rape-shield statute] is one of public pol-
icy: to provide rape and sexual assault victims greater protection
from humiliating and embarrassing public 'fishing expeditions' into
their past sexual conduct .... The statute represents one means cho-
sen by the general assembly to overcome the reluctance of victims of
sex crimes to report them for prosecution.
People v. McKenna, 196 Colo. 367, 371-72, 585 P.2d 275, 278 (1978) (emphasis in
original). See State v. Romero, 94 N.M. 22, 26, 606 P.2d 1116, 1120 (Ct. App.
1980) ("[lIt is clear.., that [the rape-shield statute] was intended to encourage
the reporting of rapes by minimizing intrusive inquiry into the personal affairs
of the victim."), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Fish, 102 N.M.
775, 701 P.2d 374, 377-78 (Ct. App. 1985).
165. See, e.g., People v. Thompson, 76 Mich. App. 705, 712, 257 N.W.2d 268,
272 (1977) ("Moreover, there is the possibility that in its deliberations the jury
will consider the 'bad character' or 'provocative behavior' of the rape victim
whose life history has been paraded before it in the most intimate detail.").
166. For a thorough development of this argument, see Ordover, supra
note 3, at 96-102.
167. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 3, at 55-56; Ordover, supra note 3, at 96,
99-102. A frequently cited study, based on a survey taken in 1972, see M.
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nonmarital sexual activity is no longer a decision to defy con-
ventional norms, the behavior is "character-neutral" and does
not support the inference "if she strayed once, she'll stray
again. '168
Once the notion of a character flaw is removed from the in-
ferential process, the mere fact that the complainant has previ-
ously engaged in consensual sexual activity affords no basis for
inferring consent on a later occasion. As one commentator has
noted, in light of current lifestyles, "one can presume that a
woman will freely choose her partners, picking some and re-
jecting others, in line with highly personal standards not sus-
ceptible of generalization.' 69 That the complainant lives with
her boyfriend, has borne children out of wedlock, or has affairs
with married men does not aid the jury in determining whether
she agreed to have sex with the accused on the occasion in
question. In summary, because nonmarital sexual activity is so
widespread and occurs under such an infinite variety of circum-
stances, the reformers argued, it simply lacks probative value as
a predictor of future behavior.1 70
The foregoing arguments demonstrating the irrelevance of
HUNT, SExuAL BEHAVIOR IN THE 1970's 16 (1974), found that of white women
between the ages of 18 to 24, 70% of the unmarried women had experienced
intercourse and 80% of the married women had engaged in premarital rela-
tions. See id. at 150. The study also showed that of the men surveyed, 66%
considered premarital sex acceptable for women if there was a strong affec-
tion; 75% found it acceptable for men if there was a strong affection. See id. at
116.
A more recent study proclaims:
It is the exceptional young person who has not had sexual inter-
course while still a teenager: Eight in ten males and seven in ten fe-
males report having had intercourse while in their teens. Only about
four percent of teenagers are married, and about 85 percent had inter-
course before marriage.
THE ALAN GUTTMACHER INSTITrE, TEENAGE PREGNANCY: THE PROBLEM
THAT HASN'T GONE AWAY 7 (1981), quoted in Note, Interpreting Missouri's
Rape Victim Shield Statute, 53 UMKC L. REV. 273, 277 (1985).
168. Ordover, supra note 3, at 97. See also People v. Blackburn, 56 Cal.
App. 3d 685, 690-91, 128 Cal. Rptr. 864, 867 (1976) ("The historical rule allowing
[evidence of unchastity] may be more a creature of a one-time male fantasy of
the 'girls men date and the girls men marry' than one of logical inference."); 2
D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 198[A], at 136 (Supp. 1980)
("[S]uch behavior is in most circumstances no longer considered an offense
against public morality, with the result that engaging in such conduct is no
longer seen as amounting to an indication of a character flaw likely to mani-
fest itself in repeated offenses against a moral standard.").
169. Berger, supra note 3, at 56.
170. See Ordover, supra note 3, at 102; see also Letwin, supra note 3, at 59-
61 (arguing that, if anything, the fact of a victim's earlier consent without
falsely charging rape enhances the victim's credibility).
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unchastity evidence were made with even greater force with re-
gard to the use of such sexual conduct evidence to impeach the
general credibility of the rape complainant.171 Earlier, Dean
Mason Ladd had made clear the illogic of this use of chastity
evidence, even under a Victorian moral code, noting that
"[h]istory contains the names of many highly respected persons
whose honor in telling the truth would not be questioned and
yet whose sex life would hardly be the model for future genera-
tions."'1 72 Thus, even if unchastity were a character flaw, it has
no relevance to general credibility. The limited use of sexual
conduct evidence to impeach only female witnesses in sexual
offense prosecutions 173 indicates that its relevance was actually
based on a sexist assumption that unchaste women will falsely
charge rape, regardless of their general credibility.
Even if one disputed the notion that the sexual revolution
rendered sexual conduct evidence irrelevant on the issues of
consent or credibility, there were still strong arguments for ex-
cluding much of it. Trial judges have the inherent power to ex-
clude relevant evidence whose probative value is substantially
outweighed by dangers such as jury prejudice and confusion,
needless cumulation of evidence, and waste of time.174 Further,
judges are empowered to control the scope of questioning to
prevent the needless embarrassment and harassment of wit-
nesses.' 75 When sexual conduct evidence is at issue, these coun-
tervailing considerations are particularly applicable. Admitting
such evidence creates not only the danger that the jury will pe-
nalize the victim for her past behavior and acquit the defendant
171. See Rudstein, supra note 28, at 42.
172. Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 166, 181
(1940).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 116-117.
174. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403. Rule 403 states that even relevant evi-
dence "may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence." Id. Unfair prejudice in this context means "an undue
tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not nec-
essarily, an emotional one." Id. advisory committee note.
175. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 611(a)(3). This rule states that courts "shall ex-
ercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses
and presenting evidence so as to... protect witnesses from harassment or un-
due embarrassment." But cf. Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 694 (1931)




on a "she got what she deserved" basis,176 but also the possibil-
ity that the victim will be humilated by the public airing of the
most intimate details of her personal life, thus deterring future
victims from reporting rapes to the authorities. 177
Finally, reformers emphasized the shortcomings of reputa-
tion evidence-the common-law mode of eliciting evidence of
sexual conduct.' 78 Reputation evidence is especially unreliable
and prejudicial when it relates to sexual matters. Because sex-
ual activity is usually conducted in private, the complainant's
reputation for "unchastity" tends to be little more than specu-
lation and exaggeration. 7 9
176. Letwin, supra note 3, at 57-58; see supra notes 157-158 and accompany-
ing text; 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 3, § 5238, at 416, 419-20.
177. See Berger, supra note 3, at 41, 45. There is some disagreement over
whether a court may properly consider the victim's privacy interests in deter-
mining whether the probative value of sexual conduct evidence is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Compare 22 C. WRIGHT & K.
GRAHAM, supra note 3, § 5238, at 420 ("[MNothing in the rule limits 'prejudice'
to instances of harm to the adversary.") (footnote omitted) with Tanford &
Bocchino, supra note 3, at 569-70. Professors J. Alexander Tanford and
Anthony Bocchino argue:
The issue is not whether evidence is prejudicial in the sense that it is
detrimental to someone involved in the trial. Rather, the question is
whether the evidence will arouse the jury's emotions of prejudice,
hostility, or sympathy. Arguments that sexual history evidence is
inadmissible because of its prejudicial impact on the rape victim miss
the point. Adverse psychological effects suffered by crime victims,
although regrettable, are not grounds for excluding probative
evidence.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Tanford and Bocchino contend that a statute may not, consistent with the
sixth amendment, require that evidence offered by a rape defendant satisfy a
standard of admissibility that is stricter than standards applied in other cases.
Id at 589. Several rape-shield statutes presently authorize courts to consider
the privacy interests of the complaining witness along with other factors in de-
termining whether to exclude otherwise relevant sexual conduct evidence. See
ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045 (Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86f (West
1985); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 233, § 21B (Law. Co-op. 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:84A-32.1 (West Supp. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3255 (Supp. 1985).
The Supreme Court of Vermont, however, recently held that the state rape-
shield statute's "private character" standard is synonymous with the tradi-
tional "unfair prejudice" test for admissibility when applied to sexual conduct
evidence. See State v. Patnaude, 140 Vt. 361, 376, 438 A.2d 402, 408 (1981); ac-
cord State v. Hudlow, 99 Wash. 2d 1, 13-14, 659 P.2d 514, 521 (1983) ("undue
prejudice" standard in the rape-shield statute contemplates prejudice to the
truthfinding process and not to the complainant).
178. See Ordover, supra note 3, at 104-05; Tanford & Bocchino, supra note
3, at 548.
179. See Ordover, supra note 3, at 104-05; see also 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRA-
HAM, supra note 3, § 5385, at 550 ("A defendant bent on smearing the victim
will find it much easier to produce witnesses who will give a low opinion of
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B. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS WITH RAPE-REFORM
LEGISLATION
Because the judicial branch failed to respond to these vari-
ous arguments by exercising its discretion and excluding evi-
dence of unchastity as irrelevant or prejudicial, reformers
sought a legislative solution. 8 0 Even though lawmakers over-
whelmingly agreed on the need for change, consensus on a stat-
utory formula was sorely lacking. Competing with reformers
for legislative recognition were civil liberties groups and some
scholars, who, although critical of the common-law rules, nev-
ertheless contended that sexual conduct evidence might in cer-
tain instances be highly relevant to the accused's defense.' 8 ' If
such were the case, exclusion of the evidence might violate the
dual sixth amendment guarantees of an effective defense: the
right to full cross-examination of the complainant insured by
the confrontation clause and the right to offer favorable de-
fense evidence by calling witnesses to establish the complain-
ant's prior sexual conduct guaranteed by the compulsory
process clause.'8 2 Opponents of restrictive rape-shield legisla-
tion relied primarily on two recent decisions of the United
her sexual morality or testify to supposed rumors of her conduct than to pro-
duce witnesses to specific instances of her conduct.") (footnote omitted).
180. Cf Commonwealth v. Majorana, 503 Pa. 602, 609, 470 A.2d 80, 83 (1983)
("It is a sad commentary that this change [from the automatic admissibility of
unchastity evidence] came about almost entirely by legislation instead of by
the development of common law.") (footnote omitted).
181. See supra notes 27-28; Amsterdam & Babcock, Proposed Position on
Issues Raised by the Administration of Laws Against Rape: Memorandum for
the ACLU of Northern California, reprinted in BABCOCK, supra note 14, at
840-43.
182. The sixth amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; [and] to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor."
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Together these clauses "entitle a defendant to present
a defense by guaranteeing him the right to produce and present evidence
through witnesses at trial." Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process:
A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REv. 567, 625
(1978).
In Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), the Supreme Court stated that
"[i]t cannot seriously be doubted at this late date that the right of cross-exami-
nation is included in the right of an accused in a criminal case to confront the
witnesses against him." Id at 404. In that case, the Court also held that the
right of confrontation is applicable to defendants in state prosecutions through
the operation of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 406. Similarly, in Washing-
ton v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967), the Court held that the compulsory process
clause is applicable to state criminal proceedings. Id at 19. It interpreted the
clause as not only insuring the right to compel the attendance of defense wit-
nesses, but also the right to introduce their testimony into evidence. Id. at 23.
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States Supreme Court declaring state exclusionary rules of evi-
dence unconstitutional in analogous factual settings. In both
cases, the Court employed a balancing test to reconcile the com-
peting interests involved.
In Chambers v. Mississippi,18 3 the Supreme Court held
that due process of law had been denied to a murder defendant
who had been thwarted in the exercise of both of these sixth
amendment rights. 8 4 The state courts had applied a combina-
tion of two otherwise valid Mississippi rules of evidence to pre-
vent Chambers from establishing at trial that another
individual, Gable McDonald, had confessed to the murder.
These two rules-the "voucher rule," which prohibited a party
from impeaching his own witness, l8 5 and the state hearsay rule,
having no exception for declarations against penal interest 86 -
prevented Chambers from cross-examining McDonald concern-
ing his written confession, which McDonald repudiated before
and during trial, and from calling witnesses to whom McDonald
had orally confessed his guilt.1 8 7
In reversing the conviction, the Court stressed that the ex-
cluded evidence was "critical to Chambers' defense."' 8 8 The
countervailing state interest, conversely, was hardly compel-
ling. The state did not even attempt to rationalize its voucher
rule,' . 9 which has been criticized as "archaic, irrational, and po-
tentially destructive of the truth-gathering process."'' 90 Simi-
larly, the ban against admitting hearsay declarations against
penal interest, which has been lifted in many states, served no
useful purpose in Chambers because the excluded statements
were highly trustworthy.' 9 1 The Court concluded that the
183. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
184. Id at 295-303.
185. The "voucher rule" is based on the notion, now largely discredited,
that a party "vouches for" his or her witness's credibility. See FED. R. EviD.
607 advisory committee note. The prosecution had not called McDonald, so
Chambers requested that McDonald be declared an adverse witness in order to
avoid the operation of the voucher rule. The court denied the request, and its
ruling was upheld by the state supreme court on the ground that McDonald
had not accused Chambers. Therefore McDonald's testimony was not "ad-
verse." See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 291-92.
186. Mississippi retained the common-law rule that only extra-judicial dec-
larations against pecuniary interest, not penal interest, may be admitted as ex-
ceptions to the hearsay rule. IHL at 299.
187. Id at 291, 295.
188. Id at 302.
189. Id at 297.
190. Id at 296 n.8.
191. Id at 300-01.
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state's interest in upholding these evidentiary rules could not
outweigh the accused's right to defend himself under the facts
and circumstances of the case.192
A far more compelling state interest was at issue the fol-
lowing year in Davis v. AZaska. 9 3 Consequently, the Court's
holding, declaring that the state's policy of protecting the confi-
dentiality of a juvenile offender's record must yield to the de-
fendant's right of confrontation, 194 weighed more heavily in the
rape-shield legislative process. The defendant in Davis, accused
of burglary and grand larceny in connection with the theft of a
safe from a bar, sought to cross-examine the state's key witness
concerning the latter's probationary status as a juvenile delin-
quent.' 95 Green, the witness, identified Davis at trial as one of
two men he had seen holding a crowbar in the location where
the police later found the missing and pried-open safe. The de-
fense sought to demonstrate that Green, fearful of jeopardizing
his probation, might have made a hasty and incorrect identifica-
tion of Davis either to shift suspicion away from himself or to
curry favor with the police. 196 The defense counsel was pre-
cluded from fully developing this line of inquiry because the
state invoked its juvenile-shield law, which mandates anonym-
ity for juvenile offenders in the interest of furthering the reha-
bilitative goals of the juvenile justice system.' 97
The Court balanced the parties' competing interests in
light of the circumstances of the case and held that "in this set-
ting," the defendant's right of confrontation was "paramount to
192. Id. at 302. Earlier in the opinion, the Court cautioned that
the right to confront and to cross-examine is not absolute and may, in
appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in
the criminal trial process. But its denial or significant dimunition
calls into question the ultimate "'integrity of the fact-finding pro-
cess"' and requires that the competing interest be closely examined.
Id. at 295 (quoting Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314, 315 (1969) (quoting Lin-
kletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 (1965))) (citations omitted). The Court
gave no examples of such potentially overriding state interests.
193. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
194. Id at 320-21.
195. Id. at 309-10. At the time of the trial and the events in question, the
witness, Green, was on probation after having been adjudicated a juvenile de-
linquent for burglarizing two cabins. Id. at 310-11.
196. Id. at 311. The safe had been discovered near Green's home. I& at
309.
197. Specifically, the state argued that exposing a juvenile's record "might
encourage the juvenile offender to commit future acts of delinquency, or cause
the juvenile offender to lose employment opportunities or otherwise suffer un-
necessarily for his youthful transgression." I& at 319.
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the State's policy of protecting a juvenile offender."'9 8 The de-
fendant had two weighty considerations on his side of the scale.
First, Green was a "crucial" witness; therefore, the "accuracy
and truthfulness of [his] testimony were key elements in the
State's case."'199 Second, the attempted cross-examination was
aimed at revealing "possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior mo-
tives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or per-
sonalities in the case at hand," as opposed to being a general
attack on Green's character.20 0
As to the countervailing state interest, the Court did not
question the validity of the state's policy of preserving the ano-
nymity of juvenile offenders.20 ' Nevertheless, it reaffirmed its
earlier holding in Alford v. United States20 2 that the trial
court's duty to protect witnesses from improper cross-examina-
tion that serves "merely to harass, annoy or humiliate" does
not extend to protecting witnesses from being discredited on
cross-examination. 20 3  The Davis Court concluded that
"[w]hatever temporary embarrassment might result to Green
or his family by disclosure of his juvenile record . . . is out-
weighed by petitioner's right to probe into the influence of pos-
sible bias in the testimony of a crucial identification witness. ' '2° 4
In contrast to the outmoded common-law rules set aside in
Chambers, laws protecting the privacy of both rape complain-
ants and juvenile offenders represent contemporary legislative
recognition of substantial state interests. Both types of statutes
also seek to promote certain ends that are unrelated to the
truthfinding process. With respect to rape-shield laws, the in-
terests furthered are those of both the complainant and the
state. The complainant is shielded from humiliating invasions
of her privacy, and the state benefits from the resulting in-
crease in reporting of rape and in the more effective enforce-
ment of rape laws. The Court in Davis did not clarify what
state interests, if any, might weigh more heavily in the balance
than those at stake in that case. The opinion strongly suggests,
198. Id.
199. Id at 317.
200. Id, at 316. As an example of a general character attack to impeach a
witness's credibility, the Court mentioned the use of prior criminal convic-
tions. Id. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
201. See Davis, 415 U.S. at 319 ("We do not and need not challenge the
state's interest as a matter of its own policy in the administration of criminal
justice to seek to preserve the anonymity of a juvenile offender.").
202. 282 U.S. 687 (1931).
203. Id. at 694, quoted in Davis, 415 U.S. at 320.
204. Davis, 415 U.S. at 319.
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however, that whenever rules exclude evidence to further non-
truthfinding, albeit substantial, state interests, they must yield
to the accused's need to elicit "crucial" defense evidence.20 5
The application of Davis to rape-shield legislation is lim-
ited, however, by a critical distinction between the two types of
shield laws. In addition to furthering goals unrelated to assess-
ing truth, rape-shield legislation generally promotes accurate
fact-finding. The juvenile-shield provision that was set aside in
Davis was designed solely to protect juvenile offenders, despite
the possibility of excluding highly relevant evidence. By com-
parison, the basic premise of the movement to exclude evidence
of unchastity was that such evidence is irrelevant in light of
contemporary sexual mores. Indeed, reformers claimed, inject-
ing evidence of unchastity into a rape trial distorts the fact-
finding process because jury prejudice towards the unchaste
complainant may result in unjust acquittals.20 6
If the evidence sought to be excluded by a rape-shield stat-
ute is irrelevant, or if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by prejudice, the sixth amendment does not mandate
its admissibility. It is beyond dispute that a criminal defendant
has no constitutional right to present irrelevant, prejudicial evi-
dence in his or her behalf.20 7 The debate over the proper scope
205. See id. at 317, 319-20.
206. See supra notes 156-158, 176 and accompanying text.
207. See Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 3, at 558, 560. Professors J. Alex-
ander Tanford and Anthony Bocchino contend:
Neither logic nor case law indicates that ... [t]he sixth amend-
ment ... give[s] a criminal defendant any greater ability to introduce
evidence than other litigants, nor does it redefine the rules of rele-
vance in criminal cases.
[T. Mhe validity of [a rape-shield] statute must be tested against
the traditional standard of admissibility: the sixth amendment guar-
antees that a criminal defendant will be able to introduce any evi-
dence probative of a material issue, unless the probative value is
outweighed by the prejudicial effect of the testimony.
Id. Accord Berger, supra note 3, at 56-67; Westen, supra note 28, at 205-13.
Professor Peter Westen goes one step further and argues that it is unconstitu-
tional for the trial judge to exclude evidence whose probative value is out-
weighed by prejudicial effect when the "less drastic alternative of sending the
evidence to the jury under cautionary instructions is available." Id. at 212.
Only if the evidence is so prejudicial as to induce the jury to disregard the cau-
tionary instructions and decide the case on irrational grounds may the court
exclude the evidence. Westen acknowledges that under certain circumstances
sexual conduct evidence might present this danger. Id. at 213.
Further, Tanford and Bocchino contend that only adverse consequences to
the fact-finding process are to be considered in determining the prejudicial ef-
fect of sexual conduct evidence; adverse consequences to the rape victim are
[Vol. 70:763
RAPE-SHIELD LAWS
of rape-shield legislation thus centered on an attempt to single
out those instances, if any, in which sexual conduct evidence
would be relevant and sufficiently critical to the defense such
that the sixth amendment would mandate its introduction-not
an easy task in light of the fact-bound nature of Chambers and
Davis.
Even the most ardent reformers acknowledged the high
probative value of past sexual conduct in at least two instances.
The first is when the defendant claims consent and establishes
prior consensual sexual relations between himself and the com-
plainant.20 8 The second is when the defendant denies alto-
gether engaging in the sexual act in question and proves
specific sexual acts between the complainant and another man
at the relevant time, such proof sufficing to prove an alterna-
tive explanation for the physical consequences of the alleged
rape.20 9 As to the first use, although the evidence is offered to
prove consent, its probative value rests on the nature of the
complainant's specific mindset toward the accused rather than
on her general unchaste character.2 10 As to the second use, the
accused is denying altogether the sexual act in question; he is
not even claiming consent. Moreover, because such proof is
limited in time and to the issue of identity, it has minimal prej-
udicial effect.2 11 It is generally agreed that sexual conduct evi-
dence in both of these narrow sets of circumstances has far
higher probative value and less prejudicial effect than evidence
of a general lack of chastity.212 Moreover, excluding such evi-
dence arguably denies the accused a fair opportunity to rebut
the charges against him.
not constitutionally permissible grounds for excluding otherwise relevant evi-
dence. See supra note 177.
208. See, e.g., infra notes 250-256 and accompanying text; S. BROWNMILLER,
supra note 4, at 386; Berger, supra note 3, at 58-59; Rudstein, supra note 28, at
34-35.
209. See infra notes 265-270 and accompanying text. Physical consequences
of rape include pregnancy, venereal disease, injury, and the presence of semen.
210. See supra note 109 and accompanying text; Berger, supra note 3, at 58-
59. Professor Vivian Berger states:
The inference from past to present behavior does not, as in cases of
third party acts, rest on highly dubious beliefs about "women who do"
and "women who don't" but rather relies on common sense and prac-
tical psychology. Admission of the proof "supplies the accused with a
circumstance making it probable that he did not obtain by violence
what he might have secured by persuasion .... "
Id. (quoting Bedgood v. State, 115 Ind. 275, 279, 17 N.E. 621, 623 (1888)).
211. See infra notes 269-270 and accompanying text.
212. See Berger, supra note 3, at 57-69; Rudstein, supra note 28, at 34-40.
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Beyond these two instances, there was little consensus
about what the Constitution requires. 213 Drafters of rape-shield
legislation viewed the challenge facing them as one of devising
a scheme that would allow for the introduction of constitution-
ally compelled sexual conduct evidence while at the same time
protecting the complainant and the fact-finding process against
its irrelevant and prejudicial uses. As stated by Professor Viv-
ian Berger in her comprehensive article on the subject, "[t]he
problem is to chart a course between inflexible legislative rules
and wholly untrammeled judicial discretion: The former
threatens the rights of defendants; the latter may ignore the
needs of complainants. 214
III. AN ALTERNATIVE LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
The response of state legislatures to advocates of rape-
shield legislation was swift and far-reaching. By 1976, over half
of the states had enacted statutes governing the admissibility of
sexual conduct evidence in rape trials.215 At present, forty-
eight states, the federal government, and the military have
such provisions; one state has reached a similar result by judi-
cial decision.216 Despite this near unanimity in the adoption of
reform legislation, the laws themselves vary widely in scope,
reflecting a range of political compromises with regard to the
competing interests of the state, the complainant, and the ac-
cused. Before discussing the application of these various statu-
tory formulae to specific cases, I will propose an alternative
solution. This is a legislative solution that synthesizes the pre-
vious discussions into a functional and workable structure that
both reflects the intent of the reformers and minimizes any
conflict with an accused's sixth amendment rights.
As noted earlier, before the enactment of rape-shield laws,
evidence of the complaining witness's sexual conduct was
treated as a species of character proof.217 Evidence that a com-
plainant had engaged in sexual relations outside of marriage
was admissible to establish unchaste character, from which the
inference of consent on a particular occasion could be drawn.218
The purpose and effect of the rape-law reform movement was
213. 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, surra note 3, § 5387, at 574.
214. Berger, supra note 3, at 69.
215. See supra note 3.
216. See supra note 3. For a list of rape-shield statutes currently in force,
see infra app. (Table 1).
217. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
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to highlight the sexist assumptions behind this evidentiary doc-
trine.2 1 9 Reformers convincingly demonstrated that the con-
cept of unchastity as a character trait, from which consent
could be inferred, was simply outmoded in light of contempo-
rary sexual mores and the changed status of women in our soci-
ety. Empirical data showed that the world of women does not
neatly divide into the chaste and the unchaste, or those "who
don't" and those "who do. '220
The appropriate legislative response to this new outlook
would have been simply to abolish the outmoded, sexist-based
use of sexual conduct evidence while permitting other uses of
such evidence to remain. Two of those other uses have already
been mentioned, namely, evidence of prior sexual conduct be-
tween the complainant and the accused to prove consent, and
evidence of prior sexual conduct between the complainant and
others to provide an alternative explanation for the physical
consequences of the alleged rape.221 Other inoffensive uses of
sexual conduct evidence that do no violence to the policies un-
derlying the rape-shield statutes will be discussed shortly.
None of those evidentiary uses rests on the anachronistic and
invidious inference of unchaste character, that is, "if she con-
sented with one man, she probably consented with others."
Moreover, such noncharacter uses of sexual conduct evidence
may be essential to the establishment of a defense. Therefore,
to prohibit them might violate the accused's sixth amendment
rights.
The invidious unchaste-character inference could have
been abolished simply by amending the rule that permits the
accused to elicit evidence of a pertinent trait of the victim's
character.222 Such an amendment might take the following
form:
In a prosecution for rape, evidence that the victim has engaged in
consensual sexual conduct with persons other than the accused is not
admissible to support the inference that a person who has previously
engaged in consensual sexual conduct is for that reason more likely to
consent to the sexual conduct with respect to which rape is alleged.
Evidence of consensual sexual conduct on the part of the victim may,
219. See supra notes 130-139 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 166-173 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 208-212 and accompanying text. These two uses are
permitted in the federal approach, see, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 412(b), but there are
other inoffensive uses of sexual conduct evidence that should be permitted.
See infra notes 302-516 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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however, be admissible for other purposes.22 3
This proposed amendment is nothing more than a specialized
application of the long-standing doctrine, now codified in Rule
404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, that prohibits using ev-
idence of a person's "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" to prove
that person's bad character as the basis for inferring conduct on
a specific occasion.224 Employing the vell-established concept
of multiple admissibility,22 5 Rule 404(b) permits evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts for other than propensity pur-
poses, such as to prove identity, opportunity, common plan or
scheme, and for other purposes not specifically mentioned in
the rule.
Indeed, the multiple admissibility concept underlies all of
the other relevance rules presently codified in Article IV of the
Federal Rules of Evidence that deal with recurring items of cir-
cumstantial evidence. For example, evidence that a person
made repairs after an accident is not admissible on the issue of
negligence,22 6 but it may be admitted when offered to prove
ownership or control of property.227 An analogous rule applies
with regard to evidence that a person was or was not insured
against liability; such evidence is not admissible on the issue of
negligence but may be offered to prove ownership or control.228
Indeed, Rule 412, the federal rape-shield provision, stands alone
in Article IV in not limiting its prohibition of sexual conduct
evidence to a particular impermissible inference; sexual con-
duct evidence is prohibited for all purposes unless it falls
within one of the rule's narrow exceptions.2 2 9 All of the other
exclusionary provisions of Article IV recognize that a single
item of evidence may be prohibited or admitted depending
upon the purpose for which the evidence is offered in a particu-
223. This proposal is set forth in full in the Conclusion as an amendment to
Federal Rule of Evidence 404. Although the proposal is referred to as a "legis-
lative solution," it may be cast either in statutory or rule form depending upon
the source of evidentiary law in a particular jurisdiction.
224. See supra notes 120-126 and accompanying text; FED. R. EviD. 404(b).
225. See supra note 122 and accompanying text; FED. R. EVID. 105.
226. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 407.
227. Id. Such evidence may also be admitted to prove the "feasibility of
precautionary measures" if the defendant contends that it was not feasible to
take such measures. See id
228. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 411.
229. FED. R. EVID. 412. The three exceptions are: 1) evidence of past sex-
ual behavior with the accused offered to prove consent; 2) evidence of past sex-
ual behavior with persons other than the accused, offered to provide an
alternative source of semen or injury; and 3) evidence of past sexual behavior
that is "constitutionally required to be admitted." FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)-(2).
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lar case.230 Of course, the court must determine, on a case-by-
case basis, whether the probative value of the evidence in prov-
ing the permissible inference is substantially outweighed by the
danger that the jury will use it for the impermissible infer-
ence.231 Similarly, under the statute proposed above, the court
would balance the probative value of the evidence in proving
any noninvidious inference against the danger that the jury
would rely on the invidious inference of consent.
Finally, regarding the minority of states that permitted evi-
dence of unchastity for the purpose of impeaching the rape
complainant's credibility,232 this sexually discriminatory use
could have been barred by a simple rule or amendment to the
rule permitting character evidence to impeach credibility.
2 33
Such a provision might read as follows:
In a prosecution for rape, evidence that the victim has engaged in
consensual sexual conduct is not admissible to support the inference
that a person who has previously engaged in consensual sexual con-
duct is for that reason less worthy of belief as a witness.2 4
Such a rule would be analogous to Rule 610 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, which similarly puts to rest the archaic
practice of allowing parties to introduce evidence of a witness's
religious belief or opinions "for the purpose of showing that by
reason of their nature [the witness's] credibility is impaired or
enhanced." 235 Now, for example, proof that a witness is an
atheist may not be offered to show that such witness is unwor-
thy of belief.23 6 The Advisory Committee Notes make clear,
however, that other uses of such evidence are still permitted,
such as to show interest or bias on the part of the witness based
upon a church affiliation. Similarly, evidence of the complain-
ant's previous sexual conduct with someone other than the ac-
cused may be relevant to show her motive for fabricating the
230. See FED. R. EvID. 407-411.
231. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 404(b) advisory committee note; R. LEMPERT &
S. SALTZBURG, supra note 67, at 187, stating-
Even when an exception to one of the 'relevance rules' .. . exists,
the trial court has discretion to exclude the information if the judge
thinks that the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the
usual counterweights to relevance. Admission is not required simply
because the conditions for an exception have been met.
232. See supra notes 115-117 and accompanying text.
233. For discussion of the existing rule, see supra note 110 and accompany-
ing text.
234. This proposal is similarly set forth in the Conclusion as an addition to
Rule 608 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
235. FED. R. EviD. 610.
236. See C. McCORMICK, supra note 21, § 48, at 113-15.
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charge237 or to specifically rebut elements of her testimony.238
These examples of attacks on the complainant's credibility are
distinct from reliance on the inference that merely because the
complainant is unchaste, she is more likely to lie under oath.
The basic problem with existing rape-shield legislation is
its failure to distinguish between benign and invidious uses of
sexual conduct evidence. This failure stems from a mispercep-
tion by the drafters of the precise wrong to be redressed by re-
form legislation. The result is not merely bad evidence law; in
many instances, the result is constitutional problems that stem
from unnecessarily broad enactments. These various problems
could have been avoided in the four sets of statutes and case
law applying them if the legislators had clearly understood the
underlying evidentiary concepts and had properly incorporated
those concepts in the rape-shield statutes.239
IV. ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF EXISTING
RAPE-SHIELD LEGISLATION
A. THE MICHIGAN APPROACH
Statutes adopting the Michigan approach are characterized
by a general prohibition of sexual conduct evidence, subject to
certain enumerated exceptions. These highly specific excep-
tions reflect legislative efforts to determine precisely those cir-
cumstances in which sexual conduct evidence is highly relevant
and material to the presentation of a defense and, therefore,
constitutionally required. In addition to their substantive re-
strictions, many Michigan-type statutes provide for an in cam-
era proceeding as a condition precedent to admissibility in
order to provide further protection to the interests of the com-
plainant and the state.2 40 In some jurisdictions, the court sim-
ply determines, after a closed hearing, whether the proffered
evidence falls within an enumerated exception and should
237. See infra notes 302-339 and accompanying text.
238. See infra notes 435-452 and accompanying text.
239. This is not to say that the reformers were unable to grasp the funda-
mentals of evidence law. It may be more fair to state that they lacked confi-
dence in a predominantly male judiciary to apply fairly a rule that allowed the
judiciary considerable discretion. See Amsterdam & Babcock, Proposed Posi-
tion on Issues Raised by the Administration of Laws Against Rape: Memoran-
dum for the ACLU of Northern California, reprinted in BABCOCK, supra note
14, at 843 ("We are... loath to leave determinations of general 'relevancy' to
judges who are too frequently male and too frequently imbued with unreal
and insensitive attitudes toward women's sexual attitudes and experiences.").
240. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
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therefore be admitted.241 Under most of the statutes, however,
the court is given discretion to exclude the evidence even if it
falls within the exception if its probative value is outweighed
by prejudicial effect under the particular circumstances. 242 Fi-
nally, with regard to the form of the evidence, several Michi-
gan-style statutes absolutely prohibit reputation or opinion
testimony, thus permitting only testimony about specific in-
stances of sexual conduct. 43
Only one exception is common to all Michigan-type stat-
utes; all permit the introduction of evidence of sexual conduct
241. See ALA. CODE § 12-21-203(d) (Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3(C)
(1982); see also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-7(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985)
(hearing required only if defense has evidence of sexual conduct between com-
plainant and accused to impeach complainant's denial); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 45-5-511(4) (1985) (hearing out of presence of jury).
242. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2) (West Supp. 1985) (no hearing re-
quired for evidence of sexual conduct with accused)*; IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-
4-4(c) (Burns 1985) (hearing out of presence of jury); KY. REv. STAT.
§ 510.145(b) (1985); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461(A) (1982); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 233, § 21B (Law. Co-op. 1985) (hearing out of presence of jury); MiCH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (West Supp. 1985) (hearing is optional, but bal-
ancing of probative value against prejudicial effect is required); MINN. R. EviD.
404(c) (hearing out of presence of jury); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.015 (Vernon
Supp. 1986)*; NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-321(2) (Supp. 1984)*; N.C.R. EVID. 412*;
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(D)-(E) (Page Supp. 1984); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3104(b) (Purdon 1983)*; S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-659.1 (Law. Co-op.
1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-17-119 (1982) (no hearing required for evidence of
sexual conduct with accused)*; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3255 (Supp. 1985); VA.
CODE § 18.2-67.7 (1982)*; W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-11 (1984) (hearing, out of pres-
ence of jury, not required if rebuttal of sexual conduct evidence introduced by
prosecution)*; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.31(11) (West 1985) (no hearing required,
but court determines admissibility upon pretrial motion).
*These statutes do not explicitly call for balancing probative value against
prejudicial effect; they require the court to determine the "relevancy" of sex-
ual conduct evidence falling within an exception.
No hearing of any kind is provided in the rape-shield laws of Louisiana,
Maine, and New Hampshire. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:498 (West 1981);
ME. R. EviD. 412; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:6 (Supp. 1983).
243. See ME. R. EVID. 412; MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461A(a) (1982); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 491.015(1) (Vernon Supp. 1986); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-321(1)
(Supp. 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3255(1) (Supp. 1985); VA. CODE § 18.2-
67.7(A) (1982). Three additional states prohibit only reputation testimony. See
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(3) (West Supp. 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:498
(West 1981); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 233, § 21B (Law. Co-op. 1985). The Tennes-
see rape-shield law is an anomaly. Only evidence of specific instances of sex-
ual conduct are prohibited, unless the issue is consent of the victim, and
relevance is determined out of the jury's hearing. Therefore, reputation and
opinion evidence are theoretically admissible on any other issue. See TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-17-119 (1982). Thus, there is nothing to prevent a witness
from testifying as to the complainant's reputation for unchastity to raise the
inference of consent.
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between the complainant and the accused.244 Other exceptions
vary widely in number and nature. At one extreme are five
states that have no additional exceptions; only evidence of sex-
ual conduct between the complainant and the accused is admis-
sible.2 45 At the other extreme are four states that have three
further exceptions. 246 In the middle are seventeen states that
have either one or two additional exceptions.247 Clearly this
spectrum of admissibility reflects a lack of consensus among
state legislatures concerning the circumstances under which
such evidence must be admitted to accommodate the needs of
the accused.
The discussion below examines these various statutory ex-
ceptions, the frequency of their inclusion in the Michigan-style
statutes, and the judicial response to defendants' efforts to in-
troduce sexual conduct evidence prohibited by statute. This
survey will show that many of the statutes fail to afford the ac-
cused the opportunity to present sexual conduct evidence
which is indisputably relevant and necessary to the presenta-
tion of a legitimate defense theory. On one level, the problem
is simply a failure to codify a sufficient number of exceptions;
the case law amply demonstrates the need to amend many of
these statutes by providing more bases for admitting sexual
conduct evidence. More significant, however, is the fact that
the common element linking each of these relevant uses of sex-
ual conduct evidence seems to have escaped the notice of the
drafters-none requires reliance on the invidious common-law
notions that a woman's consent to sexual relations with one
man implies either consent to relations with others or a lack of
credibility.
A key point to keep in mind throughout the following dis-
cussion is that the alternative legislative solution proposed ear-
lier,2 48 which simply abolishes those invidious uses, would avoid
244. Under several statutes, such proof may be offered only on the issue of
consent. See infra note 263 and accompanying text.
245. See ALA. CODE § 12-21-203(c) (Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 115-7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (may be introduced on cross-examination of
complainant; extrinsic evidence admissible only if complainant denies prior
sexual activity with accused); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:498 (West 1981); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:6 (Supp. 1983); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3104(a)
(Purdon 1983) (admissible solely on the issue of consent).
246. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461A(a) (1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.015
(Vernon Supp. 1986); N.C.R. EVID. 412; VA. CODE § 18.2-67.7(A)-(B) (1982).
247. For a breakdown of statutory exceptions under each Michigan-type
statute, see infra app. (Table 2).
248. See supra text accompanying notes 223, 234.
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the problems faced by the courts in dealing with these highly
restrictive statutes. It would provide the needed flexibility to
admit sexual conduct evidence on a case-by-case basis and
thereby vindicate the legitimate needs of the accused while do-
ing no damage to the policies underlying the legislation. Such
an accommodation of the interests of the complainant and the
accused is possible simply because the proposed solution ex-
cludes only irrelevant uses of sexual conduct evidence, and the
accused can hardly claim a constitutional entitlement to pres-
ent irrelevant evidence on his behalf.29 Indeed, in many cases
decided under the current statutes, courts have admitted sexual
conduct evidence by circumventing the explicit prohibitions on
its use and, in effect, rewriting the statutes in a manner consis-
tent with the solution proposed in this Article.
1. Bases of Admissibility of Sexual Conduct Evidence Under
the Michigan Approach: The Statutory Exceptions
a. Evidence of sexual conduct between the complainant and
the accused
All twenty-five statutes adopting the Michigan approach al-
low the accused to introduce evidence of prior sexual conduct
between himself and the complainant. The high probative
value and minimal prejudicial effect of this evidence have been
discussed.250 Rather than relying on the invidious inference
that consent with one implies consent with others, this evi-
dence is probative of the complainant's state of mind toward
the particular defendant, permitting an inference that the state
of mind continued to the occasion in question.251
Indeed, excepting this category of evidence from the gen-
eral prohibition of sexual conduct evidence provides a symme-
try with the traditional use of "other crimes" evidence of
defendants in rape and other sexual offense prosecutions.
Where the accused's previous sexual crimes were committed
249. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 208, 210 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 208, 210 and accompanying text; see also Letwin,
supra note 3, at 72. Professor Leon Letwin noted:
The goal of rationally untangling what happened between the
two persons on the charged occasion requires one to understand the
history of their sexual relationship. Quite apart from any character
implications, this prior relationship bears too heavily on the complain-
ant's probable conduct on the charged occasion, as well as on the mo-
tivation for her present accusation.
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against the present complainant, courts generally admit such
evidence under an exception to the ban on propensity evi-
dence.25 2 The theory is that the accused has a "lustful" disposi-
tion toward a particular individual, as opposed to a generally
bad character or sexually deviate nature; the existence of that
mindset makes repetition of the offense against the particular
complainant more likely.2 53
One can, to be sure, imagine instances in which evidence of
sexual conduct between the accused and the complainant would
not be relevant to prove consent, such as the case of a single
sexual encounter remote in time from the present occurrence.
Two Michigan-type statutes thus specifically require that the
sexual conduct between the accused and accuser be reasonably
close in time to the charged conduct.2- The remaining statutes,
however, do not limit the evidence in this fashion, but instead
implicitly adopt the rationale put forth by the North Carolina
legislature:
The fact that the defendant and the victim have previously engaged in
sexual relations is likely enough to demonstrate some particular bias
of the victim against the defendant, or some particular motive to fal-
sify an accusation or alter or misinterpret the facts of an encounter
between them, that evidence of this type of activity ought to be admis-
sible. This behavior is also less likely to create the kind of prejudice
which sexual behavior of a more general nature might create.
2 5 5
252. See, e.g., People v. Sylvia, 54 Cal. 2d 115, 119-20, 351 P.2d 781, 785, 4
Cal. Rptr. 509, 513 (1960); Woods v. State, 250 Ind. 132, 144, 235 N.E.2d 479, 486
(1968).
253. See Gregg, Other Acts of Sexual Misbehavior and Perversion as Evi-
dence in Prosecutions for Sexual Offenses, 6 ARIz. L. REV. 212, 214, 218-21
(1965). For a criticism of this doctrine, see R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra
note 67, at 229-30.
254. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491:015 (Vernon Supp. 1986); VA. CODE § 18.2-
67.7 (1982); see also State v. Boyd, 643 S.W.2d 825, 829-30 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)
(upholding the trial court's exclusion of evidence of sexual relations between
complainant and defendant four and five months prior to alleged rape as not
"reasonably contemporaneous" with alleged rape; trial court had admitted evi-
dence of sexual relations five days before incident); Amsterdam & Babcock,
Proposed Position on Issues Raised by the Administration of Laws Against
Rape: Memorandum for the ACLU of Northern California, reprinted in BAB-
COCK, supra note 14, at 841 (evidence of sexual conduct between complainant
and accused more than six months preceding or following alleged rape is not
admissible).
255. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE 1977 GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA: SEXUAL ASSAuLTS 92 (1977). See MINN. R.
EVID. 404(1) committee comment ("The one year limitation is arbitrary and
may be unconstitutional. A sufficient safeguard is contained in the require-
ment that the probative value must not be substantially outweighed by the in-
flammatory and prejudicial nature of the evidence.").
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This approach is preferable, particularly in light of the trial
court's power to exclude evidence whose probative value is out-
weighed by its prejudicial effect in particular cases. 25 6
Indeed, in one class of cases, several courts have upheld the
exclusion of evidence of sexual conduct between the accused
and the complainant because its probative value was out-
weighed by its prejudicial effect. These were cases in which the
allegation was of a gang rape by several men, only one of whom
previously had had consensual sexual relations with the com-
plainant. For example, in People v. Williams,25 7 four defend-
ants accused of a gang rape claimed that the complainant
consented to the various acts of sexual intercourse with them
as a group.25 8 They sought to prove that she had previously en-
gaged in consensual sexual relations with one of the defend-
ants.2 9 The Michigan Supreme Court upheld the trial court's
exclusion of this evidence, finding "little, if any, logic to the de-
fendants' argument" that because the complainant might have
consented in the past to sexual relations with defendant Wil-
liams, she "would more probably have consented.., to group
intercourse with three other men in his company. '260
There is, however, a restrictive clause in several of the stat-
utory exceptions permitting evidence of sexual conduct be-
tween the complainant and the accused that should be
removed. As recognized by the North Carolina legislature in
the commentary quoted above, such evidence may be probative
of a defense theory other than consent, such as bias or a motive
to falsify the charges. To explore this possibility, assume that
the defendant denies altogether engaging in the sexual act in
256. Most Michigan-style statutes authorize courts to exclude evidence fall-
ing within an exception where probative value is outweighed by prejudicial ef-
fect, see supra note 242 and accompanying text, therefore, the court might
exclude evidence of sexual conduct between the complainant and the accused
if the inference of present consent from past consent was not supportable. A
court might do likewise under the alternative solution proposed in this Article,
see supra text accompanying note 223, because that formulation similarly opts
for blanket treatment of evidence of sexual conduct between the complainant
and the accused. But cf. Testerman v. State, 61 Md. App. 257, 262-66, 486 A.2d
233, 235-37 (1985) (holding that the trial court's exclusion of evidence of sexual
conduct between complainant and accused was an error).
257. 416 Mich. 25, 330 N.W.2d 823 (1982).
258. Id. at 31, 330 N.W.2d at 825.
259. I.
260. Id. at 26, 330 N.W.2d at 827. Accord In re Nichols, 2 Kan. App. 2d 431,
436, 580 P.2d 1370, 1375 (1978) (upholding the trial court's exclusion of evi-




question and further contends that his former lover, the alleged
victim, had a motive to fabricate the charge of rape. Assume
further that their prior intimacies were inextricably linked to
the motive to charge falsely, for example, that she accused him
because he threatened to reveal their adulterous relations to
her husband. Several cases have held, on the authority of Da-
vis v. Alaska,261 that the accused is constitutionally entitled to
elicit evidence of sexual conduct on the part of the complainant
that is probative of a claim of bias or motive to fabricate the
charge.262 Yet, seven of the twenty-five statutes that except ev-
idence of sexual conduct between the complainant and the ac-
cused from their general prohibition explicitly limit its
admissibility to the issue of consent;263 further, only one of the
seven provides an additional exception for admitting proof of
sexual conduct on the issue of motive to testify falsely.26 Thus,
in six states adopting the Michigan approach, if evidence of the
complainant's motive to falsify also reveals prior sexual con-
duct with the accused, that avenue of impeachment is fore-
closed to an accused who does not additionally claim consent as
a defense. No cases have yet arisen claiming error in the appli-
cation of these provisions. They should be amended, however,
to remove this unnecessary and harmful restriction.
b. Evidence of specific instances of sexual conduct to prove
an alternative source of the physical consequences
of the alleged rape
The next most common exception is contained in fifteen of
the twenty-five Michigan-type statutes. Under this exception,
the accused may introduce evidence of specific instances of sex-
ual conduct between the complainant and individuals other
261. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
262. See infra notes 302-334 and accompanying text.
263. See ME. R. EVID. 412(b)(2); MINN. R. EviD. 404(c)(1)(A)(ii); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 491.015(1) (Vernon Supp. 1986); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-321(2)(b) (Supp.
1984); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3104(a) (Purdon 1983); VA. CODE § 18.2-
67.7(A)(2) (1982); W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-11(a) (1984). The Nebraska statute fur-
ther requires that the evidence of sexual conduct between the accused and the
complainant "shows such a relation to the conduct involved in the case and
tends to establish a pattern of conduct or behavior on the part of the victim as
to be relevant to the issue of consent." NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-321(2)(b) (Supp.
1984). Several other statutes have a similar standard, but apply it to evidence
of sexual conduct between the complainant and persons other than the ac-
cused. See infra note 342 and accompanying text. The Nebraska provision,
which would exclude evidence of occasional sexual encounters under disparate
circumstances between the complainant and the accused, is of dubious validity.
264. See VA. CODE § 18.2-67.7(B) (1982).
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than himself to prove that such other individuals were the
source of certain physical consequences of the alleged rape.26 5
This evidence of course has probative value only in cases in
which the defendant denies engaging in the sexual act in ques-
tion, as opposed to claiming that a consensual act of intercourse
occurred.
To corroborate its proof that a rape occurred, the state may
offer evidence that a medical examination, conducted shortly
after the alleged rape, revealed the presence of semen in the
complainant's vagina. The defendant should then be permitted
to prove that the complainant had intercourse with X close in
time to the alleged rape, which raises the inference that X, not
the defendant, was the source of the semen.266 Similarly, if the
prosecution contends that venereal disease, pregnancy, or an in-
jury, such as a ruptured hymen or bruised vagina, resulted
from the rape, the defendant would be allowed to prove specific
265. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2) (West Supp. 1985) (admissible to
show source of semen, pregnancy, injury, disease); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-
4(b)(2) (Burns 1985) (admissible to prove someone other than defendant com-
mitted rape); ME. R. EVID. 412(b)(1) (admissible to show source of semen, in-
jury); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461(A) (1982) (admissible to show source of
semen, pregnancy, disease, trauma); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 21B (Law.
Co-op. 1985) (admissible to show conduct of the victim is the cause of any
physical feature, characteristic, or condition of victim); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 750.520j(1)(b) (West Supp. 1985) (admissible to show source of semen,
pregnancy, disease); MINN. R. Evm. 404(c)(1)(B) (admissible to show source of
semen, pregnancy, disease); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.015(1)(2) (Vernon Supp.
1986) (admissible to show source of semen, pregnancy, disease); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 45-5-511(4)(b) (1985) (admissible to show source of semen, pregnancy,
disease); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-321(2)(a) (Supp. 1984) (admissible to show
source of any physical evidence including, but not limited to, semen, injury,
blood, saliva, and hair); N.C. R. EvID. 412 (admissible to show that act charged
not committed by defendant); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(D) (Page Supp.
1984) (admissible to show source of semen, pregnancy, disease); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-3-659.1(1) (Law. Co-op. 1985) (admissible to show source of semen,
pregnancy, disease); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3255(a)(3)(B) (Supp. 1985) (ad-
missible to show source of semen, pregnancy, disease); VA. CODE § 18.2-
67.7(A)(1) (1982) (admissible to show source of semen, pregnancy, disease, in-
jury to complaining witness's intimate parts).
266. This evidentiary theory is sometimes referred to as the "Scottsboro re-
buttal," an allusion to the notorious rape case in the 1930's that is frequently
cited to illustrate the historic link between rape and racism. In that case a
group of black men were accused of raping two white women on a freight
train in Alabama. Evidence of semen in the vaginas of the complainants was a
critical piece of proof, but the trial judge refused to admit defense evidence
that the complainants had had sexual intercourse the night before the alleged
rape. Although the evidence was admitted in the second set of trials, it did not
affect the outcome. See Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600 (1935); Norris v.
Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); 23 C.
WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 3, § 5388, at 590-91.
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acts of intercourse between the complainant and others to ex-
culpate himself as the source of those conditions.267
As with evidence of sexual conduct between the complain-
ant and the accused, it is difficult to dispute the high probative
value of such evidence introduced under these circumstances.
As Professor Vivian Berger has argued, if the accused "is striv-
ing to point the finger at someone else, the law should not deny
him crucial proof on these issues merely because it has the ef-
fect of revealing some of the victim's history. '2 68 Moreover,
this relatively self-contained proof, limited in time and to the
issue of identity, has minimal prejudicial effect compared to ev-
idence of the complainant's general lack of chastity.26
9 Of
course, unless the specific acts of intercourse occurred close to
the time of the alleged rape, they are irrelevant to the issue of
identity.270
Because evidence admitted under this exception is not even
directed toward the consent defense, its probative value does
not rest on the inference of unchaste character, so admitting it
does no harm to the policies underlying rape-shield legislation.
Despite the critical need for such proof in the appropriate cir-
cumstances, however, only fifteen of the twenty-five states opt-
ing for the Michigan approach except this category of evidence
from their general prohibition of sexual conduct evidence.27 1
Seven of these states limit the admissibility of such evidence to
instances that provide an alternative explanation for the exist-
ence of semen, pregnancy, or disease; evidence that an injury
267. See Berger, supra note 3, at 57-58; Note, Indiana's Rape Shield Law,
supra note 28, at 425-26.
268. Berger, supra note 3, at 58.
269. Id.
270. See Pack v. State, 571 P.2d 241, 245-46 (Wyo. 1977) (trial court properly
excluded evidence that complainant had sex with other men seven and ten
days prior to alleged rape because accused failed to introduce medical evidence
to establish the viability potential for motile sperm found in victim's vagina
subsequent to alleged rape); accord State v. Cosden, 18 Wash. App. 213, 218-20,
568 P.2d 802, 805-07 (1977), cert denied, 439 U.S. 823 (1978).
271. See supra note 265 and accompanying text. One other state, Wiscon-
sin, permits evidence of specific instances of sexual conduct to establish "the
source or origin of semen, pregnancy or disease, for use in determining the de-
gree of sexual assault or the extent of injury suffered." WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 972.11(2)(b)(2) (West 1985) (emphasis added). Under Wisconsin's sexual as-
sault statute, the degree of the offense is, in some instances, predicated upon
whether injury, disease, or pregnancy results. See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 940.225
(West 1985). If the state offers physical evidence to prove simply that an act of
intercourse occurred, however, the accused apparently would not be permitted
to introduce evidence of other acts of intercourse to dispute the fact that he
had had intercourse with the complainant.
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may have occurred during sexual activity with someone other
than the defendant is not permitted.2 2
In the face of these explicit prohibitions on the introduc-
tion of such "physical consequences" evidence, courts have
strained to uphold the statutes while at the same time admit-
ting the evidence. For example, in a Tennessee case,273 the
teenage daughter of the defendant's girlfriend did not report
the rape until almost four months after it occurred, claiming
that the defendant had threatened to harm her mother.21 4 The
state introduced evidence that the complainant had become
pregnant as a result of the rape, which allegedly occurred early
in December of 1974.275 A doctor testified that he examined
the complainant on March 22, 1975, and found her to be ap-
proximately three and one half to four months pregnant.276
The defendant, who denied ever having had intercourse with
the complainant, sought to prove that the complainant had had
sexual relations with another person during the time in ques-
tion.2 77 The trial court prohibited this line of proof because
Tennessee's rape-shield statute- 8 had no exception permitting
evidence of sexual conduct to dispute any physical conse-
quences of rape alleged by the state.279
The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the
trial court while at the same time upholding the statute against
272. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.520j(1)(b) (West Supp. 1985); MINN.
R. EVID. 404(c)(1)(B); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.015(1)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1986);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45.5-511(4)(b) (1985); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(D)
(Page Supp. 1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-659.1 (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 3255(a)(3)(B) (Supp. 1985).
In one other state, Maine, only specific instances of sexual activity that
disprove that the accused was the source of semen or injury are permitted.
ME. R. EvIn. 412(b)(1). In the rape context, unless the term "injury" is inter-
preted broadly to include disease and pregnancy, evidence that an individual
other than the accused was the source of such physical consequences would
not be admissible under the Maine shield law. See 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUEL,-
LER, supra note 168, § 198[B], at 141 (" '[I]njury' should be interpreted broadly
to include not only bruises, abrasions, lacerations and similar indications of
physical abuse, but pregnancy, which in the context of the alleged rape is in a
real sense an injury."); cf People v. Sargent, 86 Cal. App. 3d 148, 151-52, 150
Cal. Rptr. 113, 116 (1978) (a victim of forcible rape who becomes pregnant as a
result of that rape suffers "great bodily injury" under forcible rape statute).
273. Shockley v. State, 585 S.W.2d 645 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978).
274. Id- at 648.
275. I&
276. Ic-
277. I at 648-50.
278. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-17-119 (1982).
279. Shockley v. State, 585 S.W.2d 645, 649-50 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978).
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constitutional attack.28 0 It did so by ignoring the clear mandate
of the statute and concluding that the legislative intent was "to
eliminate the unjustified besmirching of a woman's reputation
by examining her prior sexual activities when such testimony is
of highly dubious relevance to the issue of her later consent or
her credibility." 281 Because the defendant was not relying on
such invidious uses of sexual conduct evidence, the court deter-
mined that the statute was simply "not controlling" and that
applying it in these circumstances would deny the defendant
due process of law.28 2
Other courts have engaged in similar reasoning in order to
admit evidence under this theory. In effect, these courts have
rewritten the applicable rape-shield statutes in order to accom-
modate the accused's need to introduce sexual conduct evidence
critical to the establishment of a mistaken identity defense.
For example, the New Hampshire rape-shield statute, perhaps
the most restrictive in the nation, prohibits evidence of "[p]rior
consensual sexual activity between the victim and any person
other than the actor. ' 28 3 Trial courts have no discretion to ad-
mit sexual conduct evidence under any circumstance other than
that listed in the statute. In State v. LaClair,2 8 the defendant
claimed that the statute unconstitutionally impaired his ability
to rebut the state's case because he was precluded from estab-
lishing both that the victim had had sexual relations with an-
other person the day preceding the rape and that such relations
had accounted for the presence of semen in her vagina.28 5 The
New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed,28 6 reaffirming its ear-
lier interpretation of the statute in State v. Howard.28 7 In
280. Id, at 651.
281. Id
282. Id The court relied heavily on Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284
(1973) (discussed supra at text accompanying notes 183-192) in holding that
the defendant had been denied due process of law by the exclusion of the evi-
dence. Shockley v. State, 585 S.W.2d 645, 650-51 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978).
283. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:6 (Supp. 1983).
284. 121 N.H. 743, 433 A.2d 1326 (1981).
285. Id at 746, 433 A.2d at 1329. The examining physician had testified
that he found nonmotile sperm in the victim's vagina on the evening of the
alleged rape; he opined that she had had intercourse "within hours" of the ex-
amination. Id. at 747, 433 A.2d at 1329. The defendant introduced evidence
that he had normal sperm motility and that normally motile sperm can re-
main motile for up to 12 hours in the vagina. Id at 747, 433 A.2d 1329-30. The
trial court prevented the accused from questioning the victim as to her sexual
activities on the day preceding the alleged rape. Id. at 745, 433 A.2d at 1328.
286. Id at 746-47, 433 A.2d 1329-30.
287. 121 N.H. 53, 426 A.2d 457 (1981).
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Howard, the court had recognized that the legislative intent of
the statute was a laudable one: protecting rape victims from
"unnecessary embarrassment, prejudice and courtroom proce-
dures that only serve to exacerbate the trauma of the rape it-
self."288 Yet, relying on Davis v. Alaska,28 9 the Howard court
also acknowledged that "[s]o total an exclusion of evidence...
raises serious constitutional questions. '290 It then concluded
that in order for the act to pass constitutional muster, it must
be interpreted so as to allow a rape defendant to demonstrate
to the court that due process requires admitting sexual conduct
evidence when, in the circumstances of a particular case, proba-
tive value outweighs prejudice.291 Applying that standard in
LaClair, the court held that despite the statute's literal lan-
guage, the accused should have been allowed to present evi-
dence supportive of his claim that another individual had been
the source of semen in the victim's vagina.292
The Michigan Court of Appeals addressed a similar prob-
lem293 when it was forced to interpret a statute that allows the
accused to introduce sexual conduct evidence establishing "the
source or origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease," but not the
causes of other physical consequences of rape, namely injury.294
The prosecution introduced evidence concerning an examina-
tion of the victim, a young child, conducted six months after
the alleged rape.295 A doctor testified that the victim did not
have an intact hymenal ring and that her vagina was unusually
open for a child of her age.296 The defendant, to provide an al-
288. Id. at 57, 426 A.2d at 459.
289. 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (discussed supra at text accompanying notes 193-
204).
290. Howard, 121 N.H. at 58, 426 A.2d at 460.
291. See id. at 58-59, 426 A.2d at 460-61.
292. LaClair, 121 N.H. at 745, 433 A.2d at 1328; accord Commonwealth v.
Majorana, 503 Pa 602, 470 A.2d 80 (1983). In Majorana, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania interpreted its rape-shield statute, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3104 (Purdon 1983), which only permits evidence of prior sexual conduct be-
tween the complainant and defendant on the issue of consent, as not barring
the admission of evidence "which is directly relevant to negate the act with
which the defendant is charged. Evidence of acts of intercourse, which show
that they, and not a rape, caused the objective signs of intercourse, is rele-
vant." Majorana, 503 Pa. at 605, 470 A.2d at 81. The court determined that
admitting sexual conduct evidence for such a limited purpose properly bal-
ances the laudable goals of the rape-shield statute with the defendant's "fun-
damental right to present in defense his own version of the facts." Id.
293. See People v. Mikula, 84 Mich. App. 108, 269 N.W.2d 195 (1978).
294. MIcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 750.520j(1)(b) (West Supp. 1985).




ternative explanation for the victim's physical condition, sought
to prove that the victim had engaged in sexual activity with a
fourteen-year-old boy several months prior to the incident in
question.297 Although the trial court held this evidence inad-
missible, the court of appeals reversed, finding that the legisla-
ture had not intended that the accused be limited to eliciting
evidence regarding only those physical conditions specifically
enumerated in the statute.298 The court stressed that there was
no rational distinction between the evidence expressly permit-
ted by statute and that which was offered in this case. More-
over, the court noted that the proof in this case "has no more
potential for harassment of a complainant than proof of the ori-
gin of one of the conditions expressly included in the
statute.
'299
It is clear that the just results reached in these various
cases came about in spite of, rather than as a result of, the ap-
plicable statutes.300 The path to justice was not smooth; it in-
volved lengthy appeals culminating in decisions that ignored
clear statutory language to uphold the statutes against constitu-
tional attack. Such a process might be worth the effort if there
were any doubt about the relevance of this evidence. There is
no question, however, but that in the appropriate circumstances
the accused must be allowed an opportunity to present evidence
of the complainant's past sexual conduct that demonstrates that
another person was the source of physical consequences of rape
alleged by the state. Moreover, this evidence, limited to the is-
sue of identity as opposed to consent or credibility, does no vio-
lence to the policies underlying the rape-shield laws.
Such evidence would be freely admissible under the legisla-
tion proposed in this Article, assuming that it met traditional
relevancy standards, because it does not draw on the invidious
inferences. Even assuming that a jurisdiction retains the Michi-
gan approach, however, it should specifically provide for the ad-
mission of such evidence, directed to all possible physical
297. Id. at 111, 269 N.W.2d at 197.
298. I& at 114, 269 N.W.2d at 198.
299. Id.
300. For cases not reaching just results regarding the admissibility of this
category of evidence, see Brown v. State, 173 Ga. App. 640, 640-41, 327 S.E.2d
515, 516-17 (1985) (prohibiting evidence in support of defense that complain-
ant's vaginal infection was caused by someone other than accused); State v.
Peyatt, 315 S.E.2d 574, 576 (W. Va. 1983) (prohibiting evidence to explain the
state's proof that the child victim's hymen was "obliterated" and "look[ed] like
that of a married woman").
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consequences of rape alleged by the prosecution.3 0 '
c. Evidence of sexual conduct tending to prove the
complainant's bias or motive to fabricate the charge
The forty-one-year-old defendant in an Oregon rape case,
Vernon Charles Jalo, attempted to introduce evidence of prior
sexual conduct on the part of his ten-year-old accuser to
demonstrate her motive to fabricate the charges against him.30 2
Jalo denied engaging in the sexual acts in question.30 3 He con-
tended that the false accusations stemmed from his discovery
that the complainant had engaged in sexual activity with his
son, among others, and from his stated intention to inform the
complainant's parents of her misconduct. 30 4 Jalo's theory was
that the complainant had charged him with rape either to retal-
iate against him or because she believed that she would not be
punished by her parents if she had been the victim of a rape
rather than a willing participant in sexual relations.30 5
The Oregon rape-shield statute in effect at the time of
Jalo's trial only excepted evidence of prior sexual conduct be-
tween the complainant and the accused, and then only if it was
offered to prove consent on the part of the complainant.30 6 The
Oregon Court of Appeals, relying on Davis v. Alaska,30 7 held
the statute unconstitutional. 30 8 As noted above,30 9 in Davis, the
United States Supreme Court held that the state's policy of pro-
tecting juvenile offenders must give way to the right of a crimi-
nal defendant to expose the "possible biases, prejudices, or
ulterior motives" of a "crucial" prosecution witness.310 The Da-
vis opinion stressed that the attempted cross-examination was
not a generalized attack on the witness's character, but instead
focused on his possible bias toward the state resulting from his
301. See, e.g., proposed rule 404(c)(i)(A), set forth in the Conclusion to this
Article ("[e]vidence of specific instances of sexual conduct tending to prove
that a person other than the accused caused the physical consequences of the
rape alleged by the prosecution").
302. State v. Jalo, 27 Or. App. 845, 847, 557 P.2d 1359, 1360 (1976) (en banc).
303. Id. at 847, 557 P.2d at 1360.
304. Id.
305. Id-
306. Act of May 20, 1975, ch. 176, § 2(4), 1975 Or. Laws 219, 219 (codified as
amended at OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.210 (1984)).
307. 415 U.S. 308 (1974). See supra text accompanying notes 193-204.
308. State v. Jalo, 27 Or. App. 845, 850-51, 557 P.2d 1359, 1362 (1976) (en
banc).
309. See supra text accompanying notes 193-206.
310. Davis, 415 U.S. at 316, 319.
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probationary status and his possible fear of being implicated
himself-a far more particularized and probative form of
impeachment. 11
Evidence of a motive to falsely charge rape similarly differs
qualitatively from mere evidence of unchaste character offered
to prove either the complainant's consent or her general lack of
veracity. Because the latter uses of sexual conduct evidence are
irrelevant or prejudicial, there is no question that they may
constitutionally be precluded.3 12 In contrast, evidence of the
complainant's prior sexual conduct that provides a motive to
fabricate the charge is highly probative of the central issue in
the case.
Even assuming that the countervailing state policies under-
lying rape-shield statutes are weightier than those at issue in
Davis, the fact remains that the rape complainant's credibility
will almost always be central to the case against the defendant.
Thus, however compelling the state interest in protecting the
privacy of the complainant, it is unlikely that such an interest
could be relied upon to block impeachment of her credibility by
means of evidence as probative as that of bias or motive to
fabricate the charge.3 13 Indeed, the Jalo court explicitly held
that "[such policies] must ... be subordinated to the defend-
ant's constitutional right to confrontation."3 14 Notably, after
the decision in Jalo, Oregon amended its statute to provide ex-
plicitly for the admission of sexual conduct evidence "that re-
lates to the motive or bias of the complainant."3 15
Despite the clear mandate of Davis, only two statutes
adopting the Michigan approach explicitly provide for the intro-
duction of sexual conduct evidence probative of a motive to
fabricate on the part of a rape complainant. 16 In the remain-
311. Id at 316-18.
312. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
313. See Berger, supra note 3, at 66-67.
314. State v. Jalo, 27 Or. App. 845, 851, 557 P.2d 1359, 1362 (1976) (en banc).
315. Act of July 27, 1977, ch. 822, § 1(5)(a), 1977 Or. Laws 863, 864 (codified
at OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.210(2)(b)(A) (1984)).
316. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461A(a)(3) (1982); VA. CODE § 18.2-
67.7(B) (1982). A third state, North Carolina, provides an exception for "spe-
cific instances of sexual behavior offered for the purpose of showing that the
act or acts charged were not committed by the defendant ... ." N.C.R. EvIn.
412. Although this exception was meant to cover "physical consequences" evi-
dence, see LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE 1977 GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA: SEXUAL ASSAULTS 93 (1977), the language
surely is broad enough to encompass evidence offered under the "motive to
fabricate" theory. Indeed, the language is so broad that it could conceivably be
interpreted to admit sexual conduct evidence on any theory, even consent.
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ing twenty-three states, this highly probative and constitution-
ally compelled evidence is not admissible unless it falls within
another exception, such as that permitting evidence of sexual
conduct with the accused. The courts of these states have dealt
with this problem in a variety of ways.
In Commonwealth v. Black,3 17 a Pennsylvania appeals
court held its rape-shield statute, which permits evidence of
sexual conduct between the complainant and the accused only
on the issue of consent,318 unconstitutional insofar as it barred
the introduction of sexual conduct evidence probative of a
claim of bias.319 Notably, a year earlier, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court had construed the same statute as not preclud-
ing evidence that provides an alternative source of the physical
consequences of rape, despite the lack of any statutory excep-
tion for such evidence. 320 Because the courts are understanda-
bly reluctant to hold rape-shield legislation unconstitutional,
this latter mode of judicial response to overly restrictive Michi-
gan-type statutes has been the dominant one.
For example, in Commonwealth v. Joyce,321 the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the trial court had
"misapplied" the statute in excluding sexual conduct evidence
probative of the defendant's claim of bias.322 The Massachu-
317. 337 Pa. Super. 548, 487 A.2d 396 (1985).
318. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3104(a) (Purdon 1983).
319. See Black 337 Pa. Super. at -, 487 A.2d at 401. Black, who was
charged with the statutory rape of his thirteen-year-old daughter, attempted to
introduce evidence of his daughter's prior sexual conduct with one of her
brothers. The charges, brought three months after the alleged rape, coincided
with violent arguments between the defendant and this brother, culminating
in the brother leaving home. As soon as the defendant was arrested and re-
moved from the family, the brother returned. Because the court applied the
rape-shield statute, the defendant was unable to prove that his daughter had
maintained an ongoing, consensual sexual relationship with her brother that
ended only when the brother left home. The defendant's theory was that his
daughter sought to penalize him for interfering in her sexual relationship with
her brother and to insure the defendant's removal from the home so that she
could resume the relationship. Id. at -, 487 A.2d at 398. Although the appel-
late court found the case indistinguishable from Davis, it nevertheless re-
manded for an in camera hearing to determine whether the evidence was
relevant to prove bias and whether its probative value was outweighed by its
prejudicial effect. Id. at -, 487 A.2d at 400-01. The concurring judges were
critical of the decision to remand, finding it a "useless act" and contending
that evidence probative of bias may not constitutionally be excluded. Id. at -
-, 487 A.2d at 402-04 (Wieand, J., concurring and dissenting).
320. See Commonwealth v. Majorana, 503 Pa. 602, 604-05, 470 A.2d 80, 81
(1983). See supra note 292.
321. 382 Mass. 222, 415 N.E.2d 181 (1981).
322. Id. at 226, 415 N.E.2d at 184.
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setts rape-shield statute, however, only permits evidence of sex-
ual conduct between the complainant and the accused and
evidence that provides an alternative explanation for the physi-
cal consequences of the alleged rape.32 3
In Joyce, the state's proof established that the defendant
had picked up the complainant while she was hitchhiking in
the early hours of the morning.324 She had been drinking heav-
ily. She asked the defendant to drop her off at a friend's house;
instead, he drove her to a parking lot where he forced her to
engage in sexual intercourse and oral sex. The complainant
screamed, attempted to escape, and was punched several times
by the defendant. Naked and bleeding from the mouth, she ran
toward the headlights of an approaching car, which turned out
to be a police cruiser.3 25 The defendant's version of the events
differed dramatically. He claimed that the complainant's
mouth was bloodied when he picked her up, and that she had
told him it was the result of a fight with her boyfriend. He also
claimed that the sexual acts in the parking lot were consensual,
and that when the police approached, he urged the complainant
to get dressed.326
The trial court applied the Massachusetts rape-shield stat-
ute, and the defendant was thus unable to introduce evidence
that his accuser had been charged with prostitution twice in the
past six months.327 In one instance, the complainant allegedly
had approached an undercover, officer and solicited him for oral
sex; in the second instance, it was alleged that she was found
undressed and engaging in sexual acts in a car after having
solicited the driver for oral sex. The defendant argued that the
complainant, having been discovered in similar situations on
two previous occasions, may have made her allegations against
him in an attempt to avoid further prosecution.328 Specifically,
the defendant urged that because the prior charges had been
dropped, the complainant may have been motivated by a fear
that they would be reopened if she were found in a compromis-
ing situation, as well as by a fear of a third prosecution.32 9
The supreme judicial court accepted the defendant's argu-
323. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 233, § 21B (Law. Co-op. 1985).
324. Joyce, 382 Mass. at 223, 415 N.E.2d at 183.
325. Id at 224, 415 N.E.2d at 183.
326. Id.
327. Id at 225, 415 N.E.2d at 184.
328. Id at 224, 415 N.E.2d at 184.
329. Id at 224 n.2, 415 N.E.2d at 184 n.2.
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ment and reversed his conviction.330 The court made it clear
that if the statute were read to exclude evidence of a rape com-
plainant's bias, "serious constitutional doubts [would be]
raised."331 It then looked "beyond the statutory language itself
for insight into the legislative purpose"332 and determined that
the "major innovative thrust" of the statute was to reverse the
common-law rule under which a complainant's reputation for
chastity was considered probative on the issue of her consent.333
The court declared that it found no "legislative consideration of
constitutional issues, or, more particularly, [of] the question of
impeachment by proof of bias. ' '33 It therefore construed the
statute as not abridging the defendant's right to introduce evi-
dence probative of the complainant's bias.
As with the previous category of "physical consequences"
evidence, it is unfortunate that the courts have had to grapple
with restrictions insufficiently considered by the legislature.335
The proposed statute would avoid these constitutional problems
by stating explicitly what the court in Joyce gleaned by examin-
ing legislative history: inferences of present consent or lack of
veracity based on past consent are forbidden; other inferences
are permissible.336 The court in Joyce notably stressed that the
defendant's purpose in offering the disputed evidence was not
to prove that the complainant had engaged in prostitution and
therefore was more likely to have solicited or consented to have
sex with him.337 His evidentiary theory was no different in this
case than it might have been in a non-rape case; its probative
value did not rest on sexually discriminatory premises. Limit-
ing the introduction of sexual conduct evidence to circum-
stances in which there is a colorable claim of bias intertwined
with such evidence 338 accommodates the defendant's need to
330. Id- at 230-32, 415 N.E.2d at 187-88.
331. Id at 226-27 n.5, 415 N.E.2d at 185 n.5.
332. Id
333. Id at 227-28, 415 N.E.2d at 185-86.
334. Id at 228, 415 N.E.2d at 186.
335. See supra text accompanying note 334; see also People v. Hackett, 421
Mich. 338, 347 n.1, 365 N.W.2d 120, 124 n.1 (1984) (stating in dictum that it was
"unlikely that either the Legislature or the drafters of the Michigan Rules of
Evidence intended to 'scuttle entirely' the evidentiary availability of cross ex-
amination for bias.") (citation omitted).
336. See supra text accompanying notes 223, 234.
337. See Joyce, 382 Mass. at 224, 415 N.E.2d at 184.
338. Not every attempt to impeach the complainant's credibility by proof of
bias will necessitate the revelation of her prior sexual conduct. Unless the evi-
dence of sexual activity is inextricably linked with the motive to fabricate, as
in Jalo and Joyce, its revelation will serve only to prejudice the complainant
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present his version of the incident without threatening the poli-
cies underlying the rape-shield laws.3 39
d. Evidence of a pattern of sexual conduct similar to the
charged sexual conduct offered to prove consent
The right of the accused to introduce sexual conduct evi-
dence under the three exceptions discussed thus far is undis-
puted. All of the Michigan-type statutes provide for the
admissibility of evidence of sexual conduct between the accused
and the complainant.340 As for evidence offered to prove either
bias or a different cause of the physical consequences of the al-
leged rape, although many of the statutes do not contain excep-
tions for this proof, when confronted with colorable claims of
and the prosecution's case. For example, if a man discovers his girlfriend in
bed with another man, and the girlfriend accuses the "other man" of rape as a
cover for her infidelity, there is no reason for the defendant to elicit evidence
of the complainant's sexual relationship with her boyfriend. See Kneedler,
supra note 33, at 495-96. Simply by showing the boyfriend/girlfriend relation-
ship, the basis for the motive to fabricate is established. See Marr v. State, 470
So. 2d 703, 706 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) ("a proper balance [was struck] be-
tween the policies undergirding the [Florida] statute, and those of the confron-
tation clause, by allowing evidence as to the bias of the prosecutrix, without
permitting specific references to sexual intimacies"); Commonwealth v. Elder,
389 Mass. 743, 752, 452 N.E.2d 1104, 1110 (1983) ("where evidence of bias is
available by other means, no evidence of the complainant's prior sexual his-
tory should be admitted"); State v. Bass, 69 Or. App. 166, 683 P.2d 1040, 1041
(1984) (evidence that the complainant's relationship with another man in-
volved "bondage and discipline" had no relevance to her motive to falsify).
339. The courts also seem to be drawing the appropriate lines in determin-
ing whether a colorable or legitimate bias claim has been alleged so as to trig-
ger the introduction of sexual conduct evidence. Compare Angus v. State, 76
Wis. 2d 191, 199, 251 N.W.2d 28, 33 (finding the following bias claim, proferred
by a defendant charged with incest, "nebulous at best": the defendant alleged
that his daughter frequently engaged in sexual intercourse and used it as a
common means of communicating her feelings toward others; because she un-
derstood this means of communication best, she chose to falsely charge the de-
fendant with incest in order to express her anger toward him), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 845 (1977), with Commonwealth v. Joyce, 382 Mass. 222, 230, 415
N.E.2d 181, 187 (1981) (upholding defendant's right to present sexual conduct
evidence probative of bias where his theory "was not inconsistent with [his)
version of the facts" and the evidence had "a rational tendency" to prove that
the complainant had an ulterior motive for charging rape). See also Common-
wealth v. Frey, 390 Mass. 245, 454 N.E.2d 478, 481-82 (1983) (holding that evi-
dence of complainant's sexual conduct could not be admitted when it was
marginally probative and the defendant had already produced ample evidence
of her bias and motive to fabricate); State v. Droste, 115 Wis. 2d 48, 56-58, 339
N.W.2d 578, 582-83 (1983) (refusing to admit evidence of complainant's prior
sexual conduct on the defendant's theory that her status as an undercover nar-
cotics officer presented a per se question of bias).
340. See supra text accompanying notes 250-264.
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entitlement to introduce such evidence, courts universally have
upheld these claims, either by holding the statutes unconstitu-
tional or by reading them so as to allow such evidence.341
The next category of evidence raises a controversial ques-
tion not presented by these three categories: whether evidence
of sexual conduct between the complainant and someone other
than the accused can ever be relevant to prove consent. Three
states adopting the Michigan approach provide an exception for
evidence which exhibits a pattern of consensual sexual conduct
on the part of the complainant so closely resembling the cir-
cumstances of the alleged rape as to raise the inference that she
consented on the occasion in question.342 The critical issue is
whether this exception is consistent with the policies underly-
ing rape-shield legislation or merely a thinly veiled attempt to
resurrect the common-law rules. Because contemporary mores
acknowledge a woman's right to pick and choose her partners
in line with highly individualized standards, her consent with
one man-perhaps a good friend or someone she dates regu-
larly-would seem to indicate nothing about her willingness to
have sex with the accused. 343 Several commentators, although
agreeing with this position, nevertheless have urged that in cer-
tain circumstances, a woman's previous sexual conduct might
tend to prove that "consent to intercourse for her has lost its
unique and nontransferable character."'344
341. See supra text accompanying notes 265-301 (physical consequence evi-
dence), 302-339 (sexual conduct evidence probative of bias).
342. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2) (West Supp. 1985) (evidence must
"[tend] to establish a pattern of conduct or behavior on the part of the victim
which is so similar to the conduct or behavior in the case that it is relevant to
the issue of consent"); MINN. R. EviD. 404(c)(1)(A)(i) (evidence must tend "to
establish a common scheme or plan of similar sexual conduct under circum-
stances similar to the case at issue, relevant and material to the issue of con-
sent"); N.C.R. EvID. 412 (evidence must demonstrate "a pattern of sexual
behavior so distinctive and so closely resembling the defendant's version of the
alleged encounter as to tend to prove that such complainant consented to the
act or acts charged").
343. See supra text accompanying notes 166-170.
344. Note, Indiana's Rape Shield Law, supra note 28, at 430. See Berger,
supra note 3, at 59-61; Letwin, supra note 3, at 76-77; Ordover, supra note 3, at
110-19; cf Amsterdam & Babcock, Proposed Position on Issues Raised by the
Administration of Laws Against Rape: Memorandum for the ACLU of North-
ern California, reprinted in BABCOCK, supra note 14, at 841 (suggesting that
evidence should be admitted if it tends "to show that the complaining witness
has engaged in consensual sexual activity with any person under particular
and characteristic circumstances sufficiently similar to those of the encounter
with the defendant so as to establish that she consented to sexual intercourse
with the defendant"). But see 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 3,
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Professor Vivian Berger examines this possibility by posing
the hypothetical case of a rape defendant who claims that he
met the complainant for the first time in a singles' bar on a Sat-
urday night. The accused maintains that he then accompanied
the complainant to her apartment, where she willingly had sex-
ual relations with him. The complainant's version of the facts
differs only with regard to what took place inside the apart-
ment; she alleges that she asked him to leave and he refused,
forcing her to submit to sex.345 Professor Berger then presents
the disputed evidence and the argument for its admission:
[W]hat if the accused were offering to show that the victim habitually
goes to bars on Saturday nights, picks up strangers and takes them
home to bed with her, and that over the past twelve months she has
done so on more than twenty occasions? Now could one assert with
assurance that this particular sexual record does not substantially re-
inforce the defendant's version of the night's events? And if it does,
should he not be permitted as a matter of constitutional right to place
this evidence before the jury?3 4 6
Even assuming relevance, one could argue that this use of
"pattern" evidence violates the universal proscription against
admitting "other acts" evidence to prove the character or pro-
pensity of a person as the basis for inferring conforming con-
duct.347 One response to such an argument has been to call this
evidence "habit" evidence, as opposed to "character" evi-
dence.348 Applying the habit label, however, is simply a weak
attempt to subvert the propensity rule. Although the line be-
tween character and habit is not easily drawn, habit is gener-
ally considered an almost automatic, nonvolitional response to a
particular situation, such as "bounding down a certain stairway
two or three steps at a time. '349 Moreover, the reason courts
§ 5387, at 583-88 (contending that the most reasonable inference to be drawn
from evidence of a pattern of sexual conduct is that the victim did not consent
in this instance).
345. Berger, supra note 3, at 59.
346. Id. at 59-60. Another example provided by Professor Berger is that of
a rock star idol accused of rape who attempts to prove that the complainant
frequently accosts such celebrities after concerts and willingly goes to bed with
them. Id. at 60.
347. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(b); supra notes 120-128 and accompanying
text.
348. See Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 3, at 586-87; see also FED. R. EviD.
406 (habit evidence relevant to prove conduct in conformity with the habit).
349. See supra note 65 and accompanying text; see also Levin v. United
States, 338 F.2d 265, 272 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (a defendant's religious practices do
not qualify as habit, because "the very volitional basis of the activity raises se-
rious questions as to its invariable nature, and hence its probative value"), cert
denied, 379 U.S. 999 (1965).
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are more receptive to habit evidence than they are to character
evidence is that the former is usually free of moral implications
and therefore does not give rise to jury prejudice.35 0 The capac-
ity for sexual conduct evidence to provoke a wide range of so-
cial responses makes the habit classification particularly
inappropriate. 51
In a thoughtful article on this subject, Professor Abraham
Ordover argues for the admissibility of evidence of a pattern of
similar sexual encounters to prove consent on the ground that
such proof does not rest on the invidious unchaste character in-
ference.3 52 It is true that the probative value of "pattern" evi-
dence does not rely on the common-law inference that past
sexual conduct with any man, under any circumstances, is pro-
bative of consent. Given contemporary moral standards and be-
havioral patterns, it is "the nature of the complainant's prior
sexual activity, rather than its mere existence, [that] provides
the only reliable indicator of present consent. 3 53 Thus, Profes-
sor Ordover would prohibit evidence of the complainant's gen-
eral reputation for unchastity, but admit repeated specific acts
of sexual conduct that are similar to the conduct at issue.A
The problem with admitting sexual conduct evidence
under this theory is that it does not avoid the forbidden infer-
ence of propensity. For example, Professor Ordover would ad-
mit evidence of specific instances of sexual conduct evidence
under the pattern theory when "the present case represented
merely one more episode in a long history of promiscuity.
'355
350. See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 67, at 249; Kuhns, supra
note 66, at 779 n.7.
351. See Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. 755, 759 (N.D. Cal. 1983) ("Defendant's
characterization of plaintiff's [sexual] conduct as habit is clearly a thinly dis-
guised attempt to seek character evidence."); accord United States v. Hol-
limon, 12 M.J. 791, 794 n.5 (A.C.M.R. 1982), rev'd in part on other grounds, 16
M.J. 164 (C.M.A. 1983); State v. Patnaude, 140 Vt. 361, 378-80, 438 A.2d 402, 410
(1981).
352. See Ordover, supra note 3, at 93-94, 110-19. Professor Ordover would
permit an inference of consent from prior patterns of behavior only if the ac-
cused made a strong showing with regard to the following factors:
(1) that the victim engaged in the alleged prior acts; (2) that the pat-
tern of conduct shares common characteristics, especially as to partici-
pants, with the incident involved in the present case; (3) that the prior
conduct is not too remote in time; (4) that the proof is necessary to
the proper presentation of the defendant's case; and (5) that the pro-
bative value of the evidence outweighs its potential prejudicial effect.
Id. at 94.
353. Id. at 93 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
354. See id. at 110, 114.
355. Id. at 118.
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A more blatant use of propensity evidence can hardly be
imagined. As to a more distinctive pattern of sexual conduct
that shares the special characteristics of the alleged rape,
Professors Berger and Ordover both analogize such evidence to
"other acts" evidence demonstrating a "unique modus oper-
andi";356 such evidence traditionally has been admissible
against criminal defendants, assuming that the modus operandi
is sufficiently unique to serve as a "signature. ' '35 7 The function
of "unique modus operandi" evidence, however, is simply to
identify the accused as the perpetrator of a particular crime
when identity is a contested issue in the case. As explained
above in the discussion of evidentiary considerations, 358 if
Smith were on trial for the murder of a law professor by means
of a unique modus operandi, evidence that Smith recently had
murdered three other law professors by a similar method
would serve to identify him as the killer. This use of "other
acts" evidence is fundamentally different, however, from show-
ing that merely because Smith is a murderer, he probably mur-
dered the deceased.359
In the context of a trial for rape, evidence that the com-
plainant previously slept with rock stars or with men she met
in singles' bars could only be used to show her propensity to
consent in such circumstances; her identity is not a disputed is-
sue. The previously discussed "common plan or scheme" ex-
ception to the propensity rule is similarly inapplicable in this
context, because a complainant's pattern of similar sexual en-
counters can hardly be said to occur as the result of a pre-ex-
isting plan or scheme on her part.360 Moreover, as with all
propensity evidence, the danger of jury prejudice is high; the
complainant may be viewed as a "loose" woman who "got what
she deserved," irrespective of her behavior on this particular
occasion.
This is not to say that such pattern evidence should never
be admitted to prove consent. If narrowly confined to circum-
stances in which the conduct is distinctive and similar to the
circumstances of the alleged rape, the probative value of such
evidence is so high that fairness mandates its admission. This
356. See Berger, supra note 3, at 60; Ordover, supra note 3, at 113.
357. See supra notes 124-125 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 124-125 and accompanying text.
359. See supra text accompanying notes 124-125.
360. Admitting sexual conduct evidence in such circumstances would be




argument takes on even greater force when one considers that
rape trials frequently involve close questions of credibility, that
is, "her word against his." Indeed, on that basis many courts
circumvent the prohibition against propensity evidence and ad-
mit evidence of prior rapes committed by defendants under the
rubric of "plan" or "pattern" in order to prove the likelihood of
nonconsent on the occasion in question.3 61 Surely if "other
acts" evidence may be offered against an accused in the interest
of promoting truthfinding, it hardly seems fair to exclude such
proof when it is offered by the accused and may tend to excul-
pate him. Moreover, in light of Davis v. Alaska, 62 a flat prohi-
361. See, eg., State v. Finley, 85 Ariz. 327, 334, 338 P.2d 790, 794-95 (1959);
State v. Esposito, 192 Conn. 166, 173-74, 471 A.2d 949, 953-54 (1984); Williams v.
State, 110 So. 2d 654, 663 (Fla.), cert denied, 361 U.S. 847 (1959); People v. Oli-
phant, 399 Mich. 472, 494-95, 250 N.W.2d 443, 449 (1976); State v. DeBaere, 356
N.W.2d 301, 305 (Minn. 1984); see also State v. Gonzales, 217 Kan. 159, 161, 535
P.2d 988, 990 (1975) ("other acts" evidence considered probative of defendant's
intent); State v. Gardner, 59 Ohio St. 2d 14, 20-21, 391 N.E.2d 337, 342 (1979)
("other acts" evidence relevant as tending to prove intent). But see, e.g.,
Lovely v. United States, 169 F.2d 386, 390 (4th Cir. 1948) (evidence of prior
rapes not admissible to prove lack of consent); People v. Tassell, 36 Cal. 3d 77,
88-89, 679 P.2d 1, 7-8, 201 Cal. Rptr. 567, 573-74 (1984) (en banc) (same); People
v. Barbour, 106 Ill. App. 3d 993, 1000, 436 N.E.2d 667, 672-74 (1982) (same);
State v. Alsteen, 108 Wis. 2d 723, 730-31, 324 N.W.2d 426, 429 (1982) (same); see
also State v. Saltarelli, 98 Wash. 2d 358, 365-67, 655 P.2d 697, 699-701 (1982) (en
banc) (evidence of prior rapes inadmissible to prove motive or intent).
In sex crimes cases generally, courts have long disregarded the restrictions
on "other crimes" evidence and have permitted the prosecutor to offer evi-
dence of the defendant's propensity for various types of sexual misconduct.
See E. IMWINKELRmD, supra note 124, § 4:11, at 29. Commentators have been
critical of this trend. See id. § 4:16, at 38; R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra
note 67, at 229-30; -A WIGMORE, supra note 60, § 62.2, at 1334-35; Gregg, supra
note 253, at 215, 235-36. Indeed, in many states a special exception exists for
other sex crimes that show the defendant's propensity for "aberrant" or "ab-
normal" sexual relations, such as incest, sodomy, and homosexuality. See, e.g.,
Woods v. State, 250 Ind. 132, 144, 235 N.E.2d 479, 486 (1968) ("depraved sexual
instinct"); State v. Schut, 71 Wash. 2d 400, 402, 429 P.2d 126, 128 (1967) ("lust-
ful inclination"). Originally this exception applied only to sex offenses involv-
ing the same parties, see supra notes 252-253 and accompanying text, but a
number of states now admit evidence of other sex offenses with other victims.
See C. McCORMICK, supra note 21, § 190, at 560-61 & nn.24-25. A further ex-
pansion has been to permit such propensity evidence even with respect to
"non-deviate" conduct such as heterosexual rape. Most states recognizing this
broader exception confine it to evidence of other acts involving the same vic-
tim, however, a "significant minority" now allow the admission of evidence of
misconduct involving third parties. See E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 124,
§ 4:15, at 35.
362. 415 U.S. 308 (1974). The decision in Davis is discussed supra notes
193-204 and accompanying text.
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bition of this evidence would seem to violate the accused's right
to present relevant evidence in support of his consent defense.
The need for symmetrical treatment of rape complainants
and rape defendants is vividly conveyed by People v. Oli-
phant,363 a case decided in 1976 by the Supreme Court of Michi-
gan. The victim, a Michigan State University student, met the
defendant while window-shopping. She agreed to go with him
to a nearby bar and later willingly accompanied him in his car
on various errands. The inside door handle on the passenger
side of the car was missing, so the victim could only exit the car
by rolling down the window and opening the door from the
outside. The defendant, Oliphant, and the victim discussed
such topics as race, racial prejudice, and marijuana.364 At this
point, the victim's version of the facts differed from that put
forth by the defendant. She testified that he suddenly switched
from a friendly to a hostile and demanding demeanor. He
drove to an unfamiliar section of the city, instructed her not to
"go for the door, e365 and threatened to use a gun or a knife if
she did not remove her clothing and have sexual intercourse
with him. Although the defendant claimed to have a weapon,
he never actually brandished one, and he did not physically in-
jure the victim. After engaging in various sexual acts with the
victim, the defendant drove her back to her dormitory, telling
her that she would never be able to prove a case of rape against
him. Other evidence showed that the defendant later went to
the police. He told them that he was apprehensive because he
had just had sex with the victim and he feared that she might
file charges against him because he had insulted her about her
unpleasant body odor. Indeed, the rape complaint was received
while the defendant was still at the stationhouse.366
The defendant testified that the sexual acts were consen-
sual, stressing the victim's willingness to accompany him in his
car and the lack of any physical evidence of rape, such as a
weapon or injury. Moreover, his appearance at the police sta-
tion was claimed to be inconsistent with rape. In rebuttal, the
state was permitted to call three other women to testify as to
strikingly similar encounters with the defendant within a five-
month period. The Michigan Supreme Court upheld the admis-
sion of this testimony, finding a plan or scheme on the part of
363. 399 Mich. 472, 250 N.W.2d 443 (1976).
364. Id at 480, 250 N.W.2d at 445.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 480-81, 250 N.W.2d at 445-46.
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the defendant to orchestrate the events surrounding these vari-
ous rapes such that it would be difficult or impossible to prove
nonconsent.36 7 Indeed, in two of the cases, the defendant was
acquitted after trial; in the third, the victim never filed a com-
plaint.368 There were several features common to all four
cases: all of the victims were college students; each encounter
started out on a friendly footing; the topics of discussion in each
instance were racial prejudice and marijuana; the women all
voluntarily entered the defendant's car and had opportunities
to flee early in the encounter; in each instance the defendant
suddenly became hostile, took his victim to an unfamiliar lo-
cale, and threatened to use a weapon if his sexual demands
were not met; each woman submitted out of fear of injury or
death; all were driven home; and none showed outward signs of
having been raped.369
The Oliphant court's characterization of the defendant's
"other acts" as a pattern of distinctive sexual encounters, strik-
ingly similar to the circumstances of the instant case, is cer-
tainly supported by the evidence. The evidence of this pattern
of conduct is indistinguishable, however, from evidence of Oli-
phant's propensity to rape. As pointed out in the dissenting
opinion, evidence of the circumstances of each encounter is ir-
relevant unless accompanied by allegations of rape.370 The in-
ferential leap is then from past rape to the likelihood of rape in
the instant case-propensity, pure and simple. Nevertheless, it
is difficult to dispute the high probative value of this evidence
on the issue of consent. When viewed in this context, the
"other acts" evidence renders Oliphant's claim of consent so
367. Id- at 488, 250 N.W.2d at 449.
368. Id at 484-86, 250 N.W.2d at 44748. A majority of the court rejected
the defendant's claim that because he had been acquitted of two of the rapes,
allowing testimony regarding those incidents violated the doctrine of collateral
estoppel as embodied in the double jeopardy clause. Id at 499-500, 250 N.W.2d
at 454; see also Oliphant v. Koehler, 594 F.2d 547, 555 (6th Cir.) (denying the
defendant's habeas corpus petition; because the prosecutor did not seek to reli-
tigate any issue which had previously been determined in the defendant's
favor, the defendant's claim of collateral estoppel was without merit), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 877 (1979).
369. See Oliphant 399 Mich. at 483-88, 250 N.W.2d at 447-49.
370. See i&L at 519-20, 250 N.W.2d at 463-64 (Levin, J., dissenting). The dis-
senting opinion disputed the majority's conclusion that Oliphant had formu-
lated a "plan" or "design" of which the charged rape was a part. Justice Levin
argued that there was simply no proof "that defendant's conduct was pursuant
to a plan, not custom or habit, and that the purpose of any such plan was jury




improbable that it seems unjust to keep such evidence from the
jury. 1
It is beyond the scope of this Article to consider whether
the ban on propensity evidence should be lifted whenever the
probative value of "other crimes" evidence is particularly high,
whether in rape cases or otherwise.372 The critical point for our
purposes is simply that, to the extent that courts circumvent
the prohibition, as in Oliphant, equal treatment should be ac-
corded the rape defendant regarding proffered evidence of the
complainant's sexual conduct that is similarly probative on the
crucial issue of consent. This precise point was made by a dis-
senting judge in People v. Dawsey.373 Noting that the lack of
any statutory exception for evidence of sexual conduct between
a complainant and others than the accused to prove consent
"appears irreconcilable with People v. Oliphant,'3 74 Judge
Kaufman of the Michigan Court of Appeals reasoned that "[ilt
is difficult to conceive of a reason why a defendant's sexual his-
371. This case brings to mind the notorious 'Brides in the Bath" case, Rex
v. Smith, 11 Crim. App. 229 (1915). In that case, the defendant's "wife" (the
defendant was a bigamist) was found drowned in her bath. The defendant was
the beneficiary of her life insurance policy. At the murder trial, the prosecu-
tion offered evidence that the defendant's two former "wives" also had been
discovered drowned in their baths. The court admitted the evidence to negate
the defendant's claim that the death was accidental. It is difficult to see how
this highly probative evidence escapes the inference of propensity. Neverthe-
less, as in Oliphant, had this evidence not been made known to the jury, the
defendant might have continued to inherit from a succession of wealthy
"wives" with impunity. See also United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 133-35
(4th Cir. 1973) (in trial for first degree murder of eight-month-old foster son
by suffocation, evidence that other children in defendant's care had died or
suffered respiratory difficulties was admissible where its relevance outweighed
possibility of prejudice), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 979 (1974). Perhaps the need for
such evidence, combined with its high probative value under such unusual cir-
cumstances, justifies an occasional departure from the propensity rule. See in-
fra note 372.
372. Two scholars recently have argued for an end to the absolute ban on
character evidence, claiming that in certain instances the probative value of
character evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. See Kuhns, supra note 66,
at 803-09; Uviller, supra note 75, at 882-90. Professor Richard Kuhns proposes
that "other acts" evidence be admitted if the court determines that its proba-
tive value outweighs its prejudicial effect. See Kuhns, supra note 66, at 806.
Professor Richard Uviller would admit evidence of specific instances of prior
conduct which "by [their] unusual nature or . . . regular occurrence, can be
fairly said to demonstrate a characterological predisposition to behave in a
similar fashion under similar circumstances." Uviller, supra note 75, at 886.
373. 76 Mich. App. 741, 257 N.W.2d 236 (1977). The majority in Dawsey up-
held the constitutionality of Michigan's rape-shield statute. 1d. at 753, 257
N.W.2d at 241.
374. Id, at 765, 257 N.W.2d at 246 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
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tory should be treated differently than that of complain-
ant's. '375 Indeed, Judge Kaufman understated the point, for it
is the accused who faces an extended loss of liberty and whose
need to present evidence in a criminal trial enjoys constitu-
tional protection. Such protection clearly must take precedence
over that provided the rape complainant by the legislature.
Assuming the propriety of a narrowly drawn exception for
"pattern" evidence, the difficult task is determining the circum-
stances under which evidence of such a pattern has sufficient
probative value on the issue of consent to outweigh its prejudi-
cial impact. The concern here is to avoid setting in motion a
process of gradual erosion of the exclusionary rule, because
there may be a fine line separating that which is truly relevant
to consent from that which simply brands the complainant as a
woman of "loose morals." With respect to one category of
proof-evidence that the complainant is a prostitute-the
courts have struck the proper balance. Typical is the response
of the Ohio Supreme Court to a challenge that its rape-shield
statute, which has no exception for sexual conduct evidence to
prove consent, was applied unconstitutionally to exclude evi-
dence of prostitution. The court there denied the accused's
challenge, reasoning that "[e]vidence that complainant had a
reputation as a prostitute is not sufficiently probative of con-
sent to outweigh the state's legitimate interests in excluding
the testimony, at least where there is no suggestion in the rec-
ord that financial arrangements were entered into for sexual
activities in this instance. '376
375. Id. Cf. State v. Gardner, 59 Ohio St. 2d 14, 16-21, 391 N.E.2d 337, 340-42
(1979) (invoking the rape-shield law to bar evidence that the victim was a pros-
titute, but admitting evidence of the defendant's prior sexual misconduct to
show nonconsent of victim).
376. State v. Gardner, 59 Ohio St. 2d 14, 18, 391 N.E.2d 337, 341 (1979). Ac-
cord State v. Quinn, 121 Ariz. 582, 585, 592 P.2d 778, 781 (Ct. App. 1978) (evi-
dence of complainant's prior acts of prostitution not admissible where
defendant does not claim a defense of consent by prostitution or where proba-
tive value of evidence is outweighed by its prejudicial effect); Commonwealth
v. Joyce, 382 Mass. 222, 231, 415 N.E.2d 181, 187 (1981) (although admitting evi-
dence of prostitution to show bias or motive, the court emphasized that it was
not departing from its long held view that evidence of prostitution is not ad-
missible on the issue of consent); People v. Williams, 416 Mich. 25, 40-44, 330
N.W.2d 823, 829-30 (1982) (evidence of complainant's prior acts of prostitution
not sufficiently probative on issue of consent to have been admitted by trial
court); State v. Romero, 94 N.M. 22, 25-26, 606 P.2d 1116, 1119-20 (Ct. App.
1980) (evidence of complainant's prostitution not probative of consent where
defendant did not raise defense of consent by prostitution), overruled in part




Indeed, evidence of prostitution lacks even minimal rele-
vance in such a case because it is highly improbable that a pro-
fessional prostitute would dispense sexual favors without
remuneration.37 7 Unless the accused defends on the ground
that the incident in question was an act of prostitution rather
than a rape, permitting evidence that the complainant engages
in prostitution is indistinguishable from relying on the unchaste
character inference. Thus, even assuming a statutory exception
for pattern evidence, proof of prostitution would be inadmissi-
ble because of a lack of similarity to the circumstances of the
incident in question.
Appellate courts in the three states that permit pattern ev-
idence378 have applied their statutory standards in a common-
sense manner, distinguishing "shadows on the wall from legiti-
mate indicators of consensual conduct."379 For example, in
Florida it is well settled that certainly one and even a few iso-
lated instances of consensual sexual conduct between the com-
plainant and other men do not constitute a "pattern of conduct-
or behavior" sufficient to be relevant on the issue of consent.380
377. See People v. Williams, 416 Mich. 25, 44, 330 N.W.2d 823, 830 (1982)
(evidence that complainant is a prostitute is more probative of fact that she
would not provide sexual services to four men gratis than of consent); cf. Win-
field v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 211, 220, 301 S.E.2d 15, 20 (1983) (holding that
evidence of a distinctive pattern of sexual conduct involving extortion of
money by threats after acts of prostitution is admissible as probative of the de-
fendant's claim that the rape charge resulted from his failure to pay).
378. See supra note 342. A fourth statute permits evidence of sexual con-
duct with persons other than the accused on the issue of consent, but does not
explicitly require that the prior conduct amount to a "pattern" of distinctive or
similar sexual acts. This exception threatens to swallow the general exclu-
sionary rule by requiring only that the prior conduct show "such a relation to
the conduct involved in the case on the part of the victim that is relevant to
the issue of consent." TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-17-119 (1982). The statute does
require, however, that this showing be made at an in camera hearing prior to
the offering of the evidence. Id See generally State v. Burgin, 668 S.W.2d 668,
670 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984) (excluding evidence of past sexual conduct be-
cause it was too remote in time (one and one-half to two years) to have any
bearing on consent); Walters v. State, 578 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1978) (finding no showing of relevance to consent; a mere claim of consent by
the accused will not trigger the right to introduce sexual conduct evidence).
As previously noted, see supra note 263, the Nebraska statute has an ex-
ception for "pattern" evidence, but this exception applies only to sexual con-
duct between the complainant and the accused; sexual conduct with third
parties is inadmissible on the issue of consent. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-
321(2)(b) (Supp. 1984).
379. Adkins v. State, 448 So. 2d 1096, 1098 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
380. See id. at 1097-98 (victim had lived with two men in the past and was
now living with a third); Kaplan v. State, 451 So. 2d 1386, 1386-88 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984) (only one of three incidents of sexual activity "remotely resem-
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Similarly, in Minnesota381 and North Carolina,382 the courts
have rejected offers of evidence of isolated acts of sexual con-
duct with persons other than the accused that occur under cir-
cumstances dissimilar to those surrounding the alleged rapes.
State v. Forney,38 3 a 1980 case decided by the North Carolina
Supreme Court, is typical in this regard. In that case, the evi-
dence showed that the victim, a cocktail waitress, was accosted
in the parking lot of her apartment complex when she returned
from work. The defendant, pointing a gun, ordered her to her
car, where he forced her to have intercourse and oral sex.
384
Upholding the rejection of the defendant's "frivolous" offer of
pattern evidence, the court stated in dictum that
[i]f the defendant had shown that the victim commonly accosted
strangers in parking lots seeking sexual partners or that she often
met men in apartment parking lots and took them to her car for sex-
ual congress, then clearly the relevance of such evidence is estab-
lished under the statute and would have been admissible.385
In a later case, State v. Shoffner,38 6 the Court of Appeals of
North Carolina found sufficient evidence of a pattern of sexual
conduct to meet the statutory standard.38 7 The complainant
had visited the defendants at their apartment and left with
bled" the defendant's version of the incident); Winters v. State, 425 So. 2d 203,
204 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (a few isolated instances of sexual activity);
McElveen v. State, 415 So. 2d 746, 748 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (three specific
instances of sexual activity not so repetitive or frequent as to establish a pat-
tern); Blunt v. State, 397 So. 2d 1047, 1047 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (victim
previously had been raped and had illegitimate children); Hodges v. State, 386
So. 2d 888, 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (complainant admitted she had had
sex once in the previous month and had slept with her former boyfriend on
one occasion, but denied other allegations of consensual sexual conduct).
381. See State v. Booker, 348 N.W.2d 753, 754-55 (Minn. 1984) (one act of
intercourse one week prior to alleged rape); State v. Dornack, 329 N.W.2d 839,
840 (Minn. 1983) (sexual conduct occurred five years before the incident in
question).
382. See State v. Rhinehart, 68 N.C. App. 615, 617-18, 316 S.E.2d 118, 120
(1984) (sexual intercourse with boyfriend earlier on night of rape); State v.
Wilhite, 58 N.C. App. 654, 658-60, 294 S.E.2d 396, 399-400 (evidence of prostitu-
tion dissimilar to encounter in question), cert. denied, 307 N.C. 129, 297 S.E.2d
403 (1982), rev'd in part on other grounds, 308 N.C. 798, 804, 303 S.E.2d 788, 792
(1983); State v. White, 48 N.C. App. 589, 593, 269 S.E.2d 323, 325 (1980) (one
incident of sexual conduct not sufficiently similar to the defendant's version);
State v. Smith, 45 N.C. App. 501, 503-04, 263 S.E.2d 371, 372-73 (1980) (sexual
activity in "dating-type" circumstances dissimilar to the encounter in
question).
383. 301 N.C. 31, 269 S.E.2d 110 (1980).
384. Id. at 32, 269 S.E.2d at 111.
385. Id at 43, 269 S.E.2d at 116-17.
386. 62 N.C. App. 245, 302 S.E.2d 830 (1983).
387. I1& at 248-49, 302 S.E.2d at 832-33.
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them by car to visit a mutual friend. She alleged that both de-
fendants undressed her and raped her in the back seat of the
car. The defendants, who claimed consent, and five other wit-
nesses testified that prior to leaving the apartment, the com-
plainant had unzipped the pants of one of the defendants,
fondled his genitals, and asked the defendants and others to
participate in an orgy. The defendants further testified that the
complainant continued this provocative behavior inside the car.
All of the evidence relating to the complainant's previous sex-
ual conduct with others, presented at a voir dire hearing, was
excluded by the trial court.388 The court of appeals upheld this
ruling as to three items of proof, consisting of isolated acts of
sexual intercourse in private.38 9 With regard to the testimony
of three other witnesses, however, one of whom had observed
the complainant "many times at a club,"390 the court reversed,
reasoning that
[t]he testimony... suggests that the prosecuting witness was the initi-
ator, the aggressor, in her sexual encounters. The evidence excluded
suggests that the prosecuting witness's modus operandi was to accost
men at clubs, parties (public places) and make sexual advances by
putting her hands "all over their bodies."...
We do not believe the Rape Victim Shield Statute requires the
prior sexual behavior of a complainant to parallel on all fours a de-
fendant's version of the prosecuting witness's sexual behavior at the
time in question. If [the pattern exception] is to have any application,
it has to be applied in this case.
391
388. Id. at 247, 302 S.E.2d at 832.
389. Id. at 248, 302 S.E.2d at 832. As to these three items, consisting of cas-
ual sexual encounters with three different men, the court ruled that
"[b]ecause even the most promiscuous among us can be raped, the Rape Victim
Shield Statute may properly be invoked to exclude [such evidence]." Id
390. Id. at 247, 302 S.E.2d at 832.
391. Id. at 248-49, 302 S.E.2d at 832-33. Specifically, the pattern evidence
consisted of the following:
1. That Kay Mitchell had observed the prosecuting witness,
many times at a club, "attracting some of the men," dancing with
them, and getting out of control by "feeling on them and stuff like
that.... [Her] hands [would be] every which way on the man's body."
2. That at a party approximately a year and a half before [the
alleged rape, the complainant] tried to seduce Darryl Summers, the
older brother of defendant Summers, and told Darryl to come by her
house later that night. When [he] came by the [complainant's] house
later that night, she got in his car. She had no underclothes on; in
fact, she was clad only in a gown. [They] then had sexual intercourse
in the car.
6. That a Mr. Pennix had observed the [complainant] seated on
a "soda crate" in the Circle Inn with two men standing in front of her,
one of whom was zipping his pants.
Id at 247-48, 302 S.E.2d at 832.
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The difficult cases, of course, are those in which the dis-
puted evidence falls somewhere between isolated instances of
dissimilar sexual conduct and frequent, repetitive conduct
closely resembling the defendant's version of the facts at trial.
Several such "close" cases have arisen in states in which the
rape-shield law has no exception for pattern evidence when de-
fendants have claimed a constitutional entitlement to introduce
such evidence to prove consent.392 These claims uniformly
have been rejected, in contrast to cases recognizing a constitu-
tional right to introduce "physical consequences" evidence and
evidence probative of bias. These decisions are perhaps under-
standable in light of the judiciary's hostility towards eviden-
tiary theories that tread dangerously close to the invidious
common-law inference, "if she consented before, she consented
again." The troubling question in such cases, however, is
whether the courts have properly balanced these legitimate
concerns with the accused's right to present evidence in support
of his consent defense.
For example, in People v. Cassidy,393 the victim met the de-
fendant at an after-hours bar and accompanied him and some
of his friends to another bar. She had previously engaged in
sexual relations with the defendant on one or two occasions.
On this particular night, the victim accompanied the defendant
to his home, went upstairs to his bedroom, and undressed. She
was, by her own admission, willing to have sexual relations
with him at that time. Thereafter, claimed the victim, the de-
fendant suddenly lunged at her and forced her to submit to
vaginal and anal intercourse by tying her and gagging her. He
yelled obscenities and acted "[l]ike a crazy person." He then
told her to dress and leave his home immediately or he would
kill her. She immediately contacted the police and went to a
hospital where she was treated for injuries.394
The defendant's version was that once inside the bedroom,
the victim asked if she could tie the defendant up. He declined,
but asked if she would like to be tied up. She consented and he
tied her hands loosely with her hosiery. They had vaginal and
anal intercourse. Suddenly, the victim's "'whole attitude
392. See, e.g., State v. Cassidy, 3 Conn. App. 374, 489 A.2d 386, 391, cert de-
nied, 196 Conn. 803, 492 A.2d 1239 (1985); State v. Vaughn, 448 So.2d 1260, 1268
(La. 1984); State v. Patnaude, 140 Vt. 361, 379, 438 A.2d 402, 410 (1981); State v.
Hudlow, 99 Wash. 2d 1, 11-19, 659 P.2d 514, 520-24 (1983) (en bane).
393. 3 Conn. App. 374, 489 A.2d 386, cert denied, 196 Conn. 803, 492 A.2d
1239 (1985).
394. Id. at -, 489 A.2d at 388.
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changed... like she didn't consent to what we were doing.' "395
She became hysterical, screaming about her husband who had
died in Vietnam. She said she "'shouldn't be doing this"' 396
and that she wanted to die and join her husband. She untied
her hands and started lunging at the defendant. The defendant
struggled with her, causing her to fall on the bed. He then told
her to leave the house, and when he returned to the bedroom
after a brief trip to the bathroom, she was gone.397
The trial court refused to admit the testimony of another
man who would have testified that a year earlier he and the
victim had gone to her home and had sexual relations. Accord-
ing to this witness, suddenly the victim began "going crazy" and
screaming about her husband who had been killed in Vietnam.
The witness told her to "forget about it" and they went to
sleep. The following morning, she showed him pictures of her
late husband.398
The Appellate Court of Connecticut rejected the defend-
ant's argument that this evidence showed a pattern of conduct,
the exclusion of which violated his constitutional rights.399 Ini-
tially, the court found that cross-examination of the victim re-
garding both the alleged rape and her prior sexual conduct with
the defendant had been unrestricted. Thus, the court deter-
mined, the jury had sufficient information to judge the victim's
credibility. Further, the court agreed with the trial court that
the evidence of the prior similar incident was not even relevant
without additional proof that the victim had made a false alle-
gation of rape following the earlier incident.40 0 Finally, the
court took note of recent Florida case law construing the statu-
tory "pattern" standard as requiring more than one incident to
establish a pattern of conduct probative of consent.401
Cassidy is a difficult case. Although there was only a sin-
gle prior episode, its similarity to the conduct in question, com-
bined with its unique features, argues strongly for its
395. Id. (quoting the defendant).
396. Id. (quoting the defendant).
397. Id. at -, 489 A.2d at 388-89.
398. Id. at -, 489 A.2d at 389.
399. Id. at -, 489 A.2d at 391-92. Connecticut's rape shield statute follows
the federal rather than the Michigan approach and therefore it contains a
"catch-basin provision," see infra notes 576-587 and accompanying text, for evi-
dence that is constitutionally required to be admitted. See CoNN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 54-86f (West 1985). The Cassidy court held that the disputed evidence
did not meet that standard. Cassidy, 3 Conn. App. at -, 489 A.2d at 392.
400. Cassidy, 3 Conn. App. at -, 489 A.2d at 392.
401. Id. (citing Hodges v. State, 386 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)).
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admission. Had the prior incident involved the indistinctive act
of picking up a man at a singles' bar, the court's determination
that a single prior incident is not probative of consent would
more likely have been correct. Nor should the lack of a false
allegation of rape following the prior incident be a basis for ex-
clusion lest the similarity requirement be carried to an ex-
treme. That factor should go to the weight of the evidence, not
to its admissibility. Indeed, to hold otherwise would negate en-
tirely the "pattern" theory; even assuming twenty similar and
distinctive prior incidents, the "failure" to bring false charges
subsequent to each act would preclude admissibility under the
court's reasoning.
More significantly, it is hard to see how the policies under-
lying the rape-shield statute would be undermined if the court
had admitted the evidence. The jury had already learned that
the victim previously had engaged in nonmarital sexual rela-
tions with a man, the defendant, with whom she was involved
on a casual basis. She was ready and willing to go home with
him after a spontaneous meeting in an after-hours bar. Little
or no further "prejudice" to the victim or the fact-finding pro-
cess would have resulted if the jury had learned of one addi-
tional episode of nonmarital sexual activity. Although the
court undoubtedly was correct in reasoning that a greater
number of similar sexual encounters would have had more pro-
bative value, such evidence would also have had a damaging ef-
fect by portraying the victim as a woman of "loose morals."
The risk of that sort of prejudice, toward which rape-shield leg-
islation was aimed, was simply not involved in Cassidy.
On the other side of the scale, the case turned entirely on
the credibility of the accused and his accuser. The court's em-
phasis on the defendant's freedom to cross-examine the victim
regarding the alleged rape displays an alarming nalvet6 towards
the realities of the trial process. The additional item of sexual
conduct evidence might well have raised in the jury's mind a
reasonable doubt about guilt even without reliance on the in-
vidious common-law inference. Thus, this close question of ad-
missibility should have been resolved in favor of the accused's
right to present evidence supportive of his version of the
incident.402
402. See also State v. Vaughn, 448 So. 2d 1260 (La. 1983). In Vaughn, a
sharply divided Supreme Court of Louisiana was faced with deciding whether
a trial court's exclusion of a single item of sexual conduct evidence denied the
accused his constitutional right to present relevant evidence in support of his
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Even more difficult are those cases in which there is some
special link between the prior acts and the incident in question
but, in contrast to Cassidy, the evidence creates a high risk of
prejudice. In People v. Patnaude,4 3 two women alleged that
they had been gang-raped by the two defendants and three
other men. The women had been hitchhiking and had accepted
a ride from these five men, some of whom they had known pre-
viously. The victims alleged that they were taken against their
will to a secluded cabin where they were forced at knifepoint to
engage in various sexual acts.404 The defendants, who claimed
that consent had been freely given, argued that they were con-
stitutionally entitled to introduce various items of sexual con-
duct evidence not permitted under Vermont's rape-shield law.
Three of the items of proof involved prior group sexual conduct
on the part of the victims. In one instance, both women had
participated together in a sexual encounter with two other
men. In another instance, one of the women had been involved
in a group sexual encounter without the second woman. In a
third, both women invited a third woman to join them at a
party where she might earn money in exchange for sexual fa-
vors. Two additional excluded items of evidence involved acts
of prostitution by one of the victims. The Supreme Court of
Vermont upheld the trial court's rejection of all of these items
of proof, holding that prior sexual conduct with others than the
accused can never be probative of consent.40 5
Assuming recognition of a pattern of conduct theory, this
case presents a close question of admissibility. Clearly the acts
of prostitution were properly excluded, because there was no
allegation of prostitution by the defendants with regard to the
incident in question. Evidence of prostitution would amount to
nothing more than proof of the victim's general promiscuity. 40 6
consent defense. Initially, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the trial
court, holding that the proffered evidence would have established a pattern of
promiscuity, that the conduct was related to the alleged offense, and that ex-
clusion of the evidence infringed the defendant's right to confront the witness.
Id. at 1262-63. On rehearing, however, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed
itself and reinstated the decision of the trial court. Id. at 1268.
403. 140 Vt. 361, 438 A.2d 402 (1981).
404. Id at 366, 438 A.2d at 403.
405. Id at 374-81, 438 A.2d at 407-411. Five other items of sexual conduct
evidence, not detailed in the opinion, were admitted at trial pursuant to excep-
tions in the shield law. It is not clear whether the evidence that was admitted
involved one or both of the complainants. Id at 374-75, 438 A.2d at 408.
406. See supra notes 376-377 and accompanying text. Furthermore, there
was evidence that only one of the two complainants previously had engaged in
prostitution. Patnaude, 140 Vt. at 375, 438 A.2d at 408.
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The previous acts of group sex, however, particularly those in-
volving the two victims together, certainly make more probable
the defendants' claim that the entire episode was consensual.
This history of and participation in group sexual encounters in-
dicates something more specific than mere unchastity or pro-
miscuity. Indeed, without the evidence, the jury might find
incredible the defense claim that these two women had volun-
tarily gone to a secluded cabin with casual acquaintances and
engaged in group sexual activity.
From the opposite perspective, however, it is hard to imag-
ine that a jury could have weighed the evidence in this case dis-
passionately had it been made aware of the victims' past sexual
conduct. The inflammatory nature of this evidence is so great
that it raises the question whether, as a practical matter, a jury
would ever find that a woman with such a "history" had been
raped.40 7 Nevertheless, where the admissibility question is a
close one, as in this case, any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the accused's right to introduce sexual conduct evidence sup-
portive of his version of the incident. Patnaude is one of those
cases, rare, one hopes, where some harm to the interests served
by the rape-shield laws must be endured in order to afford the
defendant a fair trial.40 8
These various cases suggest that courts should not mechan-
ically apply the pattern theory to determine whether evidence
of sexual conduct is relevant to the issue of consent. Rather,
407. See Berger, supra note 3, at 59.
408. For an interesting contrast to Patnaude, see State v. Hudlow, 99 Wash.
2d 1, 659 P.2d 514 (1983) (en banc), a case that also involved a gang rape of two
complainants. The defendants' version was that the incident in question was a
group sex encounter, in which the complainants took much of the initiative.
The court of appeals reversed on the ground that the trial court had improp-
erly excluded evidence that the complainants had previously initiated and en-
gaged in group sexual encounters. State v. Hudlow, 30 Wash. App. 503, 507-12,
635 P.2d 1096, 1099-1102 (1981). The Supreme Court of Washington reversed,
however, finding that the excluded evidence showed only the "general promis-
cuity" of the complainants. See Hudlow, 99 Wash. 2d at 17, 659 P.2d at 523.
Hudlow and Patnaude perhaps may be reconciled by the fact that in
Patnaude, the complainants were previously acquainted with the defendants,
whereas in Hudlow, the defendants were strangers who had given the
hitchhiking complainants a ride. The Hudlow court stressed that "no testi-
mony was offered showing that the two women had ever engaged in sex with
men other than sailors whom they knew or that they had sexual relations
with men who had picked them up hitchhiking." Id The lack of similarity
between the past and present incidents combined with the inflammatory na-
ture of the sexual conduct evidence persuaded the court that the probative




courts should examine carefully the facts and circumstances of
the prior sexual conduct to determine whether there exists
some special relationship to the incident in question. If the past
conduct is similar to the encounter in question and is either re-
petitive or unique, it is likely that its probative value outweighs
its prejudicial effect and the case for its admission is therefore
strong.409
To summarize, in the three states opting for the Michigan
approach with exceptions for pattern evidence, the courts
should apply those exceptions in the manner indicated above.
The other states that follow the Michigan approach should
amend their statutes to allow for pattern evidence in appropri-
ately limited circumstances. Under the proposed legislative so-
lution,410 such pattern evidence would be allowed because it
does not rely for its probative value on either of the invidious
inferences.
e. Evidence of sexual conduct offered to prove a mistaken
belief in consent
Suppose that a rape complainant had not consented to sex-
ual relations but that the defendant erroneously believed that
she had. Although this is commonly referred to as the "mis-
take of fact defense," the defendant in such a case really is ar-
guing that he lacked the mental state required to commit the
offense.411 Confusion concerning the degree to which such a
mistake can operate as a valid defense to rape stems from the
American courts' failure to recognize this crucial link between
the mistake and the requisite mental element.4'2
This connection was made clear, however, in the celebrated
British case, Director of Public Prosecutions v. Morgan.413 In
that case, Morgan, a senior officer in the Royal Air Force, in-
vited three of his much younger RAF companions to his home
to have sexual intercourse with his wife. Although they were
at first "incredulous," the three young men eventually were
persuaded of Morgan's sincerity after he explained that
although his wife might put up a struggle, she was "kinky" and
409. Cf Uviller, supra note 75, at 886 (arguing that such evidence should be
admissible). Professor Uviller's proposal is discussed supra note 372.
410. See supra text accompanying notes 223, 234.
411. See W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRImNAL LAW § 47, at 356
(1972); P. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAw DEFENSES § 62(b), at 245-46 (1984).
412. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 411, § 47, at 358-59.
413. [1975] 2 W.L.R. 913.
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this was the only way she could get "turned on."414 Mrs. Mor-
gan recounted that her husband and his three friends roused
her from her sleep in a room she shared with one of her chil-
dren, dragged her into another room which had a double bed,
and proceeded to take turns having intercourse with her while
she was held down. She resisted throughout, screaming for her
children to call the police. Immediately afterward, she drove to
the hospital where she reported the rape. The three visitors
claimed that they believed Mrs. Morgan was a willing partici-
pant, based upon her husband's earlier assertions.415
On appeal, the House of Lords held that an honest, albeit
unreasonable, belief in the victim's consent is a valid defense to
a charge of rape. In its view, the requisite mental element for
rape was the intent to engage in sexual intercourse with the
knowledge that the victim was not consenting. Thus, a genuine
belief that the victim consented would negate culpability.41 6
The approach to claims of mistake regarding consent is dif-
ferent in this country. Rather than look to the requisite mental
element to determine the defendant's culpability, a majority of
courts here have adopted the rule that only a reasonable mis-
take is a valid defense.4 17 Critics claim that this rule fails to
distinguish the conduct of X, who knew that the victim did not
consent, from that of Y, who mistakenly, though stupidly, be-
lieved that she did-a particularly troubling result in light of
414. I& at 928-29.
415. I&
416. I& at 938. The trial judge had instructed the jury that a person would
not be guilty of rape if that person honestly and reasonably believed the com-
plainant had consented. See i. at 931. The House of Lords decided that in-
struction was erroneous because it required the defendant's belief to be
reasonable as well as honest. Id at 938. The appeal was dismissed on grounds
of harmless error, however, because the House of Lords concluded that the
jury would have convicted the defendants even if it had been properly
charged. Id
417. See, e.g., People v. Mayberry, 15 Cal. 3d 143, 153-58, 542 P.2d 1337,
1344-47, 125 Cal. Rptr. 745, 752-55 (1975); State v. Dizon, 47 Hawaii 444, 460-61,
390 P.2d 759, 769 (1964); W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 411, § 47, at 357-
58. An explanation for this approach may be that most rape statutes are
poorly drafted with regard to the required mental element. Id Indeed, in
cases involving related offenses that have an express mental element, such as
"assault with intent to rape" or "attempted rape," most American courts hold
that even an unreasonable mistake regarding the victim's consent is a valid de-
fense. The rationale for this rule is that the mistake negates the specific
mental element of the offense-knowledge that the victim does not consent.
See, e.g., United States v. Short, 4 C.M.A. 437, 446-47, 16 C.M.R. 11, 20-21 (1954)
(Brosman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); State v. Geer, 13
Wash. App. 71, 74 n.1, 533 P.2d 389, 391 n.1 (1975).
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the severe penalties for rape.418 Only in rare cases will the evi-
dence support a claim of reasonable belief in the victim's con-
sent. When there is undisputed evidence of force or resistance,
as in Morgan, a successful defense is highly unlikely. In more
ambiguous settings, however, the claim might have merit, par-
ticularly when coupled with evidence of the victim's prior sex-
ual history, known and relied upon by the defendant at the
time in question.41 9
Imagine a case similar to Morgan, in which the defendant
has been told that the complainant is "turned on" by aggressive
men and that her "no" really means "yes."420 Assume further,
in sharp contrast to Morgan, that the encounter starts out con-
sensually-an agreed-upon dinner date or car ride-and
culminates in sexual intercourse. The defendant claims that
the complainant consented; she claims she did not, and there is
no evidence of force or resistance. In such a case, the defendant
may couple his consent defense with a claim that he reasonably
believed the complainant consented. As evidence, he may point
to her seductive behavior and token resistance during the en-
counter. Assuming that she denies such behavior and there is
no independent evidence of rape, arguably the defendant
should be permitted to offer evidence of her past sexual behav-
ior or of her reputation for particular sexual conduct that he
both knew about and relied upon in forming his belief in her
consent. Whether or not the "rumor" he heard was true, it
may well have affected his perception of her willingness to en-
gage in sex where her verbal and nonverbal conduct was suffi-
ciently ambiguous. 423 Thus, even if the jury decided that the
complainant did not consent on this occasion, it might never-
418. See Herman, supra note 27, at 66; see also P. ROBINSON, supra note
411, § 62(c), at 253 ("Under such a [reasonable mistake] provision an actor will
be liable if he makes an unreasonable mistake, even though it may be a truly
honest mistake."). Under the Model Penal Code, an unreasonable mistaken
belief in consent constitutes a defense unless the belief is recklessly held.
MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(3), 2.04(1)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). This
scheme comports with the common-law view that one must have acted at least
recklessly before criminal liability is imposed. See P. ROBINSON, supra note
411, § 61(a), at 219 nn.49-50; see also United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251
(1922) ("the general rule at common law was that the scienter was a necessary
element in the indictment, and this was followed in regard to statutory crimes
even where the statutory definition did not in terms include it").
419. See 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 3, § 5387, at 582; Berger,
supra note 3, at 62.
420. See 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 3, § 5387, at 582 (posing
the same hypothetical).
421. See D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 168, § 198[B], at 143-44.
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theless exonerate the defendant on the ground that his belief in
her consent was honestly and reasonably held.
Although most commentators agree that a rape defendant
has a constitutional right to offer evidence of the complainant's
prior sexual conduct to support a defense of mistaken belief in
consent,422 there has been little discussion of precisely what ev-
idence should qualify under this exception.42 Because the sub-
stantive law requires that the mistaken belief be reasonable,
the defendant should initially be limited to proving prior sexual
behavior similar to that in which the complainant allegedly en-
gaged on the occasion in question.424 Evidence merely that the
complainant is unchaste or generally promiscuous should not
supply the basis for a reasonable belief in consent, lest the com-
mon-law notion that "'bad girls' are fair game"' ' be resur-
rected in contravention of the policies underlying the rape-
shield laws.4 6 Conversely, the evidence should not have to rise
to the level of a "pattern" of similar sexual activity, because it
Professors Richard Lempert and Stephan Saltzburg give the following hypo-
thetical case:
Suppose, for example, two college students are engaged in erotic pet-
ting when the woman, at the point of intercourse, arguably refuses.
Her version is that she pushed him away and said, "That's it. I want
to get dressed-quickly." His version is that she may have said that,
but that he thought her pushing was teasing and what he thought she
meant was, "Do it quickly, I want to get dressed." If the woman had,
within the defendant's fraternity, a reputation for promiscuity and
was also known to have little patience for afterplay, the evidence
would be clearly relevant on the issue of whether the defendant in-
tended to have intercourse without consent.
R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 67, at 638.
422. See 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 3, § 5387, at 582; Amster-
dam & Babcock, Proposed Position on Issues Raised by the Administration of
Laws Against Rape: Memorandum for the ACLU of Northern California, re-
printed in BABCOCK, supra note 14, at 841; Berger, supra note 3, at 62-63.
423. But see 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 3, § 5387, at 582-83
(arguing that the exception must be limited to cases in which the conduct is
similar and known to the defendant, and the belief engendered by the prior
sexual conduct is reasonable).
424. Id. ("the fact that the victim may have played at rape with her lover
in her bedroom is not admissible when the charged act took place with a stran-
ger, in a dark alley, and at gun point").
425. See Berger, supra note 3, at 63.
426. An example of a court properly limiting the admissibility of evidence
under this theory is provided by In re Nichols, 2 Kan. App. 2d 431, 436, 580
P.2d 1370, 1374-75 (1978). The defendant, charged with "gang rape," unsuccess-
fully attempted to prove his past sexual conduct with the complainant, which
consisted of "rough sex" and "struggles." The Kansas Court of Appeals up-
held the trial court's determination that the "defendant should not have pre-
sumed that the victim's prior consensual activity with him alone would imply
her consent to having intercourse with his friends ...." Id.
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is merely being offered to prove the defendant's belief in con-
sent rather than the objective fact of actual consent.
A second restriction that will narrow further the scope of
this exception is the requirement that the defendant must have
known of the complainant's prior sexual activity at the time of
the encounter.42 7 The information may have been related to
him by third parties, it may have been based on his own obser-
vations of the complainant's behavior with others, or it may
have been a matter of such common knowledge in the commu-
nity that it could be elicited in the form of reputation evi-
dence. 28 Notably, this exception may represent the one
instance where evidence of the complainant's reputation for
particular sexual conduct may not only be relevant, but consti-
tutionally compelled. As noted earlier, rape-shield advocates
have decried the use of reputation evidence as especially unreli-
able and prejudicial when it relates to prior sexual conduct.42 9
In the context of proving a mistaken belief in the complainant's
consent, however, the accuracy of the reputation evidence is
immaterial; it is not being used to prove conduct in conformity
with reputation. Rather, the defendant offers such evidence
merely to prove his knowledge of, and reliance on, the com-
plainant's reputation to interpret her actions at the time in
question.43 0
Despite the consensus that such proof should be excepted
from the general prohibition of sexual conduct evidence, only
Georgia permits the accused to offer evidence that "supports an
inference that the accused could have reasonably believed that
the complaining witness consented to the conduct complained
of in the prosecution."'431 Apparently no rape defendant in any
state following the Michigan approach has yet attempted to in-
troduce sexual conduct evidence under this theory. Moreover,
a few of the states that utilize the Michigan approach prohibit
absolutely the introduction of evidence of sexual conduct in the
427. See 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 3, § 5387, at 582.
428. See id at 582 n.38.
429. See notes 178-179 and accompanying text.
430. This use of the complainant's reputation is analogous to the use of evi-
dence of a homicide victim's reputation for aggression in cases in which self-
defense is asserted. Before the defendant in such cases may use the evidence
to prove his apprehension of danger and the reasonableness of his defensive
actions, he must show that he knew of the deceased's aggressive tendencies.
In contrast, where reputation evidence is offered to prove the victim's con-
forming conduct, knowledge of the reputation is not required. See supra note
87 and accompanying text.
431. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3(b) (1982).
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form of reputation testimony.432 Thus, even if the courts of
these states were to create an exception for evidence proving a
mistaken belief in the complainant's consent, these limitations
on the form of that evidence might nonetheless make it impos-
sible for the defendant to establish a mistake claim if his con-
tention were that he reasonably relied upon the complainant's
reputation in formulating his belief in her consent.43 3 Under
the proposed legislative solution, any form of evidence offered
under this theory would be admissible, because it is not being
offered to prove consent or the complainant's lack of
credibility.43
432. See supra note 243.
433. This problem was presented in a case decided under the federal rape-
shield statute, which similarly prohibits reputation testimony. See Doe v.
United States, 666 F.2d 43, 47-48 (4th Cir. 1981) (discussed infra text accompa-
nying notes 604-613).
434. Brief mention should be made of one other Michigan-type statute that
permits the introduction of evidence to prove a reasonable belief in consent.
The North Carolina rape-shield statute, which provides an exception for "pat-
tern" evidence to prove consent, further provides that the same evidence may
be used to prove a reasonable belief in consent. See N.C.R. EVID. 412; see also
Amsterdam & Babcock, Proposed Position on Issues Raised by the Adminis-
tration of Laws Against Rape: Memorandum for the ACLU of Northern Cali-
fornia, reprinted in BABCOCK, supra note 14, at 841 (proposing that "pattern"
evidence be admitted when it "tends to show that the complaining witness has
engaged in consensual sexual activity with any person under particular and
characteristic circumstances sufficiently similar to those of the encounter with
the defendant so as to establish that she acted in such a way as to lead him to
believe that she consented"); Berger, supra note 3, at 65-66 (asserting that a
statute should allow for evidence which "tends not only to establish consent
itself but also to show suggestive and hence misleading behavior short of con-
sent, which is highly relevant on the question of what the defendant be-
lieved"). This provision of the North Carolina statute contemplates the
situation in which, although the defendant may not have known of the prior
sexual conduct, it has occurred with sufficient frequency to constitute a "pat-
tern," and therefore tends to establish that the complainant acted in accord-
ance with the defendant's version of the encounter. For example, evidence of
a pattern of prior "ambiguous" sexual conduct might persuade the jury that
the complainant again acted in her seductive and equivocal manner regarding
consent even though she did not consent on this particular occasion. Of
course, it is likely that on such facts the jury would determine that consent
was given. Nevertheless, the statute admirably affords the defendant eviden-
tiary support for his claim of mistake in the unusual case in which the com-
plainant engages in suggestive and misleading behavior but departs from her
"pattern" and does not consent on the occasion in question. Ironically, the
same statute does not permit the defendant to offer sexual conduct evidence in
the more common situation in which the prior sexual conduct does not consti-
tute a pattern but was known to the defendant and relied upon in formulating
his subjective belief in consent.
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f. Evidence of sexual conduct offered to rebut the state's proof
Three rape-shield statutes of the Michigan variety ex-
pressly provide that the accused may introduce evidence of the
rape complainant's prior sexual conduct to rebut evidence in-
troduced by the prosecution.435 These provisions contemplate
the situation in which the prosecution, either through the testi-
mony of the complainant or another witness, introduces evi-
dence of a lack of prior sexual conduct on the part of the
complainant. The rationale for permitting the defendant to of-
fer rebuttal evidence is simple and persuasive: having "opened
the door" to this line of proof, the state "should not be allowed
to shut it in the defendant's face." 436
A threshold question is whether the state should ever be
permitted to introduce evidence of the victim's lack of sexual
experience. If not, there would be no need for rebuttal evi-
dence. This issue arises most frequently when the state at-
tempts to prove that the complainant was a virgin prior to the
alleged rape. The cases are divided on the question whether
such evidence is admissible under the various rape-shield stat-
utes. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin recently interpreted its
rape-shield's prohibition of evidence of "sexual conduct" to pro-
hibit evidence of a lack of sexual activity as well.437 The court
concluded that evidence of virginity "is necessarily a comment
on the woman's prior sexual conduct. '4 38
Although other courts have adopted contrary readings of
their respective rape-shield provisions,43 9 none has considered
whether such evidence has probative value on the issue of con-
sent. Arguably, evidence of virginity, as opposed to evidence of
affirmative sexual conduct, may be relevant to the issue of con-
sent.440 Considering the frequency of nonmarital sexual activ-
435. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461A(a)(4) (1982) ("[e]vidence offered for
the purpose of impeachment when the prosecutor puts the victim's prior sex-
ual conduct in issue"); VA. CODE § 18.2-67.7(A)(3) (1982) ("[e]vidence offered to
rebut evidence of the complaining witness's prior sexual conduct introduced
by the prosecution"); W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-11 (1984) ("evidence [offered to im-
peach] credibility, if the victim first makes his or her previous sexual conduct
an issue in the trial by introducing evidence with respect thereto").
436. Berger, supra note 3, at 67.
437. State v. Gavigan, 111 Wis. 2d 150, 159, 330 N.W.2d 571, 576 (1983).
438. Id
439. See Brewer v. State, 269 Ark. 185, 189-90, 599 S.W.2d 141, 143 (1980);
People v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Preston,
121 N.H. 147, 149-50, 427 A.2d 32, 33-34 (1981).
440. See Commonwealth v. McKay, 363 Mass. 220, 227, 294 N.E.2d 213, 218
(1973), a pre-rape-shield case, in which the court held that evidence of virgin-
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ity in contemporary society,441 one might reasonably infer from
a woman's decision to forego such activity that she would be
less likely to consent on a specific occasion, particularly if the
accused were a total stranger. Of course, the introduction of
such evidence necessarily is highly prejudicial to the accused.
Just as evidence of unchastity often is unfairly prejudicial to
the state's case, a "vision of ravaged innocence" may be equally
damaging to the defendant."- 2 Although the issue of the admis-
sibility of rebuttal proof has not arisen in cases permitting evi-
dence of virginity, fundamental fairness dictates that the
accused be permitted to counter the impact of such proof with
evidence of the complainant's previous sexual conduct, if such
evidence exists.4 43
Rebuttal evidence may also be necessary when the evi-
dence of "lack of sexual conduct" offered to prove the com-
plainant's nonconsent involves the complainant's homo-
sexuality. The Ohio Court of Appeals recently held unconstitu-
tional that state's rape-shield statute because it failed to provide
the accused with the opportunity to rebut such proof with spe-
cific instances of the complainant's heterosexual conduct. In
State v. Williams,4 " the defendant claimed that the complain-
ant had consented to have sex with him on earlier occasions as
well as at the time in question. The complainant testified that
she had never had consensual sexual relations with the defend-
ant, nor with any other man for that matter, because she was a
lesbian.445 The trial court would not permit the defendant to
ity "has far more probative value on the issue of consent" than does evidence
of lack of virginity. The court added, however, that "evidence which would
tend to impeach testimony as to the virginity of the victim" should be admit-
ted. I& n.4.
441. See supra note 167.
442. See Berger, supra note 3, at 67.
443. To be sure, a statute could expressly exclude evidence of virginity,
thereby obviating the need for rebuttal evidence. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 491.015(1) (Vernon Supp. 1986) ("evidence of specific instances of the com-
plaining witness' [sic] prior sexual conduct or the absence of such instances or
conduct is inadmissible") (emphasis added).
444. 16 Ohio App. 3d 484, 477 N.E.2d 221 (1984), affd, 21 Ohio St. 3d 33, 487
N.E.2d 560 (1986).
445. Id. at 486, 477 N.E.2d at 223-24. The defense in Williams was consent,
coupled with a claim that the complainant was a prostitute and the defendant
was her "pimp." The defendant alleged further that the rape charge was the
complainant's way of "getting even" with him for taking some of her "trick"
money. After an in camera hearing, the court ruled that the defendant could
testify as to the pimp-prostitute relationship in order to establish his defense.
Id. At trial, on direct examination, the following colloquy took place between
the prosecutor and the victim:
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call as witnesses other men who would testify to specific in-
stances of sexual conduct with the complainant. The appeals
court, however, held that this application of the rape-shield
law, which had no provision for evidence of sexual conduct to
rebut the state's proof, deprived the accused of his sixth amend-
ment right to confront the witness against him.44 6 Notably, the
appeals court held that the evidence offered by the defendant
was also admissible on the ground that the complainant had
waived the protection of the rape-shield law by placing her sex-
ual past in issue.44 7
The possibility of a waiver by the complainant of the rape-
shield statute's protection is explicitly incorporated into one
such statute. The general exclusionary provision of the Vir-
ginia rape-shield law is preceded by the phrase "[u]nless the
complaining witness voluntarily agrees otherwise." 448 The stat-
ute thus recognizes the complainant as the primary beneficiary
of the shield law and permits her to waive its protection. The
rebuttal provision contained in the Virginia statute is intended
to afford the defendant the opportunity to offer contradictory
sexual conduct evidence in cases in which the complainant
agrees to place her prior sexual conduct in issue.449
This notion of waiver brings into sharp focus the hybrid
Q: Have you ever had intercourse with [the defendant]?
A: No Sir, I haven't.
Q: Have you ever gone out and solicited for sex or turned a
trick?
A: No Sir, I haven't.
Q: Can you tell us why?




446. IdM at 490, 477 N.E.2d at 228. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the
decision of the court of appeals, holding that "the rape shield law as applied in
this case violates [the defendant's] Sixth Amendment right of confrontation."
State v. Williams, 21 Ohio St. 3d 33, -, 487 N.E.2d 560, - (1986). The supreme
court reasoned:
As in Davis [415 U.S. 308 (1974)], this evidence is submitted for more
than mere impeachment of a witness' credibility. The victim's credi-
bility is indeed being impeached; however, the proferred evidence has
a more important purpose, which is to negate the implied establish-
ment of an element of the crime charged [lack of consent]. For this
reason, the probative value of the testimony outweighs any interest
the state has in its exclusion.
Id. at -, 487 N.E.2d at _.
447. Williams, 16 Ohio App. 3d at 491, 477 N.E.2d at 228.
448. VA. CODE § 18.2-67.7(A) (1982).
449. See Kneedler, supra note 33, at 493.
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quality of rape-shield laws. These laws are similar to the evi-
dentiary privileges in that they seek to protect the privacy in-
terests of nonparty witnesses.450 Unlike privileges, however,
rape-shield laws are designed to further truthfinding by exclud-
ing irrelevant and prejudicial evidence. This dichotomy raises
the question whether the complainant should ever be permitted
to "waive" a statute that furthers accurate fact-finding.45 1 As a
practical matter, most complainants probably would not agree
to the introduction of evidence of their past sexual conduct
other than evidence of a "lack of" such conduct, such as proof
of virginity or homosexuality. Such types of evidence arguably
are probative of nonconsent and, in any event, are not likely to
prejudice the inquiry so long as rebuttal proof is permitted. For
these reasons, the waiver concept should not prove troublesome
unless, as in Williams, the defendant is prohibited from intro-
ducing sexual conduct evidence to rebut the state's proof.
Thus, because evidence of the complainant's lack of sexual
activity may, in certain instances, have probative value on the
issue of consent, such evidence should be permitted in the pros-
ecution's direct case, either under a waiver theory or by specifi-
cally providing for such proof in a rape-shield statute. In such a
450. See generally C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 21, § 72, at 172 ("certain pri-
vacy interests in society are deserving of protection by privilege irrespective of
whether the existence of such privileges actually operates substantially to af-
fect conduct within the protected relationships").
451. A second question raised by the hybrid quality of rape-shield laws is
whether the state, as "beneficiary" of the statute's truthfinding function,
should be permitted to "waive" the protection of the statute by not objecting
to inadmissible sexual conduct evidence for purely strategic reasons. Doing so
would leave the complainant open to an invasion of privacy for which she has
no recourse. Courts and legislatures are not unmindful of this problem, as evi-
denced by a recent decision granting the complainant a right to appeal an in
camera admissibility determination under the federal rape-shield statute. See
Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43, 45-46 (4th Cir. 1981). Although the federal
statute makes no provision for an interlocutory appeal, the court determined
that the victim was the intended beneficiary of the statute. The court rea-
soned that because "no other party in the evidentiary proceeding shares these
interests," id at 46, the legislative intent would be frustrated if the victim
were not permitted to appeal an order admitting evidence of her past sexual
conduct. The court's determination of the merits of the appeal is discussed in-
fra text accompanying notes 604-613. See also State v. Miskell, 122 N.H. 842,
845, 451 A.2d 383, 385 (1982) (granting the complainant an interlocutory appeal
from an order compelling her to answer questions in a deposition concerning
her sexual history, on the ground that she was "the real party in interest and
her interests may differ from those of the state"); cf. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2907.02(F) (Page Supp. 1984) (granting the rape victim the right to be repre-




case, however, the defendant must be permitted to introduce
rebuttal evidence lest the open door be unconstitutionally shut
in his face. Although the situation may not arise with great fre-
quency, the potential for abuse highlights the need for a rebut-
tal provision in the remaining twenty-three Michigan-type
statutes. Under the proposed legislative solution, such evidence
of "lack of" sexual conduct and evidence offered in rebuttal
thereof would be freely allowed, because neither use involves
reliance on the invidious common-law inferences. 45 2
g. Evidence of the complainant's prior false
allegations of rape
One would be hard-pressed to dispute the high probative
value of evidence that on previous occasions the complainant
had made false allegations of rape. The media attention re-
cently devoted to Catherine Crowell Webb's recantation of her
eight-year-old accusation of rape against Gary Dotson vividly
demonstrates the powerful impact of this evidence. 453 If, in the
future, Webb were to accuse another man of rape, his defense
might be seriously impaired were he not permitted to elicit evi-
452. For an unusual fact situation raising the question of the need for re-
buttal proof, see State v. Lantz, 44 Or. App. 695, 607 P.2d 197 (1980) (en banc).
The defendant in Lantz was charged with an act of forcible anal intercourse.
The complainant testified that she did not report the incident until three days
had passed because she felt so degraded and humiliated. In a five to four deci-
sion, the Oregon Court of Appeals held that the defendant should have been
able to call three witnesses to whom the complainant had said she was a pros-
titute and "would do anything a man wanted for $100." The defendant argued
that this testimony would support the inference that the complainant was not
degraded by the defendant's forcible anal intercourse and would therefore re-
but her explanation for not promptly reporting the rape. The majority agreed,
noting the importance of prompt reporting to the issue of the victim's credibil-
ity. See id at 703-04, 607 P.2d at 202. See generally supra note 21 (discussing
admissibility of evidence that the complainant promptly reported the rape).
The dissent contended that the evidence did not tend to rebut the complain-
ant's explanation for her delay in reporting the attack. Judge Thornton ar-
gued that "[t]he logic that a person who would perform a sexual act
voluntarily on the one hand would not be humiliated if compelled to do it is
patently false." Lant, 44 Or. App. at 705, 607 P.2d at 203 (Thornton, J.,
dissenting).
453. See Starr & King, Who Is the Real Victim?, NEWSWEEK, May 20, 1985,
at 69-73. Webb declared that she lied in 1979 when she accused Dotson of rap-
ing her. Dotson was convicted and sentenced to a twenty-five to fifty-year
prison term. Dotson had served six years at the time of Webb's recantation.
Finding Webb's recantation incredible, the trial judge denied Dotson's motion
to set aside the verdict. Id. The defendant's sentence was subsequently com-




dence of Webb's earlier allegation and subsequent recantation
in the Dotson case.
There is little discussion in the rape-shield literature re-
garding the need for this evidence, and only two Michigan-style
statutes provide for its admission.4 s One reason for the gap is
definitional; evidence of prior false allegations of rape is not ev-
idence of "sexual conduct." Indeed, courts that have specifi-
cally addressed the issue uniformly have held that such
evidence is not barred by the applicable rape-shield laws.455
These courts generally reason that evidence of prior false alle-
gations does not constitute sexual conduct evidence because the
defense usually attempts to demonstrate the falsity of the prior
allegation, and thus no contention is made that the complainant
ever engaged in sexual activity.4
56
Nevertheless, several factors argue in favor of creating an
explicit provision for the introduction of evidence of prior false
allegations. First, proving the falsity of a prior allegation may
depend on showing that a particular sexual encounter, claimed
by the complainant to have been forcible, was in fact consen-
sual. In such cases, proving the falsity of the allegation will
necessarily involve introducing evidence of the past sexual act.
Prudence therefore dictates that the statute include an excep-
tion permitting sexual conduct evidence offered in support of
this theory.45 7
Even in cases in which proof of prior false allegations does
not require the introduction of sexual conduct evidence, there
is still a reason for making explicit provision for its use. Long
before the passage of rape-shield legislation, courts, although
recognizing the high probative value of evidence of false rape
charges, had to strain to find an evidentiary theory to support
454. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3255(a)(3)(C) (Supp. 1985) ("evidence of
specific instances of the complaining witness' past false allegations of [sexual
assault]"); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 972.11(2)(b)(3) (West 1985) ("[e]vidence of prior
untruthful allegations of sexual assault made by the complaining witness").
455. See, e.g., Cox v. State, 51 Md. App. 271, 281-82, 443 A.2d 607, 613-14
(1982); Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 95, 378 N.E.2d 987, 991
(1978); People v. Mandel, 61 A.D. 2d 563, 569-71, 403 N.Y.S.2d 63, 68 (1978),
rev'd on other grounds, 48 N.Y.2d 952, 401 N.E.2d 185, 425 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1979),
appeal dismissed, 446 U.S. 949 (1980); State v. Baron, 58 N.C. App. 150, 153, 292
S.E.2d 741, 743 (1982); see also People v. Hackett, 421 Mich. 338, 348, 365
N.W.2d 120, 125 (1984) (dicta).
456. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 95, 378 N.E.2d 987,
991 (1978); State v. Baron, 58 N.C. App. 150, 153, 292 S.E.2d 741, 743 (1982).
457. See Letwin, supra note 3, at 62-63 (suggesting circumstances in which




its admission.458 If the evidence was viewed as being offered to
attack the complainant's credibility by showing her character
for untruthfulness, the restrictions that surround such proof
came into play. As noted earlier,45 9 in some jurisdictions the
use of specific instances of misconduct to impeach a witness's
credibility by showing her character for untruthfulness is for-
bidden entirely. In other jurisdictions, questions regarding spe-
cific instances of misconduct are permitted only on cross-
examination.460 In these jurisdictions, if the witness denies the
past misconduct, the adverse party may not introduce extrinsic
evidence to disprove the denial.461 The reason for these restric-
tions is that such evidence is considered "collateral" to the
main issue in the case, and the jury may become confused or
distracted if the parties concentrate time and effort on periph-
eral issues.462
In admitting evidence of prior false allegations of rape,
some courts simply ignore the restrictions on credibility evi-
dence,463 while others take the position that such proof consti-
tutes substantive evidence, tending to establish that the instant
rape did not occur.464 In the latter case, the false allegation evi-
dence is not used to impeach the complainant's general charac-
ter for truthfulness, but instead is introduced to show a
propensity to charge rape falsely which in turn tends to dis-
prove the charge in question. These courts simply ignore the
458. See People v. Hurlburt, 166 Cal. App. 2d 334, 342, 333 P.2d 82, 87-88
(1958); People v. Evans, 72 Mich. 367, 380, 40 N.W. 473, 478 (1888); C. MCCOR-
MICK, supra note 21, § 196, at 580. See generally Annot., 75 A.L.R. 2d 508
(1961) (discussing the right of the defendant in a sex offense prosecution to
show that the complainant has made similar charges against other persons).
459. See supra notes 111-114 and accompanying text.
460. See id&
461. See id.
462. See supra text accompanying note 81.
463. See Hall v. State, 176 Ind. App. 59, 62, 374 N.E.2d 62, 65 (1978); People
v. Mikula, 84 Mich. App. 108, 115-16, 269 N.W.2d 195, 198-99 (1978).
464. See State v. Nab, 245 Or. 454, 421 P.2d 388 (1966), in which the court
held that evidence of prior false rape charges is admissible "'not simply to im-
peach the prosecutrix, but as independent evidence that the charged crime was
not in fact committed.'" Id. at 459, 421 P.2d at 390-91 (quoting People v.
Hurlburt, 166 Cal. App. 2d 334, 339, 333 P.2d 82, 86 (1958)). See also People v.
Evans, 72 Mich. 367, 380, 40 N.W. 473, 478 (1888) (when the state rests its case
on the testimony of the complainant, who was fourteen years old at the time
of the incident, evidence that she had made many false accusations of sexual
assault in the past would "go a long way in explaining the charge" and must be
admitted); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 21, § 196, at 580 (although evidence of
prior false accusations is a species of character evidence used to show conduct,
it is usually admissible).
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fact that admitting evidence under this theory violates the gen-
eral rule forbidding evidence of character to prove conforming
conduct.465 Yet, as with evidence of a pattern of sexual conduct
offered to prove consent, evidence of prior false allegations is so
probative of the central issue in a rape case that to exclude it
might deny evidence critical to the defense. Indeed, courts up-
holding the introduction of this evidence stress the central im-
portance of the rape complainant's credibility and the fact that
in most cases the jury has nothing to rely on but the diametri-
cally opposed versions of the event put forth by the complain-
ant and the accused.466
To avoid the problems of jury distraction and confusion,
courts uniformly require that there be a strong factual basis for
concluding that the prior accusation was false. For example,
evidence that a prosecutor did not file charges with regard to
an earlier accusation, or even that a jury acquitted the previous
rape defendant, generally is not viewed as sufficient proof of
falsity.467 An Illinois appellate court noted, "the intrinsic ve-
racity of the complainant's accusations should not be confused
with the inability of the State to meet its burden of proof for a
criminal conviction." 8 Clearly, the standard would be met if
the complainant at some point admitted the falsity of her ear-
lier allegation.469 Falling between these extremes are cases
that call for careful balancing of probative value versus prejudi-
465. It is not merely in rape cases that courts have stretched the rules to
admit evidence of prior false allegations. See C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 21,
§ 197, at 580 (discussing the admission of evidence of prior, similar false claims
and stating that "[a]lthough this is a species of character evidence to show con-
duct, it usually will be admissible"). But see Hughes v. Raines, 641 F.2d 790,
793 (9th Cir. 1981) (such evidence violates propensity rule).
466. See, e.g., People v. Gorney, 121 Ill. App. 3d 260, 263-64, 459 N.E.2d 347,
350-51 (1984); Commonwealth v. Bohannan, 376 Mass. 90, 95, 378 N.E.2d 987,
991 (1978); State v. Nab, 245 Or. 454, 458-59, 421 P.2d 388, 390-91 (1966).
467. See Hughes v. Raines, 641 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir. 1981) (district attor-
ney did not prosecute); State v. Schwartzmiller, 107 Idaho 89, 92, 685 P.2d 830,
833 (1984) (acquittal); People v. Alexander, 116 Ill. App. 3d 855, 861, 452 N.E.2d
591, 595 (1983) (two hung juries in one case and a finding of no probable cause
after the preliminary hearing in another). But see State v. McCarthy, 446 A.2d
1034, 1035 (R.I. 1982) (permitting evidence that the complainant withdrew a
rape charge against another man).
468. People v. Alexander, 116 Ill. App. 3d 855, 861, 452 N.E.2d 591, 595
(1983).
469. See People v. Hurlburt, 166 Cal. App. 2d 334, 337, 333 P.2d 82, 84
(1958); People v. Evans, 72 Mich. 367, 380, 40 N.W. 473, 478 (1888); State v. Cas-
well, 320 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn. 1982); cf People v. Gorney, 121 Ill. App. 3d
260, 263, 459 N.E.2d 347, 350 (1984) (complainant in the presence of three wit-




In State v. Demos,4 71 the complainant had made two accu-
sations of rape against other men within a thirteen-month pe-
riod preceding the instant case. The first incident was reported
promptly, but was placed on an inactive status when the com-
plainant moved to another state and could not be reached by
the police. Apparently no suspects were apprehended. The sec-
ond allegation was not prosecuted because the complainant had
submitted to two polygraph examinations regarding the inci-
dent and both times the examiner found "consistent decep-
tion."4 72 The Supreme Court of Washington held that the
accused could not introduce evidence of these allegations be-
cause they had "no tendency to prove anything in dispute and
... would have been highly prejudicial. ' 473 The court properly
found that the nonprosecution of the first accusation proved
nothing about its truth or falsity. The defendant's offer of
proof regarding the falsity of the second allegation was also
found lacking because the polygraph evidence would have been
inadmissible in court.4 74
Although not made explicit by the court, an important fac-
tor in its determination to exclude the evidence may have been
the posture of the case. The circumstantial evidence of the de-
fendant's guilt was strong,475 and thus the outcome did not rest
solely upon the complainant's credibility. This factor, which
goes to the probative value of the evidence, must be balanced
against the degree to which the trial may become bogged down
in a dispute over the truth or falsity of the previous allegations.
In sum, proof of prior false allegations of rape will almost
never require the introduction of sexual conduct evidence.
Nevertheless, because such proof does not easily fall within a
recognized theory of admissibility under prevailing rules, stat-
utes modeled on either the Michigan approach or the proposed
470. For example, most courts confronted with the question have held that
a mere denial by the former accused is not sufficient evidence of the falsity of
the accusation. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 64 Cal. Rptr. 875, 881 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1967), vacated on other grounds, 68 Cal. 2d 646, 441 P.2d 111, 68 Cal. Rptr.
599 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1051 (1969); State v. Kringstad, 353 N.W.2d
302, 311 (N.D. 1984). But see People v. Sheperd, 37 Colo. App. 336, 338-39, 551
P.2d 210, 213 (1976) (remanding to determine falsity, but indicating that a de-
nial by the former accused could establish falsity).
471. 94 Wash. 2d 733, 735, 619 P.2d 968, 969 (1980) (en banc).
472. Id.
473. Id. at 737, 619 P.2d at 970.
474. Id.
475. See id. at 737, 619 P.2d at 969.
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legislative solution should explicitly provide for its admissibil-
ity. It would then be up to the court to determine whether
there was sufficient evidence of the falsity of the prior allega-
tion and whether the probative value of the evidence out-
weighed its prejudicial effect.
h. Relevant sexual conduct evidence for which no exception
exists in any of the Michigan-style statutes
Thus far we have examined various categories of sexual
conduct evidence for which an exception is provided in one or
more of the Michigan-type statutes.476 Although the enumer-
476. Two additional exceptions appear in one and two Michigan-type stat-
utes respectively. First, the North Carolina rule excepts "evidence of sexual
behavior offered as the basis of expert psychological or psychiatric opinion
that the complainant fantasized or invented the act or acts charged .... "
N.C.R. EVID. 412. This exception applies if the accused seeks to impeach the
complainant's credibility by showing that she has a pathological condition that
causes her to charge rape falsely. Wigmore's view that such expert opinion is
indispensable to the inquiry has been soundly rejected by the courts. See C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 21, § 45, at 106-07. In its place is a general rule that a
court, in its discretion, may order a psychiatric examination of the complain-
ant when presented with compelling reasons. See, e.g., Ballard v. Superior
Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 175, 410 P.2d 838, 849, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302, 313 (1966); C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 21, § 45, at 106-07. It is questionable whether such
psychiatric evaluations are reliable or whether they are "simply old-fashioned
sexist assumptions dressed up in pseudo-scientific jargon." 23 C. WRIGHT & K.
GRAHAM, supra note 3, § 5387, at 579. See also Letwin, supra note 3, at 73 (not-
ing "skepticism about whether psychiatrists (most of whom are males) enjoy
even a relative immunity from the sexual stereotypes that prevail in the soci-
ety at large"). Even assuming the helpfulness of such testimony in a particu-
lar case, the testimony need not include references to the complainant's sexual
conduct. Pathological lying, even about sexual matters, is not "sexual con-
duct." One writer suggests that to the extent instances of the complainant's
prior sexual activity constitute an important underpinning of the expert's con-
clusion, the prejudicial impact of such proof warrants a compromise under
which the expert would be permitted to base his opinion on the sexual conduct
without testifying to its details. See Letwin, supra note 3, at 73; cf. FED. R.
EVID. 705 (expert need not give basis for his opinion). But see Berger, supra
note 3, at 69 (fairness may require disclosure of the underlying facts). In any
event, thus far the issue has been academic because there has been no attempt
to offer sexual conduct evidence under this theory in states following the
Michigan approach.
A "res gestae" exception appears in two Michigan-type statutes. See 23 C.
WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 3, § 5387, at 588. In Missouri, specific in-
stances of the complainant's prior sexual conduct are admissible if they consti-
tute "evidence of immediate surrounding circumstances of the alleged crime."
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.015(1)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1986). The Kentucky statute
similarly permits prior sexual conduct evidence "directly pertaining to the act
on which the prosecution is based." KY. REv. STAT. § 510.145(3) (1985). It is
not clear precisely what evidence was intended to be excepted by these provi-
sions. The sponsor of the Missouri bill stated in an interview that the excep-
1986]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ated exceptions theoretically accommodate the need of the ac-
cused to present relevant defense evidence, the preceding
survey demonstrates that many of the statutes do not afford
the accused even minimal protection. All Michigan-type stat-
utes permit the accused to introduce proof of prior sexual con-
duct between himself and the complainant, but some categories
of evidence, indisputably relevant and necessary to the presen-
tation of an effective defense, are not admissible under many of
the statutes. Evidence that reveals an alternative source of the
physical consequences of the rape,477 evidence probative of bias
or a motive to fabricate the charge,478 and evidence offered to
rebut the state's proof479 fall into this indisputably relevant cat-
egory. Yet, only fifteen of the twenty-five Michigan-type stat-
utes provide for the admission of "physical consequences"
evidence;4 0 only three statutes permit evidence of bias or mo-
tion was "intended to protect defendants from false claims of rape by
prostitutes and young women who had participated in group sexual inter-
course prior to the alleged rape." See Amburg & Rechtin, supra note 33, at
376. Under that interpretation, the defendant presumably would be permitted
to prove that the complainant had engaged in acts of prostitution or group sex
with third parties immediately preceding the act in question, as evidence that
she consented with the accused. Unless such evidence is admissible either as a
"pattern" of conduct or as proof of the reasonableness of defendant's belief in
consent, however, such proof would seem to be indistinguishable from evi-
dence relying on the invidious unchaste character inference.
Another possible interpretation is that the exception was directed toward
the situation where the accused contends that the complainant voluntarily
participated in a group sexual encounter with him and other individuals not
charged. See Rothstein, New Federal Evidence Rule 412 on Sex Victim's Char-
acter, 15 CRiM. L. BULL. 353, 361 (1979). The "res gestae" exception would
then permit the defendant to prove the sexual conduct between the complain-
ant and other members of the group. A special exception for such proof is un-
necessary under the Missouri and Kentucky statutes, however, because the
general prohibition of sexual conduct evidence in both statutes refers solely to
the "prior" sexual conduct of the complainant; the evidence described above
would tend to prove contemporaneous conduct and would not be prohibited by
the statute. Even if a statute did not limit its prohibition to "prior" sexual
conduct, such group sex evidence would nevertheless be admissible. Because it
simply contradicts the complainant's version of the encounter, it should come
within an exception for rebuttal proof. Indeed, the cases construing the Mis-
souri exception demonstrate that evidence permitted under this exception
either falls within the ambit of other categories of sexual conduct evidence or
is not proof of sexual conduct. See, e.g., State v. Sherman, 637 S.W.2d 704, 707
(Mo. 1982) (en banc) (admitting prior inconsistent statement of the complain-
ant regarding who had raped her); State v. Gibson, 636 S.W.2d 956, 959 (Mo.
1982) (sexual conduct evidence probative of a motive to fabricate the charge).
477. See supra notes 265-301 and accompanying text.
478. See supra notes 302-339 and accompanying text.
479. See supra notes 435-452 and accompanying text.
480. See infra app. (Table 2).
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tive to fabricate;48 ' and only three statutes specifically exempt
rebuttal evidence from the general prohibition of sexual con-
duct evidence. 482
Exceptions for other categories of evidence, arguably rele-
vant, appear with even less frequency in the Michigan-style
statutes. Among them are exceptions for "pattern" evidence
probative of consent,48 3 included in three statutes,4 84 and evi-
dence probative of a reasonable belief in consent,485 included in
one statute.
48 6
These omissions obviously could be remedied by simply
amending the statutes. To do so, however, would fail to address
the fundamental shortcoming of this statutory scheme: the
near impossibility of predicting the myriad of factual contexts
in which sexual conduct evidence might be relevant to a legiti-
mate defense theory. Significantly, the preceding survey
merely examined the categories of sexual conduct evidence that
are admissible under one or more of the Michigan-style stat-
utes; unanticipated by legislatures are further categories of sex-
ual conduct evidence for which no exception exists in any of
these statutes. Several cases have reached the appellate courts
in which defendants have sought to introduce sexual conduct
evidence under such unforeseen, but legitimate evidentiary the-
ories. As with the preceding categories of sexual conduct evi-
dence, some courts have circumvented explicit statutory
prohibitions and admitted the evidence to do justice in individ-
ual cases. These cases further demonstrate the difficulties in-
herent in an approach that deprives courts of the discretion to
determine the relevancy and admissibility of sexual conduct ev-
idence on a case-by-case basis. Two examples will suffice to il-
lustrate this flaw in the Michigan approach.
Assume that a twelve-year-old female accuses an adult
male of statutory rape. To bolster his claim that the charges
were fabricated, the accused seeks to prove that the complain-
ant previously had engaged in sexual activity, similar in nature
to the acts charged, with persons other than himself. In such a
case, the defendant is not offering the evidence to prove the
likelihood of consent, because a complainant of such tender
years is deemed legally incapable of consent. Rather, the de-
481. Id-
482. Id-
483. See supra notes 340-410 and accompanying text.
484. See infra app. (Table 2).
485. See supra notes 411-434 and accompanying text.
486. See infra app. (Table 2).
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fense theory, as recognized by the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire in State v. Howard,487 is that
the average juror would perceive the average twelve-year-old girl as a
sexual innocent. Therefore, it is probable that jurors would believe
that the sexual experience she describes must have occurred in con-
nection with the incident being prosecuted; otherwise, she could not
have described it. However, if statutory rape victims have had other
sexual experiences, it would be possible for them to provide detailed,
realistic testimony concerning an incident that may never have
happened.
4 8 8
The Howard court thus concluded that despite the rape-shield
statute's prohibition of evidence of sexual conduct between the
complainant and others than the accused, the accused must
nevertheless "be afforded the opportunity to show, by specific
incidents of sexual conduct, that the prosecutrix has the experi-
ence and ability to contrive a statutory rape charge against
hin." ' 4 8 9
Most courts confronted with such claims similarly have
held this type of evidence to be critical to the defense, reason-
ing that it serves to dispel an inference that the jury might
otherwise draw-that a young complainant would be unable to
describe the alleged sexual acts in graphic detail unless such
acts had in fact occurred with the accused.490 Clearly such evi-
dence does not draw on the common-law inferences that previ-
ous sexual conduct is probative of consent or dishonesty.
Instead, it is offered to establish a source of knowledge or fa-
miliarity with sexual matters in circumstances in which lack of
knowledge is the likely inference to be drawn by the fact
finder. In this sense, the situation is analogous to that in which
the accused offers evidence of sexual conduct between the com-
plainant and others than himself to prove a possible alternative
source of the physical consequences of rape, such as semen,
487. 121 N.H. 53, 426 A.2d 457 (1981).
488. Id at 61, 426 A.2d at 462.
489. Id
490. See Summitt v. State, 697 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Nev. 1985); People v. Ruiz,
71 A.D.2d 569, 570, 418 N.Y.S.2d 402, 403 (1979); Commonwealth v. Black, 337
Pa. Super. 548, 556 n.10, 487 A.2d 396, 400-01 n.10 (1985) (dicta); State v.
Carver, 37 Wash. App. 122, 124-25, 678 P.2d 842, 844 (1984). But see State v.
Clarke, 343 N.W.2d 158, 162-63 (Iowa 1984) (finding evidence that a "relatively
young complainant" had previously experienced oral sex to be irrelevant);
People v. Arenda, 416 Mich. 1, 12, 330 N.W.2d 814, 817-18 (1982) ("A jury is
unlikely to consider a witness's ability to describe sexual conduct as an in-
dependent factor supporting a conviction."); cf State v. Padilla, 110 Wis. 2d
414, 429, 329 N.W.2d 263, 271 (Ct. App. 1982) (no showing of similarity between
past and present incident to support inference of complainant's knowledge).
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pregnancy, or disease. In each instance, the proffered evidence
serves to demonstrate that critical evidence elicited by the pros-
ecution is as consistent with the accused's innocence as with his
guilt.
Moreover, where the complainant is very young, such evi-
dence lacks the prejudicial impact of evidence of an adult's
prior sexual conduct. Because young children are deemed inca-
pable of consent, the past conduct involves sexual abuse rather
than sexual "misconduct." Thus, there is a greater likelihood
of evoking sympathy for, rather than prejudice against, such
young complainants. Indeed, a Washington appeals court or-
dered the introduction of evidence of past sexual abuse under
this theory, holding that "[t]he evidence.., does not fit within
the concepts and purposes of the rape shield statute."491
Efforts to introduce sexual conduct evidence under this
theory are likely to increase as a result of the recent dramatic
rise in the reporting and prosecuting of child sex abuse cases.492
None of the Michigan-type statutes, however, provides an ex-
ception for such evidence.493 In Howard, the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire found it necessary to "rewrite" the applicable
statute in order to admit the evidence and still uphold the stat-
ute against constitutional attack.49 4 Thus, despite the literal
language of the statute, the court held that a rape defendant
491. State v. Carver, 37 Wash. App. 122, 124, 678 P.2d 842, 843 (1984). Ac-
cord Summitt v. State, 697 P.2d 1374, 1378 (Nev. 1985) (Steffen, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that "[t]he purposes of the 'rape victim
shield law' ... would not have been frustrated by the terse admission of facts
concerning the earlier experience since the child, then age four, was clearly a
victim whose reputation would have been unaffected by such a disclosure").
But see People v. Arenda, 416 Mich. 1, 13, 330 N.W.2d 814, 818 (1982) ("These
children and others are the ones who are most likely to be adversely affected
by unwarranted and unreasonable cross-examination into these areas. They
are among the persons whom the statute was designed to protect.").
492. According to a recent national study, there has been a 200% increase
in the reporting of child sex abuse cases since 1976. Collins, Studies Find Sex-
ual Abuse of Children is Widespread, N.Y. Times, May 13, 1982, at Cl, col. 1.
493. Three statutes, however, prohibit evidence of the complainant's "con-
sensual" sexual conduct. Arguably then, even in the absence of such an excep-
tion, evidence of past sexual abuse would be admissible. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 794.022(2) (West Supp. 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:6 (Supp. 1983);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-17-119 (1982).
494. See Howard, 121 N.H. at 58-59, 426 A.2d at 460-61. Because the com-
plainant in Howard was under thirteen and therefore under the age of con-
sent, see N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2-3 (Supp. 1983), and because the rape-
shield statute only prohibited evidence of "consensual" sexual activity, the
court could have admitted the evidence without circumventing the language of
the statute. See supra note 493.
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must be afforded the opportunity to demonstrate to the court at
a pretrial hearing that the probative value of evidence of sexual
conduct between the complainant and others than the accused
outweighs its prejudicial effect in a particular case.495
Concededly, a child's knowledge of sexual matters may de-
rive from sources other than personal experience, such as
books, movies, conversations, or even observing others engaging
in sexual activity. Clearly such sources of knowledge may ac-
complish the same evidentiary purpose-supplying a basis for
fabrication of the charges-without implicating the complain-
ant's previous sexual conduct. When, however, the accused
shows that the complainant engaged in sexual activity similar
in factual detail to the sexual conduct in issue, he should be
permitted to introduce such evidence, particularly when other
evidence in the case suggests that the complainant has a motive
to fabricate.496
The second example of a type of sexual conduct evidence
for which no exception exists in any of the Michigan-style stat-
utes, but which may be constitutionally required to be admit-
ted, regards evidence which would explain the complainant's
pregnancy at trial. In the Indiana case of Moore v. State,497 the
victim, Falise Bronston, was pregnant at the time of trial,
although concededly by someone other than the accused. The
applicable rape-shield statute contained an exception permit-
ting evidence of a complainant's prior sexual conduct that pro-
vides an alternative explanation for physical consequences of
rape, such as pregnancy.498 Because Ms. Bronston's pregnancy
was conceded by the state to be the result of sexual conduct
with someone other than the defendant, however, there was no
basis for admitting proof of her pregnancy without violating the
general statutory prohibition against the introduction of sexual
495. Howard, 121 N.H. at 59-61, 426 A.2d at 461-62.
496. As to the requirement of similarity, see State v. Padilla, 110 Wis. 2d
414, 428-29, 329 N.W.2d 263, 270-71 (1982) (defendant made no showing that
ten-year-old's prior sexual experience with her stepfather, one year previ-
ously, was similar in nature to incident in question where complainant testi-
fied that defendant, "after pulling out his penis and pushing on her 'thing'
between her legs, started 'playing with his penis' until a whitish-yellow 'cream'
came out on her housecoat"); see also Summitt v. State, 697 P.2d 1374, 1378
(Nev. 1985) (Steffen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (defendant's
conviction for fellatio was properly reversed, but because it was not shown
that the prior episode involved cunnilingus, reversal on that count was not
required).
497. 271 Ind. 464, 465, 393 N.E.2d 175, 176 (1979).
498. Id. at 466, 393 N.E.2d at 177. Moore's defense was that he had not had
sexual intercourse with Bronston. Id.
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conduct evidence with persons other than the accused.499 In-
deed, the trial court granted the state's motion in limine re-
questing that the defense make no reference to Bronston's
pregnancy or to her sexual relationship with the putative fa-
ther. 00 The court took further measures to hide from the jury
the fact of Bronston's six-month pregnancy by having her place
a coat over her lap while seated and excusing the jury when-
ever she had to enter or leave the courtroom. 01 The court did
not explain these actions until after the jury had returned its
guilty verdict.502
On appeal, the defendant claimed that the victim's "obvi-
ous" and unexplained pregnancy prejudiced the jury and de-
nied him a fair trial. He argued that the court's actions had the
effect of drawing attention to, rather than concealing, the vic-
tim's condition, as evidenced by a note from a juror requesting
that Bronston stand so that the jury could determine her
height.50 3 The defendant further contended that he should
have been able to prove at trial that Bronston was pregnant
and that he was not the father.5°4 The Supreme Court of Indi-
ana affirmed the conviction, ruling that such evidence was inad-
missible under the rape-shield statute. Moreover, the court
found no evidence in the record to support Moore's contention
that the pregnancy was obvious to the jury, noting that he had
not sought to question the juror who requested that Bronston
stand before the jury.505 Finally, the court determined that the
defendant could not claim prejudice because he had not sought
a continuance of the trial pending the completion of Bronston's
pregnancy.50 6
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's denial of Moore's habeas corpus petition.50 7 Although
the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the Indiana Supreme
499. 1&. at 465, 393 N.E.2d at 176.
500. IH
501. I& at 465-66, 393 N.E.2d at 176.
502. Id. at 466, 393 N.E.2d at 176.
503. Id at 467, 393 N.E.2d at 177. The judge denied the juror's request be-
cause the complainant had already testified to her height and weight. See
Moore v. Duckworth, 687 F.2d 1063, 1064 (7th Cir. 1982) (affirming district
court's denial of Moore's writ of habeas corpus).
504. Moore, 271 Ind. at 466-67, 393 N.E.2d at 177.
505. Id. at 467, 393 N.E.2d at 177.
506. Id. at 468, 393 N.E.2d at 177. The court stated that it would have
reached a different result had the defendant established that one or more ju-
rors became aware of the pregnancy. Id at 467, 393 N.E.2d at 177.
507. Moore v. Duckworth, 687 F.2d 1063, 1067 (7th Cir. 1982).
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Court's argument that Moore should have sought a continu-
ance, it nevertheless held that no constitutional violation had
occurred.508  The court found that the Indiana Supreme
Court's determination that the jury was unaware of the preg-
nancy was fairly supported by the record. The Seventh Circuit
did note, however, the "absurdity" of Indiana's statutory prohi-
bition against informing the jury of Bronston's pregnancy.50 9 It
further stated that "the problem raised by the mechanical ap-
plication of Indiana's Rape Shield Law to the special circum-
stances of this case is serious enough to warrant the attention
of the Indiana legislature."510 Heeding that advice, the Indiana
legislature amended the statute for the second time in six years
in response to case law indicating the need for change. 511 In ad-
dition to "physical consequences" evidence and evidence of sex-
ual conduct between the complainant and the accused, the
Indiana rape-shield statute presently permits rape defendants
to introduce evidence "[t]hat the victim's pregnancy at the time
of trial was not caused by the defendant."512 The statute fur-
ther provides that if the state concedes that fact, "the court
shall instruct the jury that the victim's pregnancy is not due to
the conduct of the defendant. '513 No other evidence concerning
the pregnancy may be admitted nor may any reference to it be
made in the presence of the jury.5 14
Although there appear to be no other reported cases rais-
ing the problem of the complainant's pregnancy at trial by
508. Id Moore was unable to raise bail and remained imprisoned awaiting
trial. Allowing for the remainder of Bronston's pregnancy followed by a pe-
riod of recuperation, the court noted that the defendant would have had to
wait an extra four months to go to trial. The court considered this a "high
premium to pay" to avoid the prejudicial impact of the pregnancy. Id at 1065.
509. Id.
510. Id at 1067.
511. See Act of Mar. 28, 1983, Pub. L. No. 322, § 1, 1983 Ind. Acts 1966, 1966
(codified at IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-4(b)(3), (f) (Burns 1985)). The statute
had been amended in 1979 to extend the statutory prohibition to evidence of
past sexual conduct of any witness other than the accused in response to Lage-
nour v. State, 268 Ind. 441, 376 N.E.2d 475 (1978). See Act of April 2, 1979, Pub.
L. No. 289, §§ 1-2, 1979 Ind. Acts 1481, 1481 (codified as amended at IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-37-44(a)(2) (Burns 1985)). In that case, the defendant sought to
cross-examine two prosecution witnesses, who had unsuccessfully prosecuted
the defendant for similar sexual assaults, about their past sexual conduct. The
trial court's exclusion of this evidence was upheld, although the court noted
that the rape-shield statute did not prohibit such proof. Lagenour, 268 Ind. at
44446, 376 N.E.2d at 478-79.
512. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-4(b)(3) (Burns 1985).




someone other than the accused, this single case vividly demon-
strates the limitations inherent in the Michigan approach to
rape-shield legislation. As noted by the Seventh Circuit, a sim-
ple judicial instruction concerning the complainant's pregnancy
is hardly the sort of evidence that the rape-shield statutes were
designed to exclude.5 5 By denying the courts flexibility to deal
with unique factual situations, these overly restrictive statutes
often lead to protracted litigation and frequently must be
amended to satisfy constitutional constraints not apparent to
the legislatures that enacted them.5 1
6
2. Summary of the Michigan Approach
The Michigan rape-shield statute517 contains an absolute
prohibition against the introduction of sexual conduct evidence
in any form, for any purpose, subject to two enumerated excep-
tions.518 The only discretion that resides in the trial court is to
determine in an in camera hearing whether the probative value
of excepted evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.5 19 At
515. Moore v. Duckworth, 687 F.2d 1063, 1065 (7th Cir. 1982).
516. An additional theory of admissibility for sexual conduct evidence sur-
faced recently in a case granting a New York prisoner's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. See Latzer v. Abrams, 602 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). The
petitioner, Robert Latzer, was convicted of sodomizing a thirteen-year-old boy
at the home of one Martin Swinthinbank. Latzer claimed that the complain-
ant had confused him with a 'Bob Fox," whom the complainant had named as
the perpetrator. The complainant identified Latzer in court as the "Bob Fox"
who had sodomized him. There were significant discrepancies between the
complainant's description of his assailant and Latzer's actual appearance.
Latzer attempted to prove that on numerous occasions the complainant had
had sexual relations with various men in the Swinthinbank home and had be-
come confused as to who had sodomized him on the night in question. Id. at
1316-17. New York's rape-shield statute follows the federal approach and has
a "catch-basin" provision, see infra notes 596-598 and accompanying text, that
permits the court to admit unexcepted sexual conduct evidence that is "rele-
vant and admissible in the interests of justice." N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 60.42(5) (McKinney 1981). The trial court's exclusion of the evidence of the
complainant's prior sexual conduct was upheld by a New York appeals court
as not meeting the statutory standard of admissibility. People v. Latzer, 101
A.D.2d 1030, 475 N.Y.S.2d 963 (1984) (aff'g mem.). Relying on Davis v. Alaska,
415 U.S. 308 (1974), the federal district court held the application of the statute
unconstitutional on the ground that the petitioner had been denied the oppor-
tunity to present effectively his mistaken identity defense. Latzer v. Abrams,
602 F. Supp. 1314, 1320 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
517. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 750.520j (West Supp. 1985).
518. The two exceptions are: (1) evidence of sexual conduct between the
complainant and the accused; and (2) evidence of specific instances of sexual
activity showing the source of origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease. Id.
§ 750.520j(1).
519. 1& § 750.520j(2).
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present, twenty-four statutes parallel the Michigan approach,
albeit with some variations.5 20 Other than evidence of sexual
conduct between the complainant and the accused, the number
and nature of exceptions ranges from no additional exceptions
in five statutes to three additional exceptions in three stat-
utes. 521 Most of the statutes require some form of judicial
screening to determine either that the evidence falls within one
of the enumerated exceptions or that its probative value out-
weighs its prejudicial effect notwithstanding that it constitutes
an exception to the general prohibition.522 None of the stat-
utes, however, authorize the trial court to admit unexcepted
sexual conduct evidence simply because its probative value out-
weighs its prejudicial effect in a particular case or because the
court finds the evidence to be essential to the accused's right to
present a defense.
To date, I have examined more than 200 appellate cases
challenging the exclusion of sexual conduct evidence under the
various Michigan-style rape-shield statutes. In most of these
cases, the proffered evidence was irrelevant to the disputed is-
sues and either expressly or implicitly relied on the common-
law notions that a woman who engages in nonmarital sexual
conduct is for that reason more likely to consent or to lie under
oath.523 As shown by the preceding case survey, however, there
are a number of relevant purposes for which the accused may
offer sexual conduct evidence that do not implicate these out-
moded and sexist notions. Yet, none of the Michigan-style stat-
utes provide for all of these relevant purposes.
The case law amply demonstrates that the flaw in the
Michigan approach is its attempt to legislatively predetermine
the relevancy of an entire category of evidence without regard
to the factual setting of the case or the purpose for which the
evidence is offered. Relevancy, after all, "is not an inherent
characteristic of any item of evidence but exists only as a rela-
tion between an item of evidence and a matter properly prova-
ble in the case. '524 Not until the issues are framed in an
520. See infra app. (Table 1).
521. See infra app. (Table 2).
522. See supra note 242.
523. See, e.g., Lawson v. State, 377 So. 2d 1115, 1116 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979)
(complainant's use of birth control methods); Roberts v. State, 268 Ind. 127,
132, 373 N.E.2d 1103, 1106 (1978) (complainant's first child born out of wed-
lock); Smith v. Commonwealth, 566 S.W.2d 181, 182-83 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978)
(complainant's sexual conduct with married man).
524. FED. R. EvID. 401 advisory committee note.
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adversarial setting can a court determine the relevancy of a
specific piece of evidence. The same may be said of the balanc-
ing of probative value against prejudicial effect. Such case-by-
case admissibility determinations, however, are absolutely pro-
hibited under all of the Michigan-type statutes.
The courts have dealt with the rigidity and underinclusive-
ness of the Michigan approach in two ways. One approach is to
hold the statute unconstitutional as applied in particular factual
settings. In two instances, courts have held that the accused's
confrontation rights were violated by the exclusion of sexual
conduct evidence probative of the complainant's motive to
fabricate the charges.52 5 In one other case, a defendant's con-
frontation rights were deemed to have been violated by the
trial court's failure to admit evidence to rebut sexual conduct
evidence introduced in the prosecution's direct case.
526
Ironically, though understandably, the more prevalent judi-
cial response to the restrictiveness of the Michigan approach is
to avoid constitutional conflicts by "reclaiming" the very discre-
tion that this statutory scheme was designed to remove. The
purpose behind the Michigan approach was to legislatively con-
trol the sexism of common-law judges by stripping them of the
discretion to determine the relevancy and admissibility of sex-
ual conduct evidence on a case-by-case basis. Yet, in almost
half of the states adopting the Michigan approach, appellate
courts have construed the applicable rape-shield statutes as per-
mitting the accused to introduce sexual conduct evidence ex-
plicitly prohibited by statute.52 7
Indeed, the Michigan rape-shield statute itself was recently
interpreted in this fashion by the Supreme Court of Michigan
in People v. Hackett.528 In that case, the court
recognize[d] that in certain limited situations, [sexual conduct] evi-
dence may not only be relevant, but its admission may be required to
preserve a defendant's constitutional right to confrontation. For ex-
ample, where the defendant proffers evidence of a complainant's prior
sexual conduct for the narrow purpose of showing the complaining
525. See State v. Jalo, 27 Or. App. 845, 850-51, 557 P.2d 1359, 1361-62 (1976)
(en banc); Commonwealth v. Black, 337 Pa. Super. 548, 557-58, 487 A.2d 396,
400-01 (1985). The Black court remanded the case for a determination of
whether the evidence in question was probative of bias. Id See supra note 319
(describing the facts of the case).
526. See State v. Williams, 16 Ohio App. 3d 484, 490-91, 477 N.E.2d 221, 227-
28 (1984), aff'd, 21 Ohio St. 3d 33, 487 N.E.2d 560 (1986). See supra notes 444-
447 and accompanying text (describing the facts of the case).
527. See infra note 532.
528. 421 Mich. 338, 365 N.W.2d 120 (1984).
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witness' bias, this would almost always be material and should be ad-
mitted. Moreover, in certain circumstances, evidence of a complain-
ant's sexual conduct may also be probative of a complainant's ulterior
motive for making a false charge. Additionally, the defendant should
be permitted to show that the complainant has made false accusations
of rape in the past....
The determination of admissibility is entrusted to the sound dis-
cretion of the trial court. In exercising its discretion, the trial court
should be mindful of the significant legislative purposes underlying
the rape-shield statute and should always favor exclusion of evidence
of a complainant's sexual conduct where its exclusion would not un-
constitutionally abridge the defendant's right to confrontation. 529
The Hackett court further ruled that the admissibility determi-
nation should be made at an in camera hearing as a means of
protecting the privacy of the victim while at the same time
safeguarding the defendant's right to a fair trial.5 30 Notably,
none of the relevant purposes for sexual conduct evidence men-
tioned by the court appears in the Michigan rape-shield statute
as an exception to the general prohibition; evidence of sexual
conduct with the accused and alternative physical consequences
evidence are the statute's only exceptions. 531
The Hackett case and others53 2 demonstrate that the Michi-
529. I& at 348-49, 365 N.W.2d at 124-25 (citations omitted).
530. 1d at 349, 365 N.W.2d at 125.
531. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j(1) (West Supp. 1985).
532. The high courts of New Hampshire and West Virginia have similarly
construed their facially restrictive rape-shield statutes to require in camera de-
terminations of the relevancy of sexual conduct evidence on a case-by-case ba-
sis. See State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 57, 426 A.2d 457, 560 (1981); State v.
Green, 163 W. Va. 681, 693, 260 S.E.2d 257, 264 (1979). Although not mandating
an evidentiary hearing, the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that sexual con-
duct evidence may be introduced for purposes other than those specifically
enumerated in the statute. State v. Vaughn, 448 So. 2d 1260, 1265 n.2 (La.
1983); see also State v. Caswell, 320 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn. 1982) (reading into
the statute a provision for evidence "constitutionally required" to be admit-
ted).
Even more radical surgery has been performed on the Missouri, North
Carolina, and Wisconsin rape-shield statutes by appellate courts of those
states. Although the Missouri statute clearly contains a general prohibition of
sexual conduct evidence subject to four enumerated exceptions, see Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 491.015 (Vernon Supp. 1986), the Missouri Supreme Court in State v.
Brown, 636 S.W.2d 929, 933 (Mo. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1912
(1983), held that the statute creates only a "presumption" that evidence of
prior sexual conduct is irrelevant. Further, although the statute clearly states
that evidence subject to an exception is admissible to the extent that "the
court finds [it] relevant to a material fact or issue," Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.015
(Vernon Supp. 1986), the Brown court construed the latter phrase as a "catch-
all" provision permitting the introduction of even unexcepted sexual conduct
evidence. Id. at 933. The Supreme Court of North Carolina has similarly char-
acterized its Michigan-style rule as essentially a procedural mechanism for
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gan approach to rape-shield legislation is unworkable in actual
operation. The force and impact of the statutory language con-
tinues to erode as courts increasingly hold that the statutes do
not really mean what they say. In most instances, the courts
have reached the correct results, but only by ignoring the clear
language of the statute and divining the underlying legislative
purpose. In that process, the courts universally have concluded
that the lawmakers' intent was simply to remove from the fact-
finding process the sexist and outdated notions that a woman
who engages in nonmarital sexual conduct is for that reason
alone more likely to consent or to lie under oath. Typical is the
Hackett court's conclusion that "the Legislature has determined
that evidence of sexual conduct is not admissible as character
evidence to prove consensual conduct or for general impeach-
ment purposes .... 1533
The preceding survey of the relevant purposes for which
sexual conduct evidence may be offered establishes that none
relies on or implicates either of the invidious inferences.
screening all proffers of sexual conduct evidence, despite the statute's clear
pronouncement that only four categories of evidence are admissible. See State
v. Fortney, 301 N.C. 31, 42, 269 S.E.2d 110, 116 (1980) (construing N.C.R. EviD.
412). In State v. Gavigan, 111 Wis. 2d 150, 330 N.W.2d 571 (1983), the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin read the applicable rape-shield statute as "a legislative de-
termination that ordinarily evidence of a complainant's prior sexual conduct
has low probative value but high prejudicial effect. Thus such evidence may
be admitted for a permissible purpose only after close judicial scrutiny." I&L at
157 n.2, 330 N.W.2d at 576 n.2 (emphasis added). Notably, in response to Gavi-
gan, the Wisconsin legislature amended the statute to absolutely prohibit the
admission of sexual conduct evidence not specifically excepted by statute. See
Act of May 10, 1984, Act No. 449, § 1, 1983 Wis. Laws 1930, 1930 (codified as
amended at Wis. STAT. ANN. § 972.11(2)(c) (West 1985)). This recent amend-
ment represents the single instance in which a legislature has overriden a
broad interpretation of a Michigan-type statute. Cf. supra note 40 (discussing
statutes amended in response to cases demonstrating the need for additional
exceptions). It will be interesting to see how the Wisconsin courts will deal
with cases in which the accused seeks to elicit sexual conduct evidence sup-
portive of a claim of bias, for example, because such proof is not specifically
excepted under the statute. See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 972.11(2) (West 1985). Such
cases will undoubtedly leave the Wisconsin courts with no recourse but to hold
the statute unconstitutional.
Finally, there are courts that have not espoused such broad constructions
of Michigan-type statutes but have nevertheless upheld the admissibility of
specific items of sexual conduct evidence on the ground that the legislature did
not intend that such evidence be excluded. See Commonwealth v. Joyce, 382
Mass. 222, 228-29, 415 N.E.2d 181, 186 (1981) (evidence of bias or motive to
falsely accuse defendant); Commonwealth v. Majorana, 503 Pa. 602, 604-05, 470
A.2d 80, 81 (1983) (physical consequences evidence); Shockley v. State, 585
S.W.2d 645, 651 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978) (physical consequences evidence).
533. Hackett 421 Mich. at 348, 365 N.W.2d at 124.
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Hence, the absolute prohibition on sexual conduct evidence
characteristic of the Michigan approach should be replaced by
the statutory model earlier proposed 534-a clear legislative
statement that such sexist notions are forbidden, but that any
other evidence of sexual conduct may be admissible if it is rele-
vant to the issues and if its probative value is not outweighed
by its prejudicial effect. In keeping with the legislative purpose
of protecting the rape victim from the unnecessary embarrass-
ment that may result from disclosures about her sex life, such
relevancy determinations should properly be made at an in
camera proceeding.535
This approach has the further benefit of minimizing any
conflict with the accused's sixth amendment rights to present
relevant evidence in his defense. A constitutional conflict
would arise only if the rape-shield statute were to bar relevant
defense evidence for purposes extrinsic to the fact-finding pro-
cess. In Davis v. Alaska,53 6 the evidence sought to be elicited-
the complaining witness's status as a juvenile offender-clearly
was relevant, but excluding it furthered the state's goal of reha-
bilitating juvenile offenders by preserving their anonymity.537
The purpose behind rape-shield legislation, however, is to ban
irrelevant and outdated uses of sexual conduct evidence. As
long as the legislation prohibits only the irrelevant and prejudi-
cial uses of the evidence, there will be no conflict with the ac-
cused's sixth amendment rights.
B. THE TEXAS APPROACH
At the opposite end of the statutory spectrum from the
Michigan "inflexible legislative rule" approach is the Texas
"untrammeled judicial discretion" approach.538 Adopted in
Texas and ten other states,539 this model is purely procedural in
nature. Nine of the eleven statutes following this scheme per-
mit the accused to introduce any form of sexual conduct evi-
dence for any purpose upon a judicial determination of
relevancy according to the traditional standard: the evidence is
admissible if its probative value outweighs its prejudicial ef-
534. See supra text accompanying notes 223, 234.
535. The Author's proposed amendment to FED. R. EVID. 404, set forth in
the Conclusion to this Article, would require an in camera hearing at which
these relevancy issues would be determined.
536. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
537. Id, at 319. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
538. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
539. For a list of Texas-type statutes, see infra app. (Table 1).
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fect.- 0 To protect the complainant's privacy and to avoid taint-
ing the fact-finding process by the mere asking of objectionable
questions,-' the relevancy determination is made at an in cam-
era proceeding prior to the offering of the evidence. -2 Under
this statutory scheme, if the court finds sexual conduct evi-
dence to be irrelevant, that evidence may not be referred to in
any manner during the trial; the complainant is thereby spared
public disclosure of her sex life and the jury is not prejudiced
by inadmissible evidence.5s
The exact procedures mandated by these nine statutes
vary. The most elaborate require that the defendant submit a
written motion accompanied by an affidavit stating his offer of
proof of relevance. If the court finds the offer to be sufficient
on its face, it orders a closed hearing, at the conclusion of which
it issues a written order "stating what evidence may be intro-
duced... , which order may include the nature of the questions
to be permitted."' 4 Although other statutes are less formal, all
are designed to encourage careful judicial consideration of the
probative worth of the evidence before allowing its
admission. 5
540. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1810.1-.4 (1977 & Supp. 1985); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-3-407 (1978); IDAHO CODE § 18-6105 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
3525 (Supp. 1984); N.M.R. EVID. 413; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13 (1981); S.D.
CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 23A-22-15 (1979); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.065
(Vernon Supp. 1986); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-312 (1983). For the precise stan-
dard of admissibility, see infra app. (Table 3). Not all of the statutes explicitly
call for the balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect; some simply
require courts to determine the "relevancy" or "admissibility" of the evidence.
See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-407(e) (1978); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-37-13
(1981). It is unlikely that these provisions were designed to abrogate the
court's traditional authority to exclude highly prejudicial evidence. See 23 C.
WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 3, § 5392, at 629-30.
541. See supra note 147.
542. The one departure from the in camera requirement is found in the
Idaho statute, which simply requires a hearing "out of the presence of the
jury." IDAHO CODE § 18-6105 (1979).
543. See FORCIBLE RAPE, supra note 10, at 27; Letwin, supra note 3, at 53.
As one court has observed, "all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fic-
tion" the assumption that the prejudicial effects of evidence can be overcome
by instructions to disregard the material. Krulewitch v. United States, 336
U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). Further, when the prosecutor
objects to questions at trial, the jurors may feel that he or she is trying to keep
evidence from them. See Comment, Motion in Limine, 29 ARK. L. REv. 215,
215 (1975).
544. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-312(a) (1983). For a similar statute see COLO.
REV. STAT. § 18-3-407(e) (1978).
545. See In re Nichols, 2 Kan. App. 2d 431, 434-45, 580 P.2d 1370, 1374
(1978); FORCBLE RAPE, supra note 10, at 26-27; 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM,
supra note 3, § 5238, at 423.
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Implicit in this statutory model is an assumption that sex-
ual conduct evidence is inadmissible unless proven otherwise by
the accused.M6 Proponents of this approach contended that the
in camera admissibility determination would strike the proper
balance between the complainant's privacy interest and the ac-
cused's right to confront his accuser.M7 Notably, however, with
regard to all nine statutes, no substantive change has been
wrought; theoretically, at least, trial judges are free to admit
sexual conduct evidence on the same basis as they did prior to
the enactment of such laws. Indeed, one student author has ex-
pressed the view that the Texas rape-shield statute "represents
nothing more than a codification of prior law."'548
The two other rape-shield laws that fall within this mini-
mally restrictive Texas category place some minor limits on the
overall discretionary scheme. In Alaska and New Jersey, evi-
dence of the complainant's sexual conduct occurring more than
one year before the date of the offense charged is explicitly
presumed to be inadmissible in the absence of "a persuasive
showing" 549 or "clear and convincing" 550 proof to the contrary,
respectively. In addition, in both instances the standard for de-
546. Indeed, the Colorado statute explicitly states that sexual conduct evi-
dence, other than sex with the defendant and physical consequences evidence,
is "presumed to be irrelevant" unless shown otherwise at an in camera hear-
ing. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-3-407 (1978).
547. For example, the policy adopted by the Board of Directors of the
American Civil Liberties Union states that
[C]areful application by trial judges of the proper standards of rele-
vance of testimony, control of cross-examination and argument, and
elimination of prejudicial instructions unique to rape and similar cases
could do much to preserve rape complainants from unnecessary impo-
sition upon their rights to sexual privacy, without detracting from the
fairness of the trial.
Policy of the American Civil Liberites Union, adopted February, 1976, quoted
in Herman, supra note 27, at 63. See also People v. McKenna, 196 Colo. 367,
373-74, 585 P.2d 275, 279 (1978) (en banc) (in camera hearing balances victim's
privacy interest against defendant's right to introduce relevant evidence);
State v. Green, 163 W. Va. 681, 687-93, 260 S.E.2d 257, 261-64 (1979) (discussing
the variety of rape-shield laws and recommending that the legislature adopt
provision for in camera hearing); Note, Forcible Rape: The Law in Tezas, 9
TEx. TECH L. REV. 563, 577-78, 585, 589 (1978) (suggesting that in camera pro-
cedure achieves realistic compromise of conflicting interests, but should be
supplemented by "fundamental rules governing the manner of evidence ad-
missible" on subject of victim's chastity).
548. Note, supra note 547, at 577. See FORCIBLE RAPE, supra note 10, at 27;
see also Weddington, supra note 33, at 13 (co-author of Texas statute questions
whether it "changes any of the old law").
549. ALAsKA STAT. § 12.45.045(b) (Supp. 1985).
550. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.2 (West Supp. 1985). On the inadvisabil-
ity of such a time limit, see supra notes 254-256 and accompanying text.
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termining admissibility is somewhat different from the tradi-
tional relevancy standard; significantly, the courts consider the
"unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the complaining wit-
ness" along with other counterweights in determining whether
otherwise relevant evidence is to be excluded.551 These two
shield laws thus are somewhat more protective of the complain-
ant than are the other nine; the presumptive one-year limit in
particular makes exposure of a lifetime of sexual encounters
highly unlikely. Nevertheless, all eleven statutes are identical
in their lack of any explicit prohibition of any form of sexual
conduct evidence for any purpose.
At the time these statutes were enacted, some commenta-
tors doubted that trial judges could shed their previously held
notions about women and sexuality without an explicit legisla-
tive command to do so. 552 For example, in their commentary
following a legislative proposal drafted for the American Civil
Liberties Union of Northern California, Professors Anthony
Amsterdam and Barbara Babcock were "loath to leave determi-
nations of general 'relevancy' to judges who are too frequently
male and too frequently imbued with unreal and insensitive at-
titudes toward women's sexual attitudes and experiences.
'553
Whether these fears were well grounded cannot be determined
with certainty by examining the appellate cases in states adopt-
ing the Texas approach. If trial judges applying these statutes
continue to admit irrelevant and prejudicial sexual conduct evi-
dence, and if rape defendants therefore go free, such cases will
go unreported because of the state's inability to appeal a finding
of not guilty5 i and the nearly universal prohibition against in-
terlocutory appeals from evidentiary rulings in criminal
cases.5 55 Notwithstanding the absence of more conclusive data,
551. ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045(a) (Supp. 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-
32.1 (West Supp. 1985). Regarding the issue of whether the victim's privacy in-
terests are a proper consideration in determining whether relevant evidence
may be excluded, see supra note 177.
552. See Amsterdam & Babcock, Proposed Position on Issues Raised by the
Administration of Laws Against Rape: Memorandum for the ACLU of North-
ern California, reprinted in BABCOCK, supra note 14, at 843; Berger, supra
note 3, at 71.
553. Amsterdam & Babcock, Proposed Position on Issues Raised by the Ad-
ministration of Laws Against Rape: Memorandum for the ACLU of Northern
California, reprinted in BABCOCK, supra note 14, at 843.
554. See supra note 148.
555. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982); 3 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 26.2(a), at 182-87 (1984). Although some states permit interlocu-
tory appeals by the accused in the discretion of the court, see id. § 26.2(a), at
187, "it is a basic premise of American jurisprudence that absent specific statu-
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the indications are that courts in jurisdictions adopting the
Texas approach are in fact eschewing reliance on the invidious
common-law inferences.
The first such indication arises upon examining the fifty-
odd reported appeals from rape convictions in which defend-
ants have claimed error resulting from the exclusion of sexual
conduct evidence by trial courts applying Texas-type statutes.
In most of these cases, the appellate courts have applied the
rape-shield statutes in a manner highly deferential to the inter-
ests of the complainant and the state, uniformly avoiding the
invidious common-law inferences.556 Indeed, it is fascinating to
observe the certainty with which courts, applying general rele-
vancy principles, determine that such evidence is without pro-
bative value when they so recently embraced the opposite view
with equal conviction. In reaching these determinations, the
courts draw heavily on the statutes' legislative history, as exem-
plified by the following language in a 1978 Colorado decision:
The basic purpose of [the statute] is one of public policy: to pro-
vide rape and sexual assault victims greater protection from humiliat-
ing and embarrassing public 'fishing expeditions' into their past
sexual conduct, without a preliminary showing that evidence thus
elicited will be relevant to some issue in the pending case. The stat-
ute represents one means chosen by the general assembly to over-
come the reluctance of victims of sex crimes to report them for
prosecution.557
In a similar vein, the Court of Appeals of Kansas held that the
rape-shield statute of that state "serves to focus both judges'
and attorneys' attention upon the fact that the victim's prior
sexual activity is not generally relevant, reminding them that a
lack of chastity has no bearing whatsoever on her truthfulness
and generally has no bearing on the important issue of con-
tory authorization, the prosecution lacks the right to appeal an adverse ruling
in a criminal case," id § 26.3(a), at 209. Many state statutes, like the federal
statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3731 (West Supp. 1985), permit appeals by the prosecu-
tion from orders suppressing or excluding evidence, but not from orders hold-
ing evidence admissible. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra, § 26.3(b), at 214-
19 (indicating that over half of the states have adopted such statutes and dis-
cussing their underlying jurisdiction). But see ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1810.2
(Supp. 1985) (permitting state appeal from in camera determination of admis-
sibility of sexual conduct evidence); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.210(3)(c) (1984)
(same); see also Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43, 46 (4th Cir. 1981) (granting
the victim an interlocutory appeal). The court's reasoning in Doe is discussed
supra note 451.
556. See infra text accompanying notes 557-567.




sent."558 In a different case, the Supreme Court of Kansas af-
firmed this view, declaring that the statute was intended to
"sen[d] a clear message to the courts that a rape victim's prior
sexual activity is generally inadmissible. 559 Similarly, in State
v. Herrera,560 the Court of Appeals of New Mexico interpreted
the controlling shield statute as a determination that "past sex-
ual conduct, in itself, indicates nothing concerning consent in a
particular case."56 ' The burden is on the defendant, the court
held, to demonstrate the relevance of sexual conduct evidence
under the circumstances of a specific case.56 2 In State v. Ro-
mero,563 the same court upheld the exclusion of evidence that
the victim was a prostitute in the absence of a defense claim
that the sexual act in question had been an agreed-upon act of
prostitution.59 The court stated that "[ilt is not the province of
the jury to pass moral judgment on the victim, and the court
should remove the temptation to do so wherever possible."56
Other appellate courts applying Texas-style rape-shield
statutes similarly have upheld trial courts' exclusion of evi-
dence of sexual conduct between the complainant and others
than the accused where such evidence established nothing more
than the complainant's general lack of chastity.5 66 The case law
generated under the Texas approach thus strongly suggests
that the trial courts' discretion to determine the relevancy of
sexual conduct evidence on a case-by-case basis is being exer-
cised in a manner consistent with the policies underlying rape-
shield legislation generally.567
558. In re Nichols, 2 Kan. App. 431, 434, 580 P.2d 1370, 1374 (1978).
559. State v. Stellwagen, 232 Kan. 744, 747, 659 P.2d 167, 170 (1983).
560. 92 N.M. 7, 582 P.2d 384 (Ct. App. 1978).
561. Id at 16, 582 P.2d at 393.
562. Id.
563. 94 N.M. 22, 606 P.2d 1116 (Ct. App. 1980), overruled in part on other
grounds, State v. Fish, 102 N.M. 775, 701 P.2d 374, 377-78 (Ct. App. 1985).
564. Id. at 25-26, 606 P.2d at 1119-20.
565. Id. at 26, 606 P.2d at 1120.
566. See, e.g., Kvasnikoff v. State, 674 P.2d 302, 306 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983);
Bobo v. State, 267 Ark. 1, 4-5, 589 S.W.2d 5, 8 (1979); People v. Gallegos, 644
P.2d 920, 925 (Colo. 1982); State v. Palin, 106 Idaho 70, 73-74, 675 P.2d 49, 52-53
(Ct. App. 1983); State v. Gibbons, 418 A.2d 830, 836 (R.I. 1980).
567. The picture is not complete without an examination of the unreported
cases in which rape defendants have been acquitted or those in which the state
has reduced or dismissed the charge due to unfavorable pretrial rulings on the
admissibility of sexual conduct evidence. Unless the lower courts are ignoring
the precedents discussed above in violation of the principle of stare decisis,
however, it can be assumed that they are indeed abandoning the common-law




Further evidence of this trend can be discerned by examn--
big the cases applying the Arkansas rape-shield statute-the
only Texas-type statute that explicitly grants the state an inter-
locutory appeal from an adverse ruling on the admissibility of
sexual conduct evidence.568 Interestingly, as first promulgated,
the statute granted both the state and the accused the right to
an interlocutory appeal from an adverse ruling.5 69 If Arkansas
trial courts were regularly admitting irrelevant sexual conduct
evidence, one would surely expect the state to have appealed a
substantial number of such rulings. Yet, of the eleven interloc-
utory appeals reported during the six years that the statute
granted both sides such a right, only one appeal was brought by
the state.570 The remaining ten appeals were brought by de-
fendants who claimed that the trial court had improperly ex-
cluded sexual conduct evidence,571 and only two of these
determinations were reversed on appeal.572 That the State of
Arkansas had appealed such a pretrial ruling in only one in-
stance demonstrates a high degree of judicial deference to rape
victims' interests, in sharp contrast to past abusive practices.573
The Texas approach's requirement of an in camera judicial
screening of sexual conduct evidence as a condition precedent
to admissibility serves the underlying legislative policies well.
This procedural mechanism compels the accused to articulate
to the court his theory of relevancy and further encourages the
court to consider carefully the probative worth of the evidence
in relation to the particular facts of the case. Although most of
the statutes modeled on the Michigan approach have the same
568. See supra note 555.
569. Act of Feb. 18, 1977, No. 197, § 2, 1977 Ark. Acts 256, 257-58, amended
by 1983 Ark. Acts 889 (codified as amended at ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1810.2(c)
(Supp. 1985)).
570. See State v. Small, 276 Ark. 26, 27, 631 S.W.2d 616, 616 (1982) (revers-
ing the trial court's admission of sexual conduct evidence).
571. See Fields v. State, 281 Ark. 43, 661 S.W.2d 359 (1983); Boreck v. State,
272 Ark. 240, 613 S.W.2d 96 (1981); Hubbard v. State, 271 Ark. 937, 611 S.W.2d
526 (1981); Kemp v. State, 270 Ark. 835, 606 S.W.2d 573 (1980); Farrell v. State,
269 Ark. 361, 601 S.W.2d 835 (1980); Dorn v. State, 267 Ark. 365, 590 S.W.2d 297
(1979); Marion v. State, 267 Ark. 345, 590 S.W.2d 288 (1979); Sterling v. State,
267 Ark. 208, 590 S.W.2d 254 (1979); Bobo v. State, 267 Ark. 1, 589 S.W.2d 5
(1979); Brown v. State, 264 Ark. 944, 581 S.W.2d 549 (1979).
572. See Marion v. State, 267 Ark. 345, 590 S.W.2d 288 (1979); Brown v.
State, 264 Ark. 944, 581 S.W.2d 549 (1979).
573. A less likely, but possible, inference is that prosecutors did not appeal
rulings that permitted the introduction of irrelevant and prejudicial evidence.
This possibility highlights the problem of the divergent interests of the state
and the complainant. See supra note 451.
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procedural features, they do not provide the courts with the
crucial element of flexibility to determine the admissibility of
sexual conduct evidence on a case-by-case basis. Under Michi-
gan-type statutes, courts may exercise discretion only with re-
gard to evidence excepted by statute.574
Nevertheless, granting any decisionmaker the unfettered
exercise of discretion always presents the risk that such discre-
tion will be abused. Without any substantive restrictions on the
admissibility of sexual conduct evidence, there remains the
danger under the Texas approach that the time may come
when sympathy for the plight of the rape victim is not as much
the fashion. This danger is particularly great where neither the
state nor the complainant can pursue an interlocutory appeal
from an in camera admissibility determination.
The proposed legislative solution discussed above575 pro-
tects rape complainants better than do Texas-type statutes be-
cause it absolutely prohibits precisely those uses of sexual
conduct evidence at which rape-shield legislation was aimed.
Beyond that explicit prohibition, courts would be free to admit
sexual conduct evidence for other, nonsexist purposes, in the
sound exercise of their discretion. Concededly, without any
provision for an interlocutory appeal by the state and/or the
complainant, this statutory prohibition might be violated and
such violations would go unchecked. Nevertheless, a restriction
that is narrowly confined to the precise evil sought to be eradi-
cated by the legislation is better than no restriction at all, so
long as the courts are granted sufficient flexibility to admit sex-
ual conduct evidence not subject to the restriction.
C. THE FEDERAL APPROACH
Thus far we have examined in detail two diametrically op-
posed approaches to the problem of regulating the admissibility
of sexual conduct evidence in rape trials. A third approach,
designed to avoid the underinclusiveness of the Michigan ap-
proach and the overinclusiveness of the Texas approach, com-
bines features of both models. This third approach has three
key features: 1) a general prohibition of sexual conduct evi-
dence, 2) several exceptions permitting sexual conduct evidence
considered indisputably relevant to an effective defense, and 3)
574. See supra notes 241-242 and accompanying text.
575. See supra text accompanying notes 223, 234; Conclusion, infra.
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a "catch-basin" provision 576 authorizing the trial court to deter-
mine the admissibility of unexcepted sexual conduct evidence
on a case-by-case basis according to a prescribed standard.
5 77
The federal rape-shield statute exemplifies the third ap-
proach.5 78 It absolutely prohibits the accused from introducing
evidence of the complainant's "past sexual behavior" in the
form of reputation or opinion testimony.5 79 Evidence of past
sexual behavior in other than reputation or opinion form is ad-
missible in two discrete situations if the court determines at an
in camera hearing that its probative value outweighs the danger
of unfair prejudice.5 0 The two situations in which such evi-
576. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 60.42, practice commentary at 565 (McKinney
1981).
577. For a list of statutes following the federal approach, see infra app.
(Table 1).
578. See FED. R. EVID. 412; see also supra notes 1-2 (discussing the legisla-
tive history of Rule 412).
579. FED. R. EvID. 412(a).
580. FED. R. EVID. 412(c)(3). Notably, this standard of admissibility varies
slightly from the general relevancy standard set out in Rule 403 under which
evidence is admissible unless prejudice "substantially" outweighs probative
value. See FED. R. EVID. 403. There is no evidence of Congress's intent on this
point. 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 3, § 5392, at 630. Due process
concerns may be raised, however, by a rule that requires the defense to meet a
standard of admissibility that is more stringent than the standard the prosecu-
tor must meet in proving guilt. See MINN. R. EVID. 404(c) committee com-
ment; cf. Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 3, at 589 (suggesting that the sixth
amendment is violated when statutes require higher admissibility standards
for evidence offered by rape defendants than for evidence offered by other de-
fendants).
The federal statute has a fairly elaborate procedural mechanism. Unless
the evidence is newly discovered, the defendant must submit a written motion,
accompanied by an offer of proof, at least fifteen days before trial. The motion
must be served on the victim as well as on the government. If the court deter-
mines that the offer of proof contains one of the three excepted categories of
evidence, it must order an in camera hearing. If the court determines that the
evidence is admissible under the statutory standard, it must so specify in an
order. FED. R. EVID. 412(c).
Another notable aspect of the rule is its treatment of conditional rele-
vancy questions. Generally, when the relevancy of evidence depends on the
fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court admits the evidence subject to the
introduction of evidence sufficient to support a jury finding of the fulfillment
of the condition. FED. R. EVID. 104(b). Under FED. R. EVID. 412(c)(2), the
judge, not the jury, decides whether the condition is fulfilled at the in camera
hearing; the rule does not make clear, however, what standard of proof the
judge must apply. The purpose of this provision is to protect the privacy of the
victim by preventing the jury from hearing sexual conduct evidence that it ul-
timately would have to discount if the factual condition were not met. See 124
CONG. REc. 34,912-13 (1978) (statement of Rep. Mann). Two commentators
have argued that if this provision permits the judge to usurp the fact-finding
function of the jury, it presents serious constitutional problems. See R.
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dence is admissible are cases in which the accused offers evi-
dence of past sexual behavior between himself and the
complainant on the issue of consent,58' and those in which evi-
dence of past sexual behavior between the complainant and
other individuals is offered on the issue of whether the accused
was the source of certain physical consequences of the rape,
namely, semen or injury.5 2 Finally, the catch-basin clause al-
lows the court to admit any other evidence of past sexual be-
havior which the court determines, after an in camera hearing,
is "constitutionally required to be admitted. ' 58 3 The rape-
shield statutes of Hawaii, Iowa, and the military are identical to
the federal statute in all pertinent respects.584 Although Ore-
gon and Connecticut follow the same general approach, they
except different categories of sexual conduct evidence from
their general prohibition.585
LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 67, at 640-41. They give an example of a
defendant who denies that he had sexual intercourse with the complainant on
the occasion in question. To prove that he did, the government will prove at
trial that the complainant contracted a venereal disease ten days after the al-
leged rape. The defendant proffers evidence at the hearing that the complain-
ant had intercourse with X and Y at the relevant time to show an alternative
source of the disease. The probative value of that evidence, however, turns on
whether X and Y had the disease contracted by the complainant. If the evi-
dence is conflicting on that issue, but the judge believes that it is more likely
than not that neither X nor Y had the disease, he should exclude the evidence
under Rule 412(c)(2). Had the jurors heard the conflicting evidence, they
might have decided differently. Professors Richard Lempert and Stephen
Saltzburg are concerned that this rule may contravene the accused's sixth
amendment right to a jury trial as well as his right to due process of law. Id.
at 641.
581. FED. R. EvID. 412(b)(2)(B). For criticism of Michigan-style statutes
that only admit evidence of complainant-defendant sexual conduct on the is-
sue of consent, see supra text accompanying notes 261-264. This limitation is
not a problem under the federal approach because of the catch-basin provision.
582. FED. R. Evm. 412(b)(2)(A).
583. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1).
584. See MIL. R. EVID. 412; HAwAII R. EVID. 412; IOWA R. EviD. 412. Nota-
bly, however, the military rule does not contain the conditional relevancy pro-
vision found in the federal rule, see supra note 580. Thus, it continues the
traditional relationship between judge and jury in deciding such questions. See
S. SALTzBURG, L. SCoNAsi & D. SCHLUETER, M=TARY RULES OF EVIDENCE
MANUAL 208 (1981).
585. For example, the Oregon statute permits the introduction of evidence
of past sexual behavior of the complainant if such evidence "[r]elates to the
motive or bias of the alleged victim"; or "[i]s necessary to rebut or explain sci-
entific or medical evidence offered by the state ... ." OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40.210(2)(b)(A)-(B) (1984). The second exception is preferable to the compa-
rable federal provision, which allows evidence that the accused was not "the
source of semen or injury." FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2)(A). Unless "injury" is in-
terpreted broadly to include disease or pregnancy, the federal statute runs the
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The various catch-basin provisions in the federal-type stat-
utes allow the courts to cure a legislative failure to include an
exception in the statutory scheme. In his statement introduc-
ing the bill in the House, Representative Mann expressly stated
that the catch-basin provision was "intended to cover those in-
stances where, because of an unusual chain of circumstances,
the general rule of inadmissibility, if followed, would result in
denying the defendant a constitutional right. '58 6 Although in-
cluding the catch-basin provision might appear to improve upon
the Texas and Michigan approaches, upon reflection it does not
offer a workable solution to the problem it seeks to resolve. At
best it is unnecessary, and at worst it is unclear. First, no ex-
plicit statutory language is needed to compel trial judges to ad-
mit evidence that is "constitutionally required to be admitted."
Even in the absence of such a provision, rape-shield legislation
could not take precedence over the Constitution.58 7 The provi-
sion therefore is little more than an unimaginative attempt to
avoid constitutional challenges. In addition, without a clear
mandate from the Supreme Court stating when a rule of evi-
dence must yield to the accused's sixth amendment right to of-
risk of precluding critical defense evidence, namely, that someone other than
the accused was the source of the victim's venereal disease or pregnancy. See
supra note 272 and accompanying text. The Oregon statute is sufficiently
broad to permit such evidence. On the other hand, the Oregon statute inexpli-
cably does not except the highly probative category of evidence of prior sexual
conduct between the complainant and the accused.
The Connecticut statute specifically admits evidence of prior sexual con-
duct between the complainant and the accused as well as other categories of
sexual conduct evidence, however, it contains no exception for evidence proba-
tive of bias or motive. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86f(l)-(4) (West 1985).
As previously noted, see supra note 177, the relevancy standard in the Con-
necticut statute differs from the traditional test in that it requires that the
probative value of the evidence be balanced against "its prejudicial effect on
the victim." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86f (West 1985) (emphasis added). A
Connecticut appeals court has held, however, that this balancing test is inap-
plicable when the evidence is admitted under the catch-all provision because,
"if the defendant's constitutional rights would be violated by the exclusion of
the evidence, no amount of prejudice to the victim could require its exclusion."
State v. Cassidy, 3 Conn. App. 374, 489 A.2d 386, 392 n.4, cert. denied, 196
Conn. 803, 192 A.2d 1239 (1985).
586. 124 CONG. REC. 34,912 (1978) (statement of Rep. Mann). See also 124
CONG. REC. 36,256 (1978) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (introducing an "identical"
bill in the Senate).
587. See S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MAN-
UAL 224 (3d ed. 1982). On the other hand, such a residual provision arguably
has a symbolic value for judges who are reluctant to declare statutes unconsti-
tutional. See United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916) (Holmes,
J.) ("[a] statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the
conclusion that it is unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that score").
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fer proof in support of a defense, the catch-basin provision
offers no guidance to trial courts regarding what evidence
meets the statutory standard.58 8 In both Chambers v. Missis-
sippi 58 9 and Davis v. Alaska,59 0 the Court made it quite clear
that its holdings were limited to the particular facts and cir-
cumstances of those cases.59 ' Until some consensus is reached
on the applicability of these precedents to rape-shield legisla-
tion, it is unwise for courts to cast into "constitutional con-
crete" their tentative conclusions regarding the admissibility of
sexual conduct evidence not specifically excepted by statute.592
In any event, the federal statute's departure from the tradi-
tional approach of avoiding decisionmaking on constitutional
grounds is simply not warranted in this context. The notion
that a constitutional conflict necessarily exists between the
state's interests in excluding sexual conduct evidence and the
defendant's need to offer relevant evidence derives from a mis-
apprehension of the purposes underlying the rape-shield stat-
utes. In contrast to evidentiary privileges, the invocation of
which frequently results in the loss of highly relevant evidence
in the interest of furthering policies extrinsic to the fact-finding
process, 59 3 rape-shield laws were meant to exclude irrelevant
and prejudicial evidence that does nothing but taint the fact-
finding process.594 Because the defendant has no constitutional
right to introduce irrelevant, prejudicial evidence, 595 and be-
cause the policies underlying rape-shield legislation will be
served by rejecting only the irrelevant and outdated uses of
sexual conduct evidence, the interests of both "sides" are sym-
metrical and need not be "balanced" in the constitutional sense.
588. See S. SAL'rZBURG, L. SCHINASI & D. SCHLEUTER, supra note 584, at
207.
589. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
590. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
591. See Davis, 415 U.S. at 319 ("[i]n this setting we conclude that the right
of confrontation is paramount to the State's policy of protecting a juvenile of-
fender"); Chambers, 410 U.S. at 303 ("under the facts and circumstances of this
case the rulings of the trial court deprived Chambers of a fair trial"). Davis
and Chambers are discussed supra text accompanying notes 183-204.
592. See 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 3, § 5387, at 565.
593. But see State v. Miskell, 122 N.H. 842, 845, 451 A.2d 383, 385 (1982)
("Mhe legislature [in enacting the rape-shield statute] intended to create a
testimonial privilege. Its purpose was to protect the victim of a rape 'from be-
ing subjected to unnecessary embarrassment, prejudice and courtroom proce-
dures that only serve to exacerbate the trauma of the rape itself.' ") (quoting
State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 57, 426 A.2d 457, 459 (1981)).
594. See supra notes 156-158, 176 and accompanying text.
595. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
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Thus, there is no need to frame the admissibility determination
in constitutional terms.
Although the New York rape-shield statute, 96 which is in
line with the federal approach, admirably casts its catch-basin
provision in nonconstitutional terms, the standard it uses is
similarly vague and imprecise. After excepting several catego-
ries of sexual conduct evidence from its general prohibition,59
the statute authorizes the court to admit unexcepted evidence
which it determines, after a hearing, to be "relevant and admis-
sible in the interests of justice. '598 As with the constitutional
catch-basin, this provision offers no guidance to trial courts in
determining what evidence meets the statutory standard. In
this sense, there is little to distinguish the New York and other
rape-shield statutes following the federal approach from those
adopting the Texas approach; neither scheme sets any substan-
tive restrictions on the use of sexual conduct evidence.
The paucity of case law under the various catch-basin pro-
visions599 makes it impossible to determine whether courts will
596. N.Y. CRIm. PRoc. LAw § 60.42 (McKinney 1981).
597. The exceptions are: 1) evidence of prior sexual conduct with the ac-
cused; 2) rebuttal evidence; 3) evidence of physical consequences, e.g., semen,
pregnancy, disease; and 4) evidence of the complainant's convictions for prosti-
tution within three years of the alleged rape. N.Y. CRIm. PROC. LAW
§ 60.42(1)-(4) (McKinney 1981). The last exception, not found in any other
rape-shield statute, appears to except a specific form of "pattern" evidence; it
is unaccompanied by the restrictions normally applicable to such evidence,
however. See supra notes 340-410 and accompanying text. First, the provision
is not limited to cases in which the defendant claims consent. Thus, under the
New York law, if the defendant denies the occurrence of the sexual acts in
question, he may introduce proof of the complainant's prostitution conviction,
although it would serve no purpose except to unfairly prejudice the complain-
ant. Second, even if the defense were consent, one conviction for prostitution,
without more, would hardly be probative of that claim. A different case might
be presented if the defendant claimed that the sexual act in question was an
agreed-upon act of prostitution. See supra notes 376-377 and accompanying
text.
598. N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAW § 60.42(5) (McKinney 1981). Unlike the other
statutes following this approach, the New York statute does not require a
hearing unless the evidence is claimed to fall within the catch-basin provision.
Moreover, the court determines whether to hold the hearing in camera or sim-
ply out of the presence of the jury. With regard to evidence falling within the
other exceptions, a standard of admissibility is not given other than that the
evidence must "[prove] or [tend] to prove" a particular proposition. N.Y. CRIM.
PRoc. LAw § 60.42(1)-(4) (McKinney 1981). The practice commentary follow-
ing this section of the code describes the exceptions as situations in which
"such evidence may, by ruling of the trial judge, become admissible." N.Y.
CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 60.42, practice commentary at 565 (McKinney 1981) (em-
phasis added).
599. There are two explanations for the dearth of case law. First, rape
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apply these provisions in a manner consistent with the underly-
ing legislative purposes, although experience under the Texas
approach strongly suggests that they will do so. 600 Neverthe-
cases are rarely tried in the federal courts, see supra note 32 and accompany-
ing text. Second, the federal statute was not enacted until 1978, see supra note
1, and the state provisions following its approach, other than that of New
York, were passed substantially later, see, e.g., Act of Feb. 1982, Pub. Act No.
82-230, 1982 Conn. Acts 527, 527 (Reg. Sess.) (codified as amended at CoNN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86(f) (West 1985)); Act of May 29, 1980, 1980 Hawaii Sess.
Laws 244, 252-53 (promulgated as HAWAII R. EID. 412); Act of August 22,
1981, ch. 892, § 31, 1981 Or. Laws 1378, 1378 (codified at OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40.210 (1984)), in some states as part of an entire evidence code modeled on
the Federal Rules of Evidence. See MIL. R. EviD. 412 (effective Sept. 1, 1980);
HAWAII R. Evm. 412 (effective Jan. 1, 1981); IowA R. EvED. 412 (effective July
1, 1983); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40.210 (1984) (effective Jan. 1, 1982). The New
York statute was passed before the federal statute. See Act of June 17, 1975,
ch. 230, § 1, 1975 McKinney's Sess. Laws of N.Y. 349, 349 (codified at N.Y.
CRiM. PRoc. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney 1981)) (effective Sept. 1, 1975).
600. See supra text accompanying notes 556-567. As mentioned earlier, see
supra text accompanying notes 554-555, because the state may not appeal an
acquittal and because of the nearly universal prohibition against interlocutory
appeals from evidentiary rulings in criminal cases, a reading of the appellate
cases applying federal-type statutes will not uncover cases in which judges al-
lowed irrelevant evidence to be admitted under a catch-all provision if the de-
fendants ultimately were acquitted. According to Assistant District Attorney
Linda Fairstein, Chief of the Sex Crime Prosecutions Unit of the New York
County District Attorney's Office since 1976, the New York rape-shield statute
has been very effective in keeping out irrelevant, prejudicial evidence; she
could not recall "a single case where the catch-all provision had been abused"
and only rarely in her experience has it been used to permit the introduction
of unexcepted sexual conduct evidence. Telephone interview with Assistant
District Attorney Linda Fairstein, Chief, Sex Crime Prosecutions Unit, New
York County District Attorney's Office (Oct. 25, 1985).
There are a limited number of reported appeals from rape convictions in
which defendants have claimed error resulting from the exclusion of sexual
conduct evidence by trial courts applying the various catch-all provisions. In
most of these cases, the appellate courts have applied these provisions in a
manner deferential to the interests of the victim and the state, similar to the
manner in which courts have applied Texas-type statutes. See, e.g., Latzer v.
Abrams, 602 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (discussed supra note 516); State v.
Cassidy, 3 Conn. App. 374, 489 A.2d 386, 389-92 (1985) (discussed supra text ac-
companying notes 393-402), cert denied, 196 Conn. 803, 192 A.2d 1239 (1985);
State v. Clarke, 343 N.W.2d 158 (Iowa 1984) (discussed supra note 490 and ac-
companying text); People v. Mandel, 48 N.Y.2d 952, 954, 401 N.E.2d 185, 187,
425 N.Y.S.2d 63, 64, (1979) (exclusion of hospital records of mental treatment,
containing numerous references to complainant's sexual conduct, was not er-
ror when other testimony regarding complainant's mental condition was ad-
mitted into evidence), appeal dismissed, 466 U.S. 949 (1980).
A departure from this trend is evident in two cases decided by a divided
United States Court of Military Appeals, which held that sexual conduct evi-
dence should have been admitted under the constitutional catch-all provision
of Military Rule of Evidence 412. See United States v. Colon-Angueria, 16 M.J.
20, 24 (C.M.A. 1983); United States v. Dorsey, 16 M.J. 1, 4-7 (C.M.A. 1983). The
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less, without any substantive limits on judicial discretion, the
catch-basin provisions could well become a loophole through
which judges could subtly resurrect common-law notions about
women and sexuality. Legislatures should therefore amend
these statutes along the lines of the proposed rape-shield stat-
ute60 1 to expressly prohibit the invidious common-law uses of
sexual conduct evidence. The proposed approach would pro-
vide the courts with more guidance than the various catch-basin
provisions in determining the admissibility of sexual conduct
evidence and would avoid adjudications on constitutional
grounds.
An additional problem is presented by the federal statute
and several statutes adopting its approach, namely those of Ha-
waii, Iowa, Oregon and the military. These five statutes abso-
lutely prohibit sexual conduct evidence to be elicited in the
form of reputation or opinion testimony.60 2 Although the
catch-basin provisions except evidence if its admission is consti-
tutionally mandated, evidence admitted under such provisions
may not be introduced in reputation or opinion form. Implic-
itly, then, the drafters determined that neither reputation nor
opinion evidence of previous sexual conduct could ever be con-
stitutionally required to be admitted.
Sexual conduct evidence in reputation form may be essen-
tial to the establishment of a defense to rape, however. The ac-
cused may wish to offer evidence that the victim's reputation
had been brought to his attention before the sexual encounter
to support a claim that he made a reasonable mistake of fact re-
garding her consent.60 3 In a case decided by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the defendant put
forth precisely this theory in an effort to introduce reputation
evidence under the federal rape-shield statute. In Doe v.
United States, 60 4 the defendant claimed that the complainant
evidence, claimed to be probative of bias or motive, was speculative, at best,
prompting two scholars to comment: "It is disheartening to see the serious-
ness with which some courts have treated these forensic fables." 23 C. WRiGHT
& K. GRAHAM, supra note 3, § 5387, at 81 (Supp. 1985).
601. See supra notes 221-238 and accompanying text.
602. See FED. R. EvID. 412(a); MIL. R. EvIn. 412(a); HAWAII R. EVID. 412(a);
IOWA R. EviD. 412(a); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.210(1) (1984).
603. See supra notes 427-430 and accompanying text.
604. 666 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1981). The procedural posture of the case is note-
worthy. The case was prosecuted in federal court because the rape occurred
on an army post. The complainant was not notified of the Rule 412 hearing on
the admissibility of sexual conduct evidence mandated by subdivision (c)(1).
When she learned that the hearing had occurred, she brought a civil suit seek-
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had consented or, in the alternative, that he reasonably be-
lieved she had consented. As to five items of evidence held ad-
missible by the trial court, the Fourth Circuit disagreed, ruling
that the evidence amounted to nothing more than proof of the
complainant's unchaste character, elicited in the prohibited
form of reputation and opinion testimony.605 Although the
court expressed some doubt as to the constitutionality of an ab-
solute prohibition on reputation and opinion testimony,606 it
saw no reason to consider that question with regard to the five
items held admissible by the trial court. The only purpose for
the evidence was to raise the inference that the complainant
had acted in conformity with her unchaste character and con-
sented to the sexual act in question. The evidence thus was
clearly irrelevant, and there is no constitutional right to pres-
ent irrelevant evidence.607
The court upheld the admissibility of some additional
proof, however, namely "evidence of the defendant's state of
mind as a result of what he knew of [the complainant's] reputa-
tion and what she had said to him. 6 0 8 Specifically, this proof
consisted of conversations with several men who told the de-
fendant of the complainant's promiscuity, a love letter written
by the complainant to another man that defendant had read,
and conversations between the defendant and the complainant
ing, inter alia, to seal the record of the hearing. Upon learning that the com-
plainant had not received notice, the court reopened the hearing, reaffirmed
its prior ruling, and ruled for the defendants in the civil action. The Fourth
Circuit determined that it had jurisdiction to hear Ms. Doe's appeal from the
Rule 412 order despite the fact that the rule does not grant the victim an inter-
locutory appeal. Id at 45-46. For further discussion of the court's reasoning,
see supra note 451.
605. Doe, 666 F.2d at 47-48. The five items of evidence consisted of:
(1) evidence of the victim's "general reputation in and around the
Army post.., where [the defendant] resided;"
(2) evidence of the victim's "habit of calling out to the barracks to
speak to various and sundry soldiers;"
(3) evidence of the victim's "habit of coming to the post to meet peo-
ple and of her habit of being at the barracks at the snack bar;"
(4) evidence from the victim's former landlord regarding "his expe-
rience with her" alleged promiscuous behavior;
(5) evidence of what a social worker learned of the victim ....
Id at 47 (quoting the district court's order). The court noted that although
"sometimes couched in terms of habit, this evidence is essentially opinion or
reputation evidence." Id
606. Id at 48 ("We are not prepared to state that extraordinary circum-
stances will never justify admission of such evidence to preserve a defendant's
constitutional rights.").
607. I& at 47-48.
608. Id at 47.
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prior to the incident in question.60 9
As to the conversations and the letter, neither involved
proof of past sexual conduct and, thus, their admissibility was
governed by general relevancy principles. The court found
such evidence to be relevant to the defendant's state of mind,
namely, his belief in the complainant's consent.6 10 As to evi-
dence of the complainant's reputation for promiscuity, con-
veyed to him by others, the court similarly found that proof to
be relevant to the accused's state of mind.6 11 In the fashion of
courts applying restrictive Michigan-type rape-shield statutes,
however, the court ignored the statute's explicit prohibition on
reputation evidence and instead looked to the legislative intent.
The court determined that
reputation and opinion evidence of the past sexual behavior of an al-
leged victim was excluded because Congress considered that this evi-
dence was not relevant to the issues of the victims [sic] consent or her
veracity. There is no indication, however, that this evidence was in-
tended to be excluded when offered solely to show the accused's state
of mind. Therefore, its admission is governed by the Rules of Evi-
dence dealing with relevancy in general.
6 1 2
The meager record in Doe does not indicate whether the
defendant put forth a colorable claim of a mistaken belief in
consent. Assuming, however, that such a claim was made, the
court correctly ruled that reputation evidence of which the de-
fendant had knowledge was relevant. The case nevertheless
demonstrates the shortcomings of a statutory scheme that abso-
lutely prohibits an accused from introducing sexual conduct ev-
idence in reputation form, without regard to the purpose for
which such evidence is offered.
Indeed, Doe demonstrates quite clearly the inability of the
drafters of rape-shield legislation to comprehend the concept of
multiple admissibility, so fundamental to the law of evidence,
and to distinguish between the benign and invidious uses of
sexual conduct evidence. In this context, the policies underly-
ing the prohibition on sexual conduct evidence in reputation
form are not even implicated, because the "truth" of the repu-
tation is not in issue. Although the complainant will undoubt-
edly suffer some degree of prejudice when the accused
609. I- at 46-47. The defendant testified at the hearing that although he
had talked on the phone with Doe several times, he did not meet her until the
night of the alleged rape. Id. The record does not reveal the substance of
these conversations or the contents of the letter.
610. Id at 48.
611. Id.
612. Id. (citation omitted).
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introduces such evidence, that damage must be endured so long
as the substantive law affords the accused a complete defense
to rape based upon a mistaken, but reasonable, belief in the
complainant's consent.613
The federal approach to the problem of restricting the use
of sexual conduct evidence is far from perfect. By making pro-
vision for evidence that is "constitutionally required," or "rele-
vant and admissible in the interests of justice," the approach
avoids the underinclusiveness and rigidity of the Michigan ap-
proach. The federal approach is flawed, however, in that it
grants courts the needed flexibility to determine the admissibil-
ity of sexual conduct evidence without providing any guidance
as to when and under what circumstances such evidence should
be admitted. In this sense it does not differ significantly from
the Texas approach, which sets no substantive restrictions on
the use of the evidence and grants judges total discretion to ad-
mit sexual conduct evidence on a case-by-case basis. Finally,
the absolute prohibition on reputation evidence may in certain
cases deny the accused his constitutional right to present the
best available evidence in support of a legitimate defense the-
ory. Each of these problems would be obviated if the proposed
legislative solution6 14 were adopted, because all forms of rele-
vant sexual conduct evidence that did not rely on the invidious
inferences for probative value clearly would be admissible.
613. See supra text accompanying notes 411-421. For an opposing view, see
Spector & Foster, supra note 31, at 97-101. The authors urge that the Doe
court's expansive reading of Rule 412 is uncalled for because proof of the de-
fendant's state of mind "is integrally intertwined with, and not separable from,
the issue of consent, an issue on which Rule 412 clearly precludes proof of
prior sexual activity in any form." HeL at 100. A claim of a reasonable belief in
consent, however, is separate and distinct from a claim of actual consent. In-
deed, the gravamen of the defense is that the accused is mistaken; the com-
plainant did not consent, although he reasonably believed that she did. See
supra text accompanying note 411. Professors Spector and Foster further urge
that the decision in Doe violated Congress's intent to limit the admissibility of
prior sexual conduct evidence to the exceptions specifically listed in the stat-
ute. See Spector & Foster, supra note 31, at 96-101. It is doubtful, however,
that Congress intended to impede the defendant in establishing that he lacked
the mens Tea for so serious an offense, particularly since Congress included an
exception for evidence "constitutionally required to be admitted." FED. R.
EviD. 412(b)(1). It is more likely that Congress did not focus on the possibility
of a noncharacter use of reputation evidence, namely, to prove the defendant's
state of mind rather than the complainant's unchaste character.
614. See supra text accompanying notes 223, 234.
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D. THE CALIFORNIA APPROACH
The fourth and final legislative approach to the admissibil-
ity of sexual conduct evidence was first adopted in California.615
The key feature of this approach is the separation of sexual
conduct evidence into two broad categories depending on the
purpose for which it is offered. Evidence is categorized as
either substantive evidence, offered to prove consent by the
complaining witness, or as credibility evidence, offered to at-
tack the complainant's credibility. The California statute, repli-
cated in two other states, 616 contains a general prohibition of
the first category of evidence, subject to a single exception. If
offered to prove consent, prior sexual conduct evidence in any
form is inadmissible unless it relates to the complainant's prior
sexual conduct with the defendant. 617 The statute does not pre-
clude, however, any sexual conduct evidence offered to attack
the complainant's credibility.618 Such evidence is dealt with in
the manner of the Texas approach: it may be introduced upon
a judicial determination of relevancy after a hearing out of the
presence of the jury.61 9 Finally, the statute contains a separate
provision granting the defendant the right to rebut any evi-
dence of sexual conduct introduced in the state's case.620
There are several problems with this draftsmanship.
Although this approach admirably recognizes that a single item
of sexual conduct evidence may have multiple uses, considera-
ble confusion exists regarding where to draw the line between
permissible and impermissible uses. The primary difficulty
stems from the ambiguity which inheres in the term "credibil-
615. Act of Aug. 30, 1974, ch. 569, §§ 1-2, 1974 Cal. Stat. 1388, 1388-89 (codi-
fied as amended at CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 782, 1103(b) (West Supp. 1986)). For an
excellent analysis of the California statute, see Letwin, supra note 3.
616. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 3508, 3509 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 12.1-20-14 to -15 (1985).
617. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103(b)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1986).
618. Id. § 1103(b)(4).
619. Id. § 782. This section further requires that the defendant submit a
written motion accompanied by an offer of proof stating the evidence proposed
to be presented and its relevancy in attacking the complainaint's credibility. If
the court finds the offer sufficient, it must order the hearing, at the conclusion
of which it must issue an order stating what evidence may be introduced. The
standard of admissibility is consistent with that applied to evidence generally
under California rules of evidence. Evidence is admissible unless "its proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will
(a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of
undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury." CAL.
EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1966).
620. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103(b)(3) (West Supp. 1986).
[Vol. 70:763
RAPE-SHIELD LAWS
ity." On its face, the subsection that freely allows evidence
bearing on credibility appears to resurrect the common-law
rule that admitted evidence of unchastity to impeach the rape
complainant's general credibility.621 Because California was
among the majority of jurisdictions at common law that re-
jected the notion that "promiscuity imports dishonesty, '622 the
drafters probably did not intend to reverse that trend in the
context of a rape reform statute.623 Nevertheless, the impreci-
sion in the statutory language is unfortunate.
Looking behind the statutory language, the legislative his-
tory indicates that the subsection dealing with credibility was
added in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Davis v.
Alaska624 to insulate the statute from constitutional chal-
lenge.625 This raises the question whether the legislature in-
tended merely to afford the accused the avenue of im-
peachment at issue in that case-evidence of a motive to fabri-
cate-or other lines of attack as well. For example, it is un-
clear whether the California rape defendant may elicit evidence
that the complainant previously made false accusations of rape
if such impeachment necessitates the introduction of sexual
conduct evidence.626 Equally troubling is the issue of whether
the accused may elicit evidence of specific instances of sexual
conduct to show that a young and seemingly innocent com-
plainant had the experience and ability to contrive a statutory
rape charge.6 27 Surely this type of evidence bears on the com-
plainant's credibility. Fortunately, one of the most persuasive
modes of impeachment-evidence to rebut sexual conduct evi-
dence introduced in the state's case-is specifically provided for
621. See supra notes 110-119 and accompanying text.
622. Letwin, supra note 3, at 45-46. See also People v. Johnson, 106 Cal.
289, 294, 39 P. 622-23 (1895) (reputation for unchastity goes to the question of
consent only). But see former California jury instruction, CALJIC No. 10.06
(3d rev. ed. 1970) (reproduced supra note 96); Comment, California Rape Evi-
dence Reform: An Analysis of Senate Bill 1678, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1551, 1562-63
(1975) (stating that early California cases failed to make clear the purposes for
which unchastity evidence was admitted) (citing People v. Pantages, 212 Cal.
237, 263-64, 297 P. 890, 901 (1931); People v. Degnen, 70 Cal. App. 567, 590-92,
234 P. 129, 138-39 (1925)).
623. See Letwin, supra note 3, at 61 ("It]he implications of such a reading
would be striking").
624. 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 193-204).
625. See Comment, supra note 622, at 1571 n.129 (citing CAL. S. JoUR. 9848-
49 (May 16, 1974); ASSEMBLY COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CAL. LEGIs. 1973-74
REG. SESS., BILL DIGEST OF S.B. 1678, at 2 (May 1974)).
626. See supra notes 453-475 and accompanying text.
627. See supra notes 487-496 and accompanying text.
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in a separate subsection of the statute.628
As to other modes of proof, the attempt to categorize sex-
ual conduct evidence as bearing on either consent or credibility
is simply unworkable in the context of a rape prosecution. Be-
cause sexual activity, criminal or otherwise, is usually con-
ducted in private, the state almost always establishes its
substantive case through the complainant's testimony. Thus,
where the defendant claims consent, any evidence that im-
peaches the complainant's credibility simultaneously raises the
likelihood of consent. The corollary is also true; evidence pro-
bative of consent will tend to impeach the complainant's credi-
bility, because it is she who has testified that the sexual
encounter was against her will.62 9 That consent and credibility
are in many cases functionally equivalent raises the possibility
that evidence of past sexual conduct prohibited by the "con-
sent" provision may enter through the "credibility" door on the
theory that the victim lied when she denied that consent was
given. Thus, the loophole created by the ambiguous credibility
provision threatens to undermine the very purpose behind the
reform legislation.630 This risk is particularly great considering
the restrictiveness of the consent provision, which only permits
evidence of sexual conduct between the complainant and the
accused. Courts may be tempted to admit under the rubric of
"credibility" the very evidence intended to be excluded under
the statute: evidence of sexual conduct between the complain-
ant and others than the accused.631
Such misuse of the credibility provision is evident in two
California cases, People v. Varona632 and People v. Randle.
633
In Varona, the complainant testified that she had been visiting
a friend who, at 11:30 p.m., drove her to within a few blocks of
a bus stop where she planned to take a bus home. While walk-
ing to the bus stop, the complainant allegedly was attacked by
the two defendants. They took her to a nearby house, raped
her, and forced her to commit oral sex. The defendants
claimed that the entire encounter was an agreed-upon act of
628. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103(b)(3) (West Supp. 1986).
629. See Letwin, supra note 3, at 66; Comment, supra note 622, at 1567-68.
630. See Comment, supra note 622, at 1559-61, 1567-68.
631. Professor Leon Letwin argues persuasively for a reading of the Cali-
fornia provisions that would prohibit all character uses of sexual conduct evi-
dence, whether directed toward the issues of consent or credibility. See
Letwin, supra note 3, at 42-43, 63-69.
632. 143 Cal. App. 3d 566, 192 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1983).
633. 130 Cal. App. 3d 286, 181 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1982).
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prostitution which resulted in a rape charge only when they re-
fused to pay.63 4 The trial court excluded evidence, proffered by
the defense, that the complainant previously had pleaded guilty
to a prostitution charge and was on probation at the time of
trial.635
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the evidence of
prostitution was relevant to "credibility" and should have been
admitted under the exception for such evidence in the rape-
shield statute. 36 In making this determination, the court
stressed certain facts contained in the official records of the
complainant's earlier prostitution case.63 7 According to the
records, the complainant previously had solicited customers in
the very area where the alleged rape took place. The court
found this fact especially significant in light of the complain-
ant's testimony that her "friend" would only drive her to
within two blocks of the bus stop because the friend had an ur-
gent appointment at home at 11:30 p.m. It was also shown that
in the practice of her profession, the complainant "specialized"
in oral copulation, which, the court held, "tends to support the
defense claim that the oral copulation ... was voluntarily en-
gaged in by the woman. '638
In Randle, the issue of consent similarly was closely con-
tested. The defendant, a Berkeley police officer, met the com-
plainant at a bar in San Francisco. She had just arrived by
train from Mountain View and was unemployed and temporar-
ily without a residence.639 Her version of the encounter was
that after dancing and drinking with the defendant, she went
downstairs to make a phone call. The defendant followed her
and asked her to go home with him, but she declined. The de-
fendant then grabbed her and pushed her into the men's rest-
room where he forced her to engage in oral sex.60 The
defendant conceded that an act of oral sex took place but
claimed that it was consensual and in exchange for money. He
634. Varona, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 568, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
635. Id. Moreover, the prosecutor in his summation argued that there was
no evidence that the complainant was a prostitute. Id.
636. Id. at 569, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
637. Id at 569-70, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 46. The case does not make clear
whether the "official records" relied on by the court revealed a history of pros-
titution by the complainant, perhaps as a result of a pre-sentence investigation,
or whether they simply described the facts of the case in which the complain-
ant had earlier pleaded guilty.
638. Id at 570, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 46.




alleged that the complainant asked to go home with him, but
that he said he had another engagement. She then offered him
sex for money because her "money situation was bad," and he
accepted her proposition. 41
Following the guilty verdict, an individual from the com-
plainant's hometown who had read a newspaper account of the
trial contacted the defense counsel with information regarding
the complainant. Thereafter, the defendant moved for a new
trial, offering the testimony of numerous individuals who
would establish the complainant's "reputation for and instances
of soliciting public sex acts in exchange for money, drugs and
drinks."642 The court granted the motion, reasoning that
[t]he newly discovered evidence would render a different result
probable on retrial of this case. The core of the disagreement is
whether the sex act occurred with consent or force. The victim told
her story and the appellant told his. The new evidence does more
than merely impeach [the complainant]-it tends to destroy her testi-
mony by raising grave doubts about her veracity and credibility. Her
credibility is central to the proof of the crime.
643
The facts and circumstances of Varona and Randle illus-
trate the overlap between the concepts of consent and credibil-
ity. The determination in each case that the disputed evidence
cast doubt on the complainant's credibility was not based on the
theory that prostitutes in general are more likely to lie under
oath. Rather, this evidence was admitted as relevant to the dis-
puted issue of consent, and the impeachment of the complain-
ant's credibility was a mere by-product of that substantive use.
That substantive use, however, is not permitted under the Cali-
fornia statute.64
This is not to say that the evidence in question was not rel-
evant to consent. Particularly with regard to Varona, one
might convincingly argue that the evidence qualified as "pat-
tern" evidence in that it was sufficiently distinctive and similar
in nature to the sexual conduct at issue to be relevant to con-
sent; its exclusion therefore would have denied the defendant
641. 1& at 290-91, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 747.
642. Id- at 292, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 748. Specifically, the defendant presented
the court with "twenty declarations" from seventeen persons "familiar" with
the complainant who would additionally testify that the complainant's earlier
account of the incident in question had contradicted her trial testimony and
that the complainant had a general reputation for dishonesty and had commit-
ted specific instances of theft. Id at 293, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 749.
643. Id at 293, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 749 (citing People v. Huskins, 245 Cal. App.
2d 859, 863, 54 Cal. Rptr. 253, 255 (1966)).
644. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103(b)(1) (West Supp. 1986).
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the opportunity to present an effective defense.645 The point to
be made, however, is that such a determination is not permissi-
ble under the California rape-shield statute. The statute pro-
hibits evidence that establishes consent unless the evidence
relates to sexual conduct between the complainant and the ac-
cused; it permits any and all evidence relevant to credibility,
but without giving any guidance as to what evidence qualifies
under that rubric.6 6 In Randle, for example, the court summa-
rily concluded that evidence of the complainant's previous sex-
ual conduct raised "grave doubts about her veracity and
credibility"' 7 without articulating the inferences that could
properly be drawn from the evidence. Indeed, it is not clear
whether the court was relying on the complainant's general
promiscuity as relevant to her credibility or upon specific facts
and circumstances that linked the past acts of prostitution to
the facts in the present case. In short, because the complain-
ant's credibility is almost always the central issue in a rape
case, the ambiguous credibility provision threatens to under-
mine the policies underlying the rape-shield statute; the sole
limitation on abuse is the mandatory screening procedure
which requires the trial court to carefully scrutinize evidence
offered pursuant to this provision.648
Criticism of California's credibility provision prompted two
other states to codify the California consent/credibility dichot-
645. See supra notes 340-410 and accompanying text.
646. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 1103(b)(4) (West Supp. 1986).
647. Randle, 130 Cal. App. at 293, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 749.
648. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 782 (West Supp. 1986). Other categories of sex-
ual conduct evidence not specifically excepted would be admissible under the
statute either because they are not directed to the issue of consent, or because
they are offered in rebuttal. Examples include evidence of specific instances
of sexual activity offered to prove an alternative source of the physical conse-
quences of rape, see supra text accompanying notes 265-301, and evidence of
past sexual conduct known to the accused offered to prove his reasonable be-
lief in consent. See supra text accompanying notes 411-434.
The Oklahoma rape-shield statute represents a variation on the California
provision in that it avoids any mention of credibility and simply prohibits sex-
ual conduct evidence offered to prove consent, unless the evidence involves
the complainant's sexual conduct with the defendant or is offered in rebuttal.
See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 750 (West Supp. 1985). Unfortunately, the fail-
ure to mention credibility does not eliminate the problems that result from
the consent/credibility dichotomy. Because the complainant's credibility is al-
most always in issue, the defendant can circumvent the prohibition on consent
evidence by claiming that the proof he seeks to elicit bears on credibility. The
risk of abuse is particularly high under this statute because it has no provision
for an in camera screening of the evidence.
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omy with a reverse twist.649 The Washington 650 and Nevada 651
rape-shield statutes prohibit sexual conduct evidence offered to
impeach credibility, but permit it on the issue of consent.652 As
to evidence offered to prove consent, both statutes simply re-
quire the court to determine relevancy after a hearing.653
Although these two statutes clearly succeed in plugging the
credibility loophole, they run the risk of underinclusiveness by
not providing for avenues of impeachment that may be consti-
tutionally compelled. In particular, impeachment by showing
bias or motive to fabricate is not excepted from the prohibition
of credibility evidence.654 Thus, in a case in which the defend-
ant does not claim consent, but instead denies altogether the
sexual act in question, he would be prevented from establishing
the complainant's motive to falsify the charge if that motive
was inextricably intertwined with evidence of her past sexual
history. In dicta, however, the Washington Supreme Court re-
cently construed the statute in a manner that would permit
such impeachment by looking behind the statutory language to
the legislative history.655 The court concluded that the prohibi-
649. See 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 3, § 5387, at 575.
650. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.020 (West Supp. 1986).
651. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 48.069, 50.090 (1983).
652. See i& § 48.069; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.020(2) (West Supp.
1986). The one exception to the ban on credibility evidence permits the de-
fendant to rebut evidence of sexual conduct introduced by the prosecution.
See NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.090 (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.020(4)
(West Supp. 1986).
653. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.069 (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.44.020(3) (West Supp. 1986). The Nevada statute requires the accused to
submit a written offer of proof of the relevancy of the evidence on the issue of
consent. If the court finds the offer to be sufficient, it must order a hearing
out of the presence of the jury. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.069 (1983). The pro-
cedural provisions of the Washington statute are similar, except that in Wash-
ington, the hearing must be closed to the public. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.44.020(3) (West Supp. 1986).
The standard of admissibility under the Nevada statute for consent evi-
dence is the same as for evidence generally. Exclusion is required if probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 48.069, 48.035 (1983). Under the Washington statute, however, the
court must balance probative value against prejudicial effect and must addi-
tionally determine whether "exclusion [of the evidence] would result in denial
of substantial justice to the defendant." WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.44.020(3)(d) (West Supp. 1986). For application of this standard, see State
v. Hudlow, 99 Wash. 2d 1, 12-18, 659 P.2d 514, 521-24 (1983) (holding that if evi-
dence is of minimal relevancy, it may be excluded because the state's interest
is compelling, regarding evidence of high probative value, no state interest can
be compelling enough to exclude it consistent with the sixth amendment).
654. See supra notes 302-339 and accompanying text.
655. State v. Hudlow, 99 Wash. 2d 1, 8-10, 659 P.2d 514, 517-20 (1983).
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tion of credibility evidence was designed merely to prohibit re-
liance on the inference that unchastity in and of itself impairs a
complainant's general credibility.656 Again, the ambiguity in-
herent in the term "credibility" creates confusion over the pre-
cise scope of the statutory prohibition.
Other modes of impeachment have been prohibited at the
trial court level because of the ban on credibility evidence
under this statutory scheme. In State v. Summit,65 7 a Nevada
statutory rape defendant claimed a denial of confrontation
based on the exclusion of sexual conduct evidence offered to
show knowledge of sexual matters on the part of the seemingly
innocent six-year-old complainant.658 The Supreme Court of
Nevada determined that such evidence was relevant to impeach
the complainant's credibility in that it could establish that she
had the means and ability to fabricate the charge. To uphold
the constitutionality of the statute, the court held that, despite
the prohibition on evidence offered to impeach the complain-
ant's credibility, the accused must be afforded the opportunity
to demonstrate to the trial judge that the probative value of
such credibility evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect in a
particular case.659
Although the credibility provisions of the Washington and
Nevada rape-shield statute are overly restrictive, their consent
provisions suffer from the opposite defect. Because there are
no substantive restrictions on evidence offered to prove con-
sent, there is always the risk, similar to that present in statutes
adopting the Texas and federal approaches, that judges will too
readily assume that prior consensual sexual activity makes con-
sent on the occasion in question more likely. Thus far, the
courts applying this statutory scheme, like the courts applying
the flexible Texas and federal approaches, have steered clear of
such sexist assumptions and have carefully scrutinized sexual
conduct evidence offered to prove consent.660 Nevertheless, the
656. Id.
657. 697 P.2d 1374 (Nev. 1985). See supra text accompanying notes 487-496;
supra note 490.
658. See Summit, 697 P.2d at 1375; see supra text accompanying notes 487-
496.
659. See Summit, 697 P.2d at 1377; see also State v. Carver, 37 Wash. App.
122, 122-25, 678 P.2d 842, 843-44 (1984). In Carver, the trial court had excluded
evidence offered under this theory because of the statutory bar on credibility
evidence. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the evidence was highly
relevant and that the statute did not apply to evidence of prior sexual abuse,
as opposed to misconduct. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 491.
660. See, e.g., State v. Hudlow, 99 Wash. 2d 1, 10-11, 659 P.2d 514, 520 (1983)
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lack of any restrictions on the exercise of discretion in this area
is a cause for some concern.
In sum, the California approach to rape-shield legislation
suffers from ambiguity regarding which uses of sexual conduct
evidence are intended to be prohibited. That different states
using this general approach have adopted reverse formulations
of the consent/credibility dichotomy demonstrates the ambigu-
ity and confusion that surrounds these terms.661 The California
approach correctly recognizes that the interests of the com-
plainant and the accused will be accommodated only by distin-
guishing between the invidious and benign uses of sexual
conduct evidence. As the case law illustrates, however, the cat-
egories of "consent" and "credibility" are not expressive of
either of these uses, because consent may be proven and credi-
bility may be attacked in either a benign or an invidious fash-
ion. The virtue of the legislation proposed in this Article is that
it clearly confines the prohibition of sexual conduct evidence to
the invidious uses and permits sexual conduct evidence offered
for any other purpose to be admitted in the discretion of the
trial court on a case-by-case basis. It thereby effectuates the
underlying legislative policies and at the same time clearly af-
fords the accused the opportunity to present relevant evidence
in his defense.
("Without other factors tending to indicate the past consensual sexual activity
is factually similar in some respects to the consensual sex act claimed by de-
fendant, it should not be considered relevant.") (discussed supra note 408);
State v. Mounsey, 31 Wash. App. 511, 521 n.2, 643 P.2d 892, 898 n.2 (1982) (up-
holding the trial court's exclusion of a psychologist's testimony that the com-
plainant "tended to drink heavily, then 'pick up' men in bars, but acted
remorsefully after having sexual relations," where the encounter in question
did not take place at a bar and there was no evidence of excessive drinking).
661. There is one final variation on the California approach. The Missis-
sippi rape-shield statute is included here because it distinguishes between
"consent" and "credibility" uses of sexual conduct evidence. The Mississippi
statute, however, grants the trial judge a degree of discretion more characteris-
tic of the Texas approach. See MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-68, 97-3-70 (Supp.
1985). Sexual conduct evidence offered to attack credibility is subject to in
camera screening to determine if it is "relevant and otherwise admissible." Id
§ 97-3-68(d). Evidence offered to prove consent is prohibited, but there are nu-
merous exceptions, for example, prior sex with the defendant, rebuttal evi-
dence, or physical consequences evidence, followed by a catch-basin provision.
Under the catch-basin provision, the court must determine, at an in camera
hearing, whether the consent evidence is "relevant and admissible in the inter-
ests of justice." Id § 97-3-70(5). Unlike the California statute, sexual conduct





Assume a code of evidence modeled on the Federal Rules
of Evidence. To flesh out the alternative legislative solution
proposed earlier in this Article, I would amend Rule 404,662
dealing with character and other crimes evidence, as follows:
Rule 404 Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct; Ex-
ceptions; Other Crimes; Sexual Conduct of Victim of Rape.
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's charac-
ter or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of prov-
ing that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion,
except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of
his character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to re-
but the same;
(2) Character of victim of a crime other than rape. Evi-
dence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime,
other than in a prosecution for rape, offered by an accused, or by
the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait
of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a
homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first
aggressor,
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a wit-
ness, as provided in rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, how-
ever, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, oppor-
tunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.
(c) Sexual conduct of victim of rape. In a prosecution for rape,
evidence that the victim has engaged in consensual sexual conduct
with persons other than the accused is not admissible to support the
inference that a person who has previously engaged in consensual sex-
ual conduct is for that reason more likely to consent to the sexual con-
duct with respect to which rape is alleged. Evidence of consensual
sexual conduct on the part of the victim may, however, be admissible
for other purposes.
(1) By way of illustration only, and not by way of limita-
tion, the following are examples of evidence admissible under
this section:
(A) Evidence of specij' instances of sexual conduct
tending to prove that a person other than the accused caused
the physical consequences of the rape alleged by the
prosecution;
(B) Evidence of sexual conduct tending to prove bias or
motive to fabricate on the part of the victim;
(C) Evidence of a pattern of sexual conduct so distinc-
tive and so closely resembling the accused's version of the al-
662. FED. R. EVID. 404.
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leged encounter with the victim as to tend to prove that the
victim consented to the act charged or behaved in such a
manner as to lead the accused reasonably to believe that the
victim consented;
(D) Evidence of prior sexual conduc known to the ac-
cused at the time of the act charged, tending to prove that the
accused reasonably believed that the victim was consenting to
the act charged,
(E) Evidence tending to rebut proof introduced by the
prosecution regarding the victim's sexual conduct;
(F) Evidence that the victim has made false allegations
of rape;
(2) Evidence of consensual sexual conduct on the part of the
victim may not be offered or referred to except pursuant to the
following procedure:
(A) The party seeking to offer such evidence shall make
a written motion accompanied by an affidavit stating an of-
fer of proof of the relevance of such evidence;
(B) If the court deems the offer of proof sufficient the
court shall order an in camera hearing to determine the ad-
missibility of the evidence;
(C) At the conclusion of the hearing, if the court finds
that the evidence is relevant to a material issue and that its
probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, the court shall make an order stating the
extent to which such evidence is admissible.
Rule 608, dealing with the character of witnesses as it bears
on credibility, would be amended by adding the following
subsection:
(c) Credibility of rape victim In a prosecution for rape, evi-
dence that the victim has engaged in consensual sexual conduct is not
admissible to support the inference that a person who has previously
engaged in consensual sexual conduct is for that reason less worthy of
belief as a witness.
The agenda of rape-law reformers in the mid-1970's was a
formidable one: to bring the legal rules governing rape cases in
line with those in all other criminal cases and thereby shift the
rape trial's focus from an inquiry into the complainant's moral
worth to a determination of the defendant's culpability. In en-
acting rape-shield legislation, reformers sought to remove sex-
ist assumptions from the fact-finding process, putting to rest
the common-law notions that unchaste women are more likely
to consent and to lie under oath than their virtuous sisters. In
embarking on this bold venture, the implications of legislative
change were not altogether clear. The impulse to strip trial
judges of the discretion to determine the relevancy of sexual
conduct evidence on a case-by-case basis was understandable in
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light of the agenda at hand. Experience under the Michigan ap-
proach to rape-shield legislation teaches that this model is un-
workable in practice; courts continue to circumvent the
restrictions on their discretionary powers to accommodate the
competing claims of rape defendants to introduce relevant sex-
ual conduct evidence. It is further evident, however, that the
force and impact of rape-law reform is such that courts operat-
ing under more discretionary standards are dealing with sexual
conduct evidence in a manner consistent with the policies un-
derlying the legislation. This transformation in judicial atti-
tudes, brought about by reform legislation, ironically makes
possible a less radical approach, one that will preserve the gains
of the past decade but bring about a more satisfying resolution
of the various interests at stake.
The alternative legislative solution proposed in this Article
represents such an approach. Unlike the overly restrictive and
constitutionally suspect Michigan approach, it is not limited in
applicability to specific defense theories. Unlike the Texas ap-
proach, it cannot easily be manipulated by judges to penalize
"undeserving" complainants. Unlike the federal approach, it
does not require courts to grapple with constitutional issues and
ever-changing notions of equity. Finally, unlike the California
approach, it is unambiguous and does not create the danger that
admissible evidence can be prohibited merely by attaching to it
a different label. By prohibiting only those uses of evidence
that the rape-shield laws were designed to prevent, the pro-
posed solution is a functional and workable approach that can






Rape-Shield Statutes Listed By Approach
A. MICHIGAN APPROACH:
Alabama: ALA. CODE § 12-21-203 (Supp. 1985)
Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2)-(3)(West Supp.
1985)
Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3 (1982)
Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-7 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1985)
Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-4 (Burns 1985)
Kentucky: Ky. REV. STAT. § 510.145 (1985)
Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:498 (West 1981)
Maine: ME. R. EVID. 412
Maryland: MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461A (1982)
Massachusetts: MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 21B (Law. Co-
op. 1985)
Michigan: MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 750.520j (West Supp.
1985)
Minnesota: MINN. R. EVID. 404(c)
Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.015 (Vernon Supp. 1986)
Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511(4) (1985)
Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-321 (Supp. 1984)
New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:6 (Supp.
1983)
North Carolina: N.C.R. EviD. 412
Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(D) (Page Supp.
1984)
Pennsylvania: 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3104 (Purdon
1983)
South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-659.1 (Law. Co-op.
1985)
Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-17-119 (1982)
Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3255 (Supp. 1985)
Virginia: VA. CODE § 18.2-67.7 (1982)
West Virginia: W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-11 (1984)






Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045 (Supp. 1985)
Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1810.1-.4 (1977 & Supp.
1985)
Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-407 (1978)
Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 18-6105 (1979)
Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3525 (Supp. 1984)
New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.1-.3 (West
Supp. 1985)
New Mexico: N.M.R. EVID. 413
Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-37-13 (1981)
South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 23A-22-15
(1979)
Texas: TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.065 (Vernon Supp.
1986)
Wyoming: WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-312 (1983)
C. FEDERAL APPROACH:
Federal: FED. R. EviD. 412
Military: MiL. R. EviD. 412
Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86f (West 1985)
Hawaii: HAWAH R. EVID. 412
Iowa: IOWA R. EvID. 412
New York: N.Y. CRim. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney
1981)
Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.210 (1984)
D. CALIFORNIA APPROACH:
California: CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 782, 1103(b) (West Supp.
1986)
Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 3508, 3509 (1979)
Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-68, 97-3-70 (Supp.
1985)
Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 48.069, 50.090 (1983)
North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 12.1-20-14 to -15
(1985)
Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 750 (West Supp.
1985)
Washington: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.020 (West
Supp. 1986)
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Table 2
Statutory Exceptions Under the Michigan
Approach-
Permissible Uses of Sexual
Conduct Evidence
Physical
With the Consequences Bias/Motive
States Accused Evidence to Fabricate
ALABAMA X
ALA. CODE § 12-21-203 (Supp. 1985)
FLORIDA X X
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2)-(3) Semen, pregnancy,
(West Supp. 1985) injury, disease
GEORGIA X
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3 (1982)
ILLINOIS X
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-7
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985)
INDIANA X X
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-4 All physical
(Buns 1985) consequences
KENTUCKY X
KY. REV. STAT. § 510.145
(1985)
LOUISIANA X
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:498
(West 1981)
MAINE X X
MF. R. EVID. 412 Only on consent Semen, injury
MARYLAND X X X
M . ANN. CODE art 27, § 461A (1982) Semen, pregnancy,
disease, trauma
MASSACHUSETTS X X
MA. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 21B All physical
(Law. Co-op. 1985) consequences
MICHIGAN X X
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j Semen, pregnancy,
(West Supp. 1985) disease
MINNESOTA X X
MINN. R. EVrD. 404(c) Only on consent Semen, pregnancy,
disease
MISSOURI X X
MO. ANN. STAT. § 491.015 Only on consent Semen, pregnancy,
(Vernon Supp. 1986) disease
MONTANA X X
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511(4) Semen, pregnancy,
(1985) disease
NEBRASKA X X
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-321 Only on consent All physical
(Supp. 1984) and must be consequences
pattern
NEW HAMPSHIRE X
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Table 2 (cont.)
Statutory Exceptions Under the Michigan
Approach-
Permissible Uses of Sexual
Conduct Evidence
Physical
With the Consequences Bias/Motive
States Accused Evidence to Fabricate
NORTH CAROLINA X X
N.C.&. EvID. 412 All physical
consequences
OHIO X X
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(D) Semen, pregnancy,
(Page Supp. 1984) disease
PENNSYLVANIA X
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3104 Only on consent
(Purdon 1983)
SOUTH CAROLINA X X
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-659.1 Semen, pregnancy,
(Law. Co-op. 1985) disease
TENNESSEE X
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-17-119 (1982)
VERMONT X x
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3255 Semen, pregnancy,
(Supp. 1985) disease
VIRGINIA X X X
VA. CODE § 18.2-67.7 (1982) Only on consent Semen, pregnancy,
disease, injury
WEST VIRGINIA X
W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-11 (1984) Only on consent
WISCONSIN X
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Table 3
Procedural Provisions of the Texas Approach
Condition Precedent Procedure for Criteria
States to Offering Determination of for
of Evidence Admissibility Admissibility
ALASKA "Application" anytime In camera hearing Relevant; probative value
ALASKA STAT. before or during trial outweighs possibility of
§ 12.45.045(a)-(b) (Supp. prejudicial effect, of confusion
1985) of issues, or of unwarranted
invasion of privacy; rebuttable
presumption of inadmissibility
if sexual activity occurred
more than one year before
date of offense
ARKANSAS Written motion and In camera hearing Probative value outweighs
ARK. STAT. ANN. offer of proof, anytime (written record for prejudicial effect
§ 41-1810.2 (1977 & Supp. prior to defense interlocutory appeal
1985) resting by state)
COLORADO** Written motion and In camera hearing Relevancy
COLO. REV. STAT. offer of proof 30 days
§ 18-3-407(2)(a)-(c) (1978) before trial (unless
good cause shown)
IDAHO "Application" before Hearing out of Relevancy
IDAHO CODE or during trial presence of jury
§ 18-6105 (1979)
KANSAS Written motion and In camera hearing Relevant and not otherwise
KAN. STAT. ANN. offer of proof 7 days inadmissible
§ 21-3525 (Supp. 1984) before trial (unless
waived by court)
NEW JERSEY "Application" anytime In camera hearing Relevant; probative value
N.J. STAT. ANN. before or during trial outweighs possibility of
§ 2A.84A-32.1-.2 (West prejudicial effect, of confusion
Supp. 1985) of issues, or of unwarranted
invasion of privacy; rebuttable
presumption of inadmissibility
if sexual activity occurred
more than one year before
date of offense
NEW MEXICO Written motion prior In camera hearing Probative value outweighs
N.M.R. EVD. 413 to trial (unless good prejudicial effect
cause)
RHODE ISLAND* "Notice" and offer of In camera hearing Court rules on admissibility
RI. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13 proof
(1981)
SOUTH DAKOTA "[P]roposes to offer In camera hearing Relevancy
S.D. CODIFIED LAwS ANN. evidence"
§ 23A-22-15 (1979)
TEXAS "[I]nform the court In camera hearing Probative value outweighs
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. out of the hearing of prejudicial effect
§ 22.065(a)-(b) (Vernon the jury prior to
Supp. 1986) asking such question"
WYOMING* Written motion and In camera hearing Probative value substantially
WYO. STAT. ANN. offer of proof ten days outweighs prejudicial effect
§ 6-2-312(a) (1983) before trial
Statutes do not apply to evidence of sexual conduct with the accused
Statute does not apply to evidence of sexual conduct with the accused and physical consequences evidence
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Table 4
Procedural Provisions and Statutory Exceptions




Written Offer of Absolutely With the Physical
Jurisdiction Motion Proof Hearing Prohibited Accused Consequences
FEDERAL X X X X X X
FED. R. EVID. 412 15 days Written In Only on Semen or
before trial camera consent injury
(unless good
cause)
MILITARY '"Notice" X X X X X
MIL. R. EvID. 412 May be in Only on Semen or
camera consent injury
CONNECTICUT X X X X X
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. Optional May be in Only on Semen,
§ 54-86f (West 1985) camera consent disease,
pregnancy or
injury
HAWAII X X X X X X
HAWAII R. EVID. 412 15 days In Only on Semen or
before trial camera consent injury
(unless good
cause)
IOWA X X X X X X
IOWA R. EVID. 412 15 days Written In Only on Semen or
before trial camera consent injury
(unless good
cause)
NEW YORK X X X X
N.Y. CRit PR= LAW Only for Only for Semen,
§ 60.42 (McKinney 1981) evidence evidence disease, or
under under pregnancy
catch-all catch-all
OREGON X X X X X
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 15 days Written In To rebut or
§ 40.210 (1984) before trial camera explain





Conviction for Standard of Standard for Judge Determines
Bias Prostitution Admissibility in Admissibility Question of
or Rebuttal Within 3 Years Catch-all for Excepted Conditional
Motive Evidence of Alleged Rape Provision Evidence Relevancy










Constitutionally Probative value X
required outweighs
prejudice
Constitutionally Probative value X
required outweighs
prejudice
X X Relevant and No standard
admissible in enunciated
the interests of ("determined
justice by the court')
X Constitutionally Probative value X
required outweighs
prejudice
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:763
Table 5
Prohibited Uses of Sexual Conduct Evidence Under
the California Approach
To Attack Rebuttal Evidence
State To Prove Consent Complainants Credibility
CALIFORNIA X
CAL. EVID. CODE Except conduct with
§§ 782, 1103(b) (West Supp. the accused
1986)
DELAWARE X
DEL. CODE ANN. Except conduct with
tit. -1, §§ 3508, 3509 (1979) the accused
MISSISSIPPI X
Ms. CODE ANN. Except conduct with






§§ 48.069, 50.090 (1983)
NORTH DAKOTA X
NJ). CENT. CODE ANN. Except conduct with
§§ 12.1-20-14 to -15 (1985) the accused
OKLAHOMA X
OKLA. STAT. ANN. Except conduct with
tit 22, § 750 (West Supp. the accused
1985)
WASHINGTON X
WAsH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.44.020 (West Supp.
1986)
